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 The American approach to legal hermeneutics emerged from the covenant theology 
of the Puritans. American civil religion understands the Constitution to be based in natural 
laws: a secularized conception of God-given rights. To change the text would collapse the 
epistemological framework of the nation.  When a nation sees its constitution as a sacred 
text, then the answer to contemporary problems cannot be to change that text; rather, it 
must be to return to the text with an even more fundamentalist hermeneutic. Both gun rights 
advocate Charlton Heston, and gun control advocate Barack Obama, argued their cases 
using a fundamentalist hermeneutic, drawing on American civil religious rhetoric.  
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INTRODUCTION: HERMENEUTIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
 
…[A]n axiom of African American preaching is that a text without a context is a 
pretext. And the way the Second Amendment is most regularly cited is without 
context… 
          Wilda Gafney (Brite Divinity School) and John Pahl (Berkley Law) 
 
The Black Panthers Create a White Monster 
            On May 2nd, 1967, The Black Panther Party for Self Defense took an armed 
delegation to the California state legislature. Bobby Seal, then Chairman of the Black 
Panthers, read a press release stating that the legislature intended to take away the 
people’s — particularly black people’s — constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms. 
Up to this point, the Second Amendment had been largely ignored by lawyers, legal 
scholars, and the American people. Even American Rifleman, the magazine of the 
National Rifle Association, did not mention the Second Amendment until the late 1960s 
(Abumrad, 2018).  Yet, in the fifty years since Bobby Seal made his statement, the 
Second Amendment has gone from being largely ignored to being the topic of everything 
from presidential debates to country western songs.             
 The purpose of this dissertation is not to advocate for or against gun control laws. 
It is not even to decide whether an individualist or collectivist interpretation of the 
Second Amendment best matches the Framers’ original intent; rather, I seek to 
understand how the Second Amendment became so hallowed that even a group as radical 
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as the Black Panthers – or as liberal as the Democratic Party, or as populist as the NRA -- 
could appeal to it to legitimate their interests.  
 In this dissertation, I argue that the answers to this question lie in the American 
impulse to what I term the fundamentalist hermeneutic: a devotion to the original text. I 
argue that this fundamentalist hermeneutic can be traced back to the Puritan covenant 
theology. This covenant theology was the theological and political philosophy of the 
earliest European settlers in what is now the United State of America. It remains the 
epistemological foundation of the nation.  In this study, I review this history and 
demonstrate how both gun rights and gun control advocates have continually applied this 
fundamentalist hermeneutic and employed sacred rhetoric in their attempts to sway 
public opinion and mobilize individuals around the issue of gun control in the USA. 
The Fundamentalist Hermeneutic 
One cannot theorize about the meaning of a legal document -- whether it be a 
statute, constitution, or judicial opinion-without at least implicitly invoking a 
theory of interpretation, for interpretation precedes and makes possible the 
recognition of meaning in a written work. (Mootz, 1988, p. 526) 
 
 Hermes. The messenger of the gods. With his winged sandals he moves swiftly 
and easily between the world of mortals and Mount Olympus, translating the words and 
deeds of the gods into a form that humans can understand. Hermes is the protector of not 
just human heralds and orators, but also of tricksters and thieves; the line between 
interpretation and deception is slim. We all know that it is easy to -- intentionally or 
unintentionally -- interpret a text in a manner that would disgust its author.  As a 
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language translator myself, I have learned that when this is unintentional, it is often the 
result of a lack of awareness of the context of the original text, and when it is intentional, 
it is almost always ideological.  
  In antiquity, Greece established practices for the interpretation of “oracles, 
dreams, myths, philosophical and poetical works, but also laws and contracts” 
(Mantzavinos, 2020). The contemporary Greek philosopher of the social science 
Mantzavinos argues that the most “remarkable” of these practices was allegoresis: 
which can be translated as meaning simply “saying something different”.  As opposed 
to aiming for a literal interpretation, this approach to hermeneutics aimed at a “deeper 
meaning” of texts as diverse as the Delphic oracle’s pronouncements, to cannon law, 
to Homeric epics. Citing the classicist Johnathon Tate’s seminal 1934 essay “On the 
History of Allegorism,” Mantzavinos states that this approach was taken when 
authoritative texts, “contained claims and statements that seemed theologically and 
morally inappropriate or false”. Allegory was used as an interpretive tool when a 
literal interpretation went against contemporary understandings of morality and 
theology.  
 Early references to this allegorical approach to hermeneutics hint at the fact that 
in the western tradition, hermeneutics has inextricably been tied to the occult and 
specifically to the interpretation of religious texts. It is not merely coincidence that 
Schleiermacher is considered the father of modern theology and the father of modern 
hermeneutics: the fields diverge but they come from the same path.  While the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines hermeneutics broadly as “the methodology of 
interpretation” (Mantzavinos, 2020), outside of academia, the very word hermeneutics 
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itself refers to biblical hermeneutics. The first sentence of the entry on hermeneutics in 
the familiar Encyclopedia Britannica is simply “Hermeneutics [is] the study of the 
general principles of biblical interpretation.” It goes on to note that “For both Jews and 
Christians throughout their histories, the primary purpose of hermeneutics, and of the 
exegetical methods employed in interpretation, has been to discover the truths and values 
of the Bible” (“Hermeneutics: Definition, History, Types, & Facts,” n.d.).   
 Scholars have defined four major schools of biblical hermeneutics of varying 
popularity at various times and places in the history of the Christian church: literal, 
allegorical, moral, and anagogical. Though Mantzavinos points out how, since antiquity, 
the allegorical tradition of hermeneutics explicitly is linked to the interpretation of 
religious texts, the Puritans -- the group that began the colonial religious and legal 
traditions in what would become the USA -- believed in the literal approach to Biblical 
hermeneutics. The Puritans did not believe that allegory could be used when the Bible did 
fit modern conceptions of morality, theology, or reality. Instead, morality, theology, and 
reality must be re-shaped according to the Bible.  
 In the USA, a nation deeply rooted in the faith of its founders, the popular 
understanding of hermeneutics remains an attempt to discover Truth -- with a capital T.  
The American civil religion takes this from the Biblical hermeneutic tradition. The 
literalist hermeneutic which was the hermeneutic approach to both legal and religious 
texts for priests, judges, and lay people in the earliest colonies of what is today the USA 
and remains a powerful force in American religion, politics, law and society.  
 This literal approach pays attention to the "plain meaning", grammar, and context 
of the text. (“Hermeneutics: Definition, History, Types, & Facts,” n.d.) The first of the 
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church fathers associated with this tradition is St. Jerome, a Latin convert to Christianity 
who was responsible for the retranslation of the Latin New Testament from Greek 
manuscripts. Later, and perhaps most influentially, Thomas Aquinas (Hermeneutics, n.d.) 
came to be the standard-bearer of this literal approach. Most importantly for this essay, 
Martin Luther and John Calvin fiercely defended this literalist interpretation (and accused 
anyone who did not agree of being heretics and apostates).  
 Even in the literal hermeneutic tradition of Jerome and Aquinas,  attention is paid 
to grammar and context: the situation in which the text was written is worth 
understanding. The issue of context is where the debates within this literal tradition itself 
arise. In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I discuss how the Protestant tenet of Sola Scriptura 
(that the scriptures are the only infallible source of authority) leads to an even more 
radical literalist tradition which sees the text itself as the only reliable authority. To these 
proto-Fundamentalists, even histories of biblical times cannot be relied on to further 
understanding of the Bible: the fundamentalist biblical hermeneutic tradition demands 
that the text be interpreted in itself, divorced of context.   
 I use the term hermeneutic fundamentalist to indicate a near total disregard for 
any other text which might give clues to the authorial context of writing1. Today, those 
who are called fundamentalist Christians regard biblical stories such as the story Noah's 
Ark to be the historical truth. They do not take into account the context of the creation of 
the story -- i.e., that legends of great floods were common in the Middle East at the time, 
and that the story of Noah's ark arose out of this tradition.  When I refer to contemporary 
                                                   
1 Here, one could draw connections to contemporary literary theory and others who dismiss authorial intent 
as irrelevant. However, fundamentalist interpreters may think that authorial intent is important, but they 
certainly believe that one cannot rely on texts outside of the Bible in order to discover authorial intent.  
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biblical hermeneutic fundamentalists, I mean the people who believe that the story of 
Noah's ark is an accurate historical account of a man who literally built an actual boat 
large enough to take a breeding pair of every animal species that existed in the world at 
that time2.  
 In this dissertation, I argue that this hermeneutic fundamentalism -- a radical 
subset of the literalist hermeneutic tradition believing in a devotion to the text itself 
outside of context -- is evident in all of American hermeneutics, most importantly, in the 
interpretation of legal texts. In “Chapter 4: American Covenant”, I go into greater detail 
as to why the Puritans came to take this hermeneutic approach based in their covenant 
theology and how it was historically passed down to later generations. I explain how 
hermeneutic fundamentalism came to be the foundation of the American social contract 
itself: America exists as it does today because of the hermeneutic fundamentalist 
approach to legal hermeneutics, particularly, to the Constitution.  We cannot understand 
the contemporary gun control/ gun rights debate if we do not understand the importance 
of hermeneutic fundamentalism to the fabric of American society. 
Legal hermeneutics 
 Though many of the world’s religions are based on a rich mix of oral traditions, 
rituals, and perhaps multiple written text, Judeo-Christian-Islamic monotheism is set 
apart from other world religions in its stress on the written cannon alone.  Though the 
semi-oral traditions of the Hadith, the Talmud, and stories of the lives of Church 
                                                   
2 I understand that it is difficult for many of us in academia to accept that many actually take this view of 
the Bible and think that they are perhaps misrepresenting their own beliefs for political power, economic 
gain, or simply consistency. However, to use Joshua Gunn's (2018) analogy, in this dissertation I abide by 
the Wizard of Oz rule: I do not “pay attention to the man [or woman] behind the curtain” (p. 5).   Instead, I 
trust that the subjects of my study believe what they claim to believe.  
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patriarchs may slip into some sects on this great monotheistic tradition, the Christian 
Protestant tradition actively rejects these.  As I will detail in the chapter American 
Covenant, the Bible is the sole source of authority for the Protestant sect. So, too, with 
the legal tradition of the USA, the largest Protestant country in the world. Unlike other 
former British colonies such as Canada which incorporate aspects of the civil code 
tradition (dating back to Byzantium and then revived by Napoleon), the legal system of 
the United States is based on stare decisis: written law and legal precedent. American 
legal hermeneutics is much more akin to a literalist biblical hermeneutics than it is to 
Gadamerian hermeneutics and other philosophical hermeneutics which search for 
meaning.  
 Though contemporary scholars of legal hermeneutics, such as Dr. Tina Botts, ask 
the following: “are the criteria we have used in the past to ascertain the meaning of a 
given law the criteria we should still use today?” and “on what basis can one meaning of 
a given law be justifiably prioritized over another?”, (Botts, n.d.) These are not the 
questions that American judges ask.  The task of the US judge is not to ask such 
questions, but simply to review legal precedent. The American legal system prides itself 
on the notion that Lady Justice is blind, she does not take context into account, she gives 
out objective rulings based on precedent.  
 As the American critical legal theorist Peter Goodrich explains, though we might 
trace the intellectual lineage of legal hermeneutics back to the interpretations of classical 
codifications of Greece, “legal hermeneutics really only developed with the growth and 
medieval reception of Roman law” (Goodrich, 2016).  As Goodrich notes, the task of 
these medieval hermeneuticians was to apply Roman law to “circumstances far removed 
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in time and space from the original contexts of the written law”.  The American legal 
hermeneutic tradition is a descendent of this medieval tradition of interpreting the written 
words of men from a faraway time.   
 Goodrich (2016) notes that in Europe during the Renaissance era humanism 
entered the scholarly and legal conversations regarding hermeneutics.  He argues that “in 
place of the glossators’ slavish observance of textual letter and rule, humanism sought to 
comprehend the law in terms of the context of its historical enunciation” (emphasis 
added). In the late 16th and early 17th century, English philosophers and jurists such as 
Francis Bacon began to expand their understanding of legal hermeneutics to include an 
understanding of the importance of context. Though, as Goodrich notes, legal 
hermeneutics in the old world remained predicated on “earlier theological and juristic 
conceptions of construction and interpretation”,  there was a move beyond biblical 
literalist hermeneutic models towards “more secular concerns” of  “the place of language 
and meaning within the efflorescence of legislation and administrative regulation that 
accompanied the growth of the modern industrial state” (Goodrich, 2016). 
 However, this trend toward incorporating humanist insights into hermeneutics 
during the Renaissance in England and the Continent was missed by the Puritans who 
rejected the importance of context.  The subset of the Puritans who sought to completely 
escape the English (the English Separatist Puritans who would become the American 
Pilgrims) stuck to their insistence on interpreting the text in itself.  In Chapter Two and 
Four of this dissertation, I discuss how American civil religion further entrenched this 
distain of the humanist insistence on the importance of context.  
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The term civil religion refers to the symbolic system of values, beliefs, heroes, 
icons and rituals of the contemporary nation-state. Robert Bella (1967) stressed the 
unifying character of civil religion. He argued that civil religion has been used to reject 
non-conformist ideas and groups thereby uniting the populous.  However, Bellah’s 
Durkheimian assumption that religion – including civil religion – is always integrative is 
by no means unchallenged.  The tension between religion and society leads us to question 
if all religion, including civil religion, is necessarily a uniting force. 
 As the American legal scholar John McNamara (2017) writes, quibbles over 
“semantic precision” are “endemic” in Constitutional law all over the globe; 
however, what is different in the United States is that Constitutional law “is perceived 
and acknowledged as a political inheritance from the all-knowing, near infallible 
composers” (para. 8). Here, we see the connection between civil religion and the 
fundamentalist hermeneutic. Civil religion, which I explain in detail in Chapter 2, often 
gives national founders the status of deities.  This can come about organically or as 
imposed by nationalist lawmakers. Though scholars of American legal hermeneutics 
such as Francis  Mootz III argue that there is “merit" in the suggestion that legal 
hermeneutics  “may be as "unscientific" and "subjective" as literary criticism” (Mootz, 
1988, p. 526), this is not the opinion of those who follow the fundamentalist hermeneutic. 
Even such a suggestion is blasphemous. For the jurist who believes wholeheartedly in the 
American civil religion (which I detail in part 2 of Chapter 2) there is no room for art to 
enter into legal interpretation: like their view of the Bible itself, the words of the 
Constitution were divinely inspired and written by civil religious saints, meaning that 
there is no need to speculate on context. There is no room for speculating on whether the 
 10 
Founding Fathers had something wrong, or even if the law should be changed given new 
circumstances; rather, like the Evangelical Protestants’ fundamentalist interpretation of 
the Bible, many American justices, politicians, law-makers, and ordinary people take a 
fundamentalist hermeneutic approach to the Constitution.  Though they may not use a 
term such as hermeneutic fundamentalists, scholars note that there is a dominant belief in 
America that a legal text has one clear and precise meaning that is conveyed “on its 
face,” rather than several “competing” meanings” (Mootz, 1988, p. 527). Those who 
follow an extreme literalist hermeneutic, which I call the fundamentalist hermeneutic, 
lack the imagination to see that there may be more than one possible interpretation of a 
text. McNamara refers to this obsessive attention to the founders’ intentions as 
“approaching a type of civil devotion to the heroic initiators of the nation”.  Just like the 
fundamentalist Christian preachers who claim the world is 6000 years old, many 
Americans apply a fundamentalist hermeneutic to their sacred documents civil religious 
documents including the Constitution and its amendments.  
            Though the Second Amendment is often discussed as part of the cannon of 
American civil religion, there has been little to no academic research into how the Second 
Amendment became a part of the cannon of American civil religion and how it 
remains in this place despite the divisiveness of the issue of gun control.  This 
dissertation explores how this secular document became a sacred document which must 
be approached with a fundamentalist hermeneutic. In addition, I show how both gun 
rights and gun control advocates have used civil religious rhetoric to attempt to change 
public opinion of the Second Amendment in America while still remaining within the 
confines of the fundamentalist hermeneutic.  
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Antonin and Me:  
A Roadmap to this Study and Why I Agree with Scalia 
            I begin this dissertation with a philosophical review of the concept of civil 
religion.  In the earliest civilizations, there was no separation between religion and 
politics: the pharaohs were gods and the emperors sat on heavenly thrones. It is only with 
the separation of the political and the religious spheres that the idea of civil religion 
comes about. Western political theorists from Plato on have noted religion’s ability to 
foster an “imagined community” as Benedict Anderson (1991) might say. The Romans 
incorporated aspects of their subjugated people’s regional religions into their own 
pantheistic civic religion to build their empire — giving a feeling of unity. Political 
theorists from Machiavelli to Hobbes stressed the utility of a civil religion to control the 
masses without the use of force. In this section, I pay particular attention to Rousseau’s 
discussion of civil religion and the nation state as this will be important in my later 
chapter on Obama’s use of civil religious rhetoric.  I finish this section by moving from 
the political philosophers to the sociologists, discussing Durkheim’s functional view of 
religion.    
            In the second part of this chapter, I continue the sociological thread but focus on 
civil religion in the USA.  I begin by discussing Alexis De Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America (1954) , then move on to Robert N. Bellah’s Civil Religion in America. Though I 
review other scholars’ views on American civil religion, it is undoubtedly the work of 
Robert Nealy Bellah which has been most influential for subsequent scholars of 
American civil religion, as well as this dissertation. Bellah has been referred to as “the 
father of American civil religion” (Kazin, 2013).  He inspired a generation of scholars, 
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from the philosopher Jurgen Habermas3, to sociologists like Philip Gorski and Robert 
Wuthnow, to the theologian Marc Andrus. Even politicians such as Bill Clinton note his 
influence on their own understanding of the USA (Giesen & Suber, 2005, p. 49).   
 Of all the definitions of civil religion I reviewed while writing this dissertation, I 
find Bellah’s definition the most useful: Bellah defines civil religion as the manner in 
which people interpret “historical experience in the light of transcendent reality” (1967, 
p. 3).  This definition gives us a new lens for viewing both civil religion which is 
imposed by the government, and more organic civil religion which emerges from the 
people. Contemplating how the mundane is given transcendental importance helps us 
better understand American practices --  from lighting up a Christmas tree to referring to 
French fried potatoes as “freedom fries”.  The definition also allows us to critically 
examine practices which verge on religious nationalism such as putting flags on veterans’ 
graves, and expelling students who kneel during the national anthem.  
 Most importantly for this dissertation, this definition helps us separate signal from 
noise in the debate over gun control.  How do gun rights and gun control advocates 
imbue their rhetoric with “transcendental significance”? Looking through Bellah’s lens, it 
became clear to me that rhetors on both sides of the gun control debate attempt to 
associate their arguments with something that is already sacred, most notably, the Bill of 
Rights, part of the sacred cannon of American civil religion.  As Morgan Marietta 
explains (2012), sacred rhetoric has no need for such information because sacred rhetoric 
pushes for a quantum, not qualified, leap. Once we approach the rhetoric of the gun 
control debate with the understanding that rhetors are attempting to make the issue into 
                                                   
3 The influence was mutual as Bellah also cited Habermas’s work (Sheedy, 2019) 
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one of transcendental rather than mundane reality, we understand the appeal to the 
Second Amendment, and rhetors claim on the ‘only’ possible interpretation of the saints 
words.  
            In the third chapter, I attempt to put the Second Amendment into the context of 
American civil religion. I begin with a brief history of the right to bear arms in the 
17th century English Bill of Rights, focusing on its guarantee of the right of protestant 
militias to bear arms. I then discuss early gun laws in the thirteen colonies, and the 
passing of the Second Amendment. I focus on the history of the colonial militias as this is 
crucial to understanding the Framer’s intent in granting the right to bear arms.   
            I then discuss the hermeneutic traditions associated with the interpretation of the 
Second Amendment such as the constitutional originalist tradition, the Living 
Constitution tradition, the individual rights hermeneutic, and the collective rights 
hermeneutic. I believe it is crucial for us to realize that all interpretations of legal 
documents come from not just a political weltanschauung, but a particular understanding 
of hermeneutics itself. All of these traditions embrace a fundamentalist hermeneutic.  
 The fundamentalist hermeneutic never progressed beyond the Schleiermacherian 
(Schleiermacher, 1978) attempt to find authorial intent.  For Schleiermacher the aim of 
hermeneutics is to discover the author’s aim through the “divinatory technique” of 
examining why specific words and phrases were used.  With the divinatory technique, the 
interpreter enters into the mind of the author.  As Schleiermacher writes: “By leading the 
interpreter to transform himself, so to speak, into the author, the divinatory method seeks 
to gain an immediate comprehension of the author as an individual” (p. 150).  
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 As I will explain in Chapter 3, the individualist interpretation of the Second 
Amendment believes that we must merely enter a hermeneutic circle: to understand the 
Second Amendment, we must look at the entire Bill of Rights. They profess that the rest 
of the rights granted in the Bill of Rights (i.e. the right to free speech, the right to a 
speedy trial) are individual rights; therefore, the right to bear arms is a collective right.  
 Yet, Schleiermacher also believed that one should attempt to become familiar 
with the biographical and historical details of the context of the author.  As I will discuss 
in Chapter 3, both those who follow the individualist and collectivist understandings of 
the 2nd amendment believe that we must understand that they have the one true 
understanding of the context of the Second Amendment. The collectivists see that, at the 
time of writing, the militias defended the nation through their collective right to bear 
arms.  
            When I began this study, I expected to find that the collective rights interpretation 
of the Second Amendment was closest to that which the Founding Fathers of the USA 
intended.  The collective rights interpretation of the Second Amendment is the 
interpretation that was set in legal precedent arguably until 2010 when Justice Anton 
Scalia’s decision ruled in favour of an individualist interpretation in the case of DC v 
Heller. This is to say, until 2010, most cases tried in the US Supreme Court assumed that 
the right to bear arms guaranteed in the Second Amendment referred to organizations like 
state militias (including slave patrols) instead of individuals. Through the historical 
research I conducted in writing chapter three, I have come to believe that the Founding 
Fathers granted the collective right to bear arms to the militias in order to gain and 
maintain independence from the British Empire. More importantly, I have come to see 
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that the Founding Fathers granted the individual right to bear arms to all white settlers in 
order to maintain the institution of slavery and to further appropriate land from 
indigenous peoples.  Both the collective and the individual right to bear arms were crucial 
in the capitalist imperialist project of the United States of America. 
            In 1970, the Pulitzer-prize winning American historian and public intellectual 
Richard Hofstadter coined the term “gun culture” (1970).  In his article “America as a 
Gun Culture”, Hofstadter uses the term to describe the American embrace and celebration 
of weapons. He argued that this gun culture comes complete with its own mythical 
history, rituals such as rites of passage, and codes of ethics.  Like other liberal historians 
of the day, Hofstadter thinks that the Second Amendment was ‘meant’ to be a collective 
instead of individual right. He writes, “the Second Amendment was, in effect, a promise 
that Congress would not be able to bar the states from doing whatever was necessary to 
maintain well-regulated militias” (para. 17).  
            However, the critical historian Dunbar-Ortiz (2018, p. 17) notes that what liberal 
historians like Hofstadter propose is that the one collective right was somehow slipped 
into the Bill of Individual Rights.  In the draft of the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which 
predates the federal Constitution, Thomas Jefferson wrote “No man shall ever be 
debarred the use of arms”.  Respectable liberal historians such as Hofstadter gloss over 
this obvious statement of an individual right.  But the more radical historian Dunbar-Ortiz 
writes: 
Killing, looting, burning, raping and terrorizing Indians were traditions in each of 
the colonies long before the Constitutional Convention. ‘Militias,’ as in 
government-controlled units, were institutionalized by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 
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15 of the US Constitution, and were used to officially invade and occupy Native 
land.  But the Second Amendment (like the other ten amendments) enshrined 
an individual right.  The Second Amendment’s language specifically 
gave individuals and families the right to form volunteer militias to attack Indians 
and take their land” (emphasis added, p. 18). 
For scholars such as Dunbar-Ortiz, “The violent appropriation of Native land by white 
settlers was seen as an individual right in the Second Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, second only to freedom of speech”. (p. 35) 
            It is not surprising that we are taught a romanticized version of the founding of 
the USA, not just in the USA. The founders of all nations become heroes and their lives 
are sanitized. But the white-washing of American history is particularly disturbing as the 
Founding Fathers of the USA are held up as heroes by anti-colonialist, anti-monarchist 
movements around the world. Yet, what those American colonists really considered 
oppressive, the thing they fought to overthrow, was not the British monarchy but the 
British restrictions on appropriating indigenous land. Though even non-Americans learn 
about the Boston Tea Party and the colonists cheer of “taxation without representation is 
tyranny”, we rarely discuss what these taxes were paying for (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 
31).  The taxes on the colonies were collected in order to arm, feed, and house British 
soldiers whose goal was to slow the spread of English settlement on indigenous land west 
of the Allegheny-Appalachian mountain chain. These British soldiers were by no means 
heroes, they were agents of a brutal empire, but in this instance, they were paid to stop 
the illegal appropriation of indigenous land. The early settlers of the American colonies 
did not want to pay taxes to support their work. 
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            As the study of Biblical hermeneutics has taught us, to understand any document 
we must understand the historical circumstances of its writers. Authorial intent matters. 
We must recognize that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to allow settlers the 
individual right to bear arms in order to continue the institution of slavery and to further 
dispossess indigenous peoples.  To pretend that the Second Amendment was meant as a 
collective right is to romanticize America’s founding and deny its roots as a settler-
colonial supremacist imperialist project. 
            Though this finding was not the purpose of my research, it significantly changed 
the course of my research, the pages you are about to read, and my view of how the gun 
control debate in America must proceed.  Gun control advocates cannot simply continue 
to insist that the Second Amendment was meant only to allow Americans to be free of 
British rule and therefore meant only as a collective right of the militias.  As I will 
display in the chapter on President Obama’s rhetoric of gun control, this approach to 
advocating for gun control has failed.  Gun control advocates must realize that the 
individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment was crucial to the white 
supremacist imperialist project the Founders undertook in 1776.  Again, I stress that this 
is not the main finding of this project, but I would be remiss not to mention my new 
understanding and belief that  if Americans fail to recognize that their civil religious 
cannon currently includes a document that guarantees the collective and individual right 
of every citizen to bear arms, there cannot be reasonable gun laws in the USA. 
            In the second section of the historical review of the Second Amendment, I focus 
on the Second Amendment as a civil religious text.  I begin by asking the question: why 
don’t Americans simply change the Constitution as the interpretation has been causing 
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debate for decades? In this section I give the legal answer to this question and begin to 
explore possible social reasons.  Though not all Americans may state this as explicitly as, 
for example, those who belong to the Church of Latter Day Saints (Wardle, 1989), the 
Enlightenment ideas of natural laws and rights guaranteed by a divinely-inspired 
constitution permeate all American civil religious discourse.  When one sees one’s sacred 
texts as divinely-inspired, then the answer to contemporary problems cannot be to change 
the text; rather, it must be to return to the text with an even more fundamentalist 
hermeneutic. When this is compounded with an individualistic ideology that claims that 
individual disposition is a more important factor in outcomes than situational factors, we 
can understand why many, particularly Protestant, Americans see the collectivist 
interpretation of the Constitution as flawed.  If Americans rhetors, such as Obama, wish 
to change gun laws, the populous must understand the inherent contradiction between 
absolute democracy and natural laws enshrined in a constitution.  
            When I began this project, I did not expect that I would be doing a lot of 
rhetorical, rather than theological research. But I have come to understand that, with 
regard to American legal rhetoric, hermeneutics cannot be divorced from theology. As I 
dug into the literature on the Constitution of the USA and on American civil religion, I 
began to realize that one cannot understand these topics without understanding Puritan 
covenant theology.  I begin the fourth chapter, “American Covenant”, by explaining 
the roots of the covenant in ancient Jewish thought, stressing its relationship to the idea of 
a ‘nation’. I pay specific attention to the structure of these covenants, as I will use this 
structure as an analytical tool to compare and contrast these covenants to the American 
founding documents.  I then focus on Puritan covenant theology and its impact on 
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American law from the Mayflower Compact to the present day, stressing the roots of the 
American fundamentalist hermeneutic in the earliest settlers’ Calvinism.  I once again 
bring up and more fully discuss the covenantal principle of limited-authority and the 
problem of reconciling natural law with popular sovereignty.  I stress that understanding 
this problem is key to understanding the American fervour for limiting government 
authority: if a government oversteps its bounds it is not just the government but the whole 
nation which is damned.  
            The chapter “American Covenant” is perhaps the most important chapter in this 
dissertation.  American civil religion and American gun laws cannot be understood 
without a thorough understanding of Puritan covenant theology which has been 
secularized in the American fundamentalist hermeneutic including the importance the 
Supreme Court of the USA places on legal precedent. This fundamentalist hermeneutic 
and American civil religion mean that both gun control and gun rights activists must 
appeal to ‘the sacred’ rather than facts and data if they want to change public opinion.   
            The fifth and sixth chapters of this dissertation are rhetorical analyses: one of gun 
rights rhetoric, and one of gun control rhetoric. The fifth chapter, Moses of the NRA, is 
an analysis of Charlton Heston’s rhetoric of gun rights during his time with the NRA. I 
begin with the history of how the National Rifle Association changed from a hunting and 
sport shooting club to a political lobbying group with the aim of promoting the 
individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment as the only interpretation.  I draw 
on the theories of Durkheim, Eliade, and Berger and Luckman to discuss how the NRA 
made this interpretation of the Second Amendment sacred. I draw on the work of the 
contemporary American rhetorical theorist Morgan Marietta (2012) to argue that sacred 
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rhetoric changes our thinking from qualified to absolute.  By using sacred rhetoric, the 
NRA did not have to offer statistics and logic to back up their arguments, they only 
needed to draw on the words of the American Civil Religious saints – the founding 
fathers — to end all arguments.    
            In the second half of the chapter I analyze the rhetoric of Charlton Heston’s gun 
rights rhetoric. I dive into Heston’s appropriation of the language of civil rights, and how 
he attempted to use his association with a more recent civil religious saint, Martin Luther 
King Jr., to make the individual right to bear arms a sacred right. I end by discussing 
Heston’s famous phrase “From my cold dead hands!” and why it became a rhetorical 
meme – reproducing and mutating into everything from rallying cry to sick joke. 
            In my analysis of Barak Obama’s gun control rhetoric, I argue that Obama 
attempted to overcome the problem of fleeting engagement by creating a sacred civic 
obligation to defeat gun violence.  I begin with a discussion of Obama’s own study of the 
American civil religious tradition.  Though we tend to associate the American civil 
religion with Christian Nationalism, and thus right-wing, white Americans, American 
civil religion was also fundamental to the civil rights movement of the 1960s and has 
been upheld in the African American churches which have produced some of the finest 
rhetors in the history of the American civil religious tradition.  
            After discussing Obama’s place in the American civil religious tradition, I focus 
specifically on his ‘national eulogies’ following mass shootings.  I note that though the 
national eulogies he gave in his first term followed the classical epideictic structure of 
eulogies; these eulogies became deliberative following the Sandy Hook massacre. 
Drawing on the work of memory theorists (ex. Assmann, 2011; Halbwachs, 1992; 
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Honneth, 2015; Nora, 1989; Özyürek, 2007), I discuss how Obama attempted to use 
sacred rhetoric to manipulate public memory. While gun control activists generally use 
facts and data to advocate for gun control from a utilitarian standpoint, Obama, instead, 
turned to the rhetoric of civil religion. Instead of arguing for the utilitarian necessity of a 
change of laws in order to save laws, Obama used the fundamentalist hermeneutic to 
argue that gun control is in keeping with the essence of what it means to be an 
American.  I argue that following the Sandy Hook shooting, Obama attempted to turn gun 
control supporters into activists by convincing them that it was their civil religious 
obligation to protect the less fortunate through enacting gun control legislation. 
 The gun-rights advocate Charlton Heston repeatedly claimed that the only valid 
interpretation of the Second Amendment is the individualist interpretation: the founders 
meant to guarantee all men the individual right to bear arms.  Gun-control advocates such 
as President Obama are careful never to dismiss the intent of the founders as irrelevant, as 
this would violate the American fundamentalist hermeneutic and the practice of taking all 
law from the sacred cannon of American civil religion.  Instead, they stress the prefatory 
clause of the Second Amendment (“A well regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free state…”) claiming that this clause indicates that the founders intended 
only a collective right to bear arms.   
 Neither side of the argument approaches the question of the right to bear arms 
with a utilitarian solution.  Rather, they aim to make the public see “historical experience 
in the light of transcendent reality” (Bellah, 1967, p. 3).  A mass shooting becomes not 
simply a personal tragedy for the families of the victims, but a rhetorical battle for the 
soul of the nation. Puritan covenant theology and the Lockean social contract instruct 
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Americans that they have not just a right, but a duty to overthrow unjust governments.  If 
not, the nation will be damned. For gun control advocates, a government which does not 
protect children from school shootings damns the nation.  For gun rights advocates, a 
government which takes away a man’s God-given right to bear arms is damning the 
nation. Examining this debate in light of Bellah’s understanding of civil religion as well 
as the history of the American fundamentalist hermeneutic – from the Puritans to the 
present -- helps us understand the passion on both sides.  
Conclusion 
            In the United States, there are approximately 33 000 fatalities from guns each year 
(McNamara, 2017). The American rhetorical theorists J. Michael Hogan and Craig Rood 
(2015) see rhetorical scholars as having a role to play in breaking the impasse 
surrounding sensible gun control in the USA.  They write: 
Our answer lies in an approach to rhetorical criticism that is interventionalist yet 
sensitive to political and cultural differences… it holds public advocates on all 
sides of the debate to higher rhetorical standards… It is an approach with an 
explicitly pedagogical and public mission – to encourage advocates to deliberate 
‘in good faith’ and citizens to get involved.  Such an approach requires that first 
that we fashion a rhetorical history that helps us understand how the gun debate 
became so polarized, divisive, and unproductive in the first place.  Then we can at 
least begin to identify the cause of the deliberative stalemate and suggest ways to 
move the debate forward (p. 360). 
I hope that this dissertation will add to this “rhetorical history”. I see the role of the 
rhetorical critic as that of interpreter: without interpreters, people who speak different 
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languages, regardless of intentions, cannot communicate. Rhetorical critics can help 
people who come from different worlds communicate. We illuminate, and help people 
make sense of current events.  Through this, we empower people to take action on the 
governmental, and also the personal level.  
            As religious scholars Andrew L. Whitehead, Landon Schnabel, and Samuel L. 
Perry (n.d.) state, 
the gun control debate is complicated by deeply held moral and religious schemas 
that discussions focused solely on rational public safety calculations do not 
sufficiently address… the issue of gun rights and restrictions in the USA is not a 
simple matter of calculated public safety but instead a symbolic 
battleground (p.2).  
Gun laws in America affect the globe. It is not just that guns which are legally purchased 
in the USA are smuggled into neighboring countries (Parsons, 2018), but also that US 
gun laws and the tone of the gun control debate set an example for other countries.  If we, 
as global citizens, do not understand the ideological roots of US gun laws, they will 
continue to negatively affect us. 
            Though I have admitted that I have come to believe that the individualist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment was the Framers intent, I still believe that the 
USA needs stricter gun control.  The critical historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, whose 
primary research changed my own opinion on the Framers intent, quotes Professor David 
Cole to make the claim that: 
Gun control advocates will not make progress until they recognize that the NRA’s 
power lies in the appeal of its ideas, its political engagement and acumen, and the 
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intense commitments of its members.  Until gun control advocates can match 
these features, they are unlikely to make much progress.  That the gun industry 
may have helped construct modern gun culture does not negate the very real 
power that culture holds today (Cole; quoted in Dunbar-Ortiz, p. 22). 
If I want my daughter to go to a school in the USA where she is not forced to go through 
mass-shooting drills, I need to help liberals, as well as my fellow radicals, understand the 
importance of civil religion and the American fundamentalist hermeneutic in the 
construction of gun laws. 
            In her personal essay for the National Public Radio program This American Life, 
the British journalist Bim Adewunmi (2020), who came to America to cover the 2016 
presidential election campaigns, stated that on her visa application to the United States, 
she mentioned Alexis De Tocqueville and Alistair Cooke.  Like Adewunmi, both these 
men were foreigners who come to the United States in a time of upheaval to understand 
the nation and send news back to their home countries.  I did not write anything of this 
sort on my own visa application to the United States in 2014. Barak Obama was the 
president and I had no idea what a coronavirus was. I had just survived a political 
uprising in my beloved home of Istanbul and had no intention or desire to be in 
another.  But here I am. 
            Unlike many immigrants including Adewunmi (a Muslim African-Brit), with 
some blond hair dye and a little help of the American accent-training cassette tapes I 
bought in my teens, I can pass for a WASPy American. Because of this, I hear things that 
other foreigners are not privy to and do things other foreigners cannot do. I believe that 
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the privilege of ‘passing’ comes with a moral obligation: to try to figure out what the hell 




LITERATURE REVIEW: CIVIL RELIGION 
 
To the eye of reason… it certainly seems strange. But then the majority of human 
actions are not meant to be looked at with the eyes of reason. 
        Aldous Huxley (1974) 
 
 To understand the relationship of the United States to guns, we must understand the 
United States’ relationship to its own constitution. And to understand its relationship to its 
own constitution, we must understand the American Civil Religion. For this reason, this 
chapter is a literature review of the concept of civil religion and American Civil Religion 
specifically.   
 From Gandhi to Ataturk, national myths serve to create heroes of national founders.  
But perhaps no nation in the world – outside of totalitarian regimes like North Korea – regard 
the words of its founders as divinely-inspired if not divine in and of themselves.  While 
works of propaganda such as Mao’s Little Red Book or Hitler’s Mein Kampf  were 
undoubtedly held up as ‘holy’ by some, the Constitution of the United States is in a different 
category: the Constitution is a legal document which is revered as a cannon of the American 
civil religion for more than two centuries. Because it is a canon of civil religion in a nation 
whose first colonists built a society based on a fundamentalist hermeneutic interpretation of 
religious texts, the Constitution itself must be approached with this same fundamentalist 
hermeneutic. 
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 I begin with a quick review of the concept of civil religion from pre-history to 
modernity, paying particular attention to thinkers such as Plato and Machiavelli who 
recognized the potential for leaders to subvert religious sentiment to serve rulers.  I then 
begin a lengthy discussion of the importance of civil religion with the emergence of the 
nation state.  The ideas of Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau, who saw the importance 
of myths and heroes in nation-building, were influential to the founding of the United 
States and continue to be influential to nationalist – including post-colonial nationalist – 
movements around the world.  
  As I move my review into the modern era, my discussion moves from being 
political to sociological.  In modernity, the sociologist not only studied how rulers used 
civil religion, but also how it emerged organically within societies.  Many of these 
sociologists took the Durkheimian view that any religion, even civil religion, functions as 
a glue to bind people into a whole (cited in Henry, 1981). These functionalists saw that in 
modern times, civil religion, whether artificially constructed by rulers or arising from the 
people’s folk beliefs and practices, served to construct disparate groups into a 
community.  
 From this sociological discussion, I focus in on civil religion in America.  Robert 
Nealy Bellah, the “father of American civil religion”(Kazin, 2013) saw that religion had 
integrative properties. Though I briefly review many of the other important scholars of 
American civil religion, it is undoubtedly the work of Robert Nealy Bellah which has 
most influence subsequent scholars of American civil religion, as well as this dissertation.  
As stated earlier, Bellah’s definition of civil religion as a process of imbuing events with 
“transcendental” meaning has greatly helped me understand why the rhetoric of gun 
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control in the USA is more often a debate over the interpretation of the Second 
Amendment rather than saving lives.  
 Of the theorists who followed Bellah’s understanding of civil religion, I draw 
most heavily on the work of the Michael Angrosino, a scholar of theology and 
anthropology.  I expand on Michael Angrosino’s classification of different views of 
American Civil Religion, from the folk religion of the people to religious nationalism.  
 From here, I begin to discuss the importance of the cannon of American Civil 
Religion.  I draw heavily on the legal scholar Stamford Levinson (1989), who took 
Bellah’s notion of civil religion as giving transcendent meaning to national texts, people, 
and events, and focused on the Constitution.  Here, I begin to connect the notion of civil 
religion and hermeneutics. The hermeneutic practice of interpreting the cannon gives 
transcendent meaning to these texts.  I end the chapter with an extensive discussion on 
Philip Gorski’s (2017) discussion of civil religion.  Gorski, a student of Bellah, is perhaps 
the most respected scholar of American Civil Religion alive today.  His discussion of the 
impact of Puritan covenant theology on contemporary ACR is particularly relevant to this 
dissertation.  
Religion and the State from Pre-history to Modernity  
            Throughout most of history we can safely assume that religion and the state have 
been one — or at least that priests and kings (or chiefs and shamans) were intimately 
connected. In his ethnographic analysis of indigenous Australian society, Durkheim notes 
that organized religion and civil religion were “undifferentiated” (Coleman, 1970) – that 
is, they were one institution. So, too, in ancient Europe, the Middle East and China: from 
the Egyptian Pharaohs to the Emperors of China, political leaders were manifestations of 
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the divine. In these theocracies, the problem of the tension between religion and politics 
is solved with the fusion of the two.  The concept of civil religion only comes about when 
there is a separation of these two powers, and, in Western discourse, a discussion of how 
one might be used to complement the other. 
            In the Athenian polis, religion was a matter of the state: it is redundant to speak of 
civil religion in Athens as there was no other kind (Lewis, 2010, p. 22).  It was the 
Ecclesia that condemned Socrates to death, charged with corrupting the youth 
and worshipping gods other than those sanctioned by the polis.  The Ecclesia – translated 
as the “assembly” (from which we get our modern English terms ecclesiastic, 
Ecclesiastes, etc.) – held ultimate political and religious power over the citizens. 
            Plato saw state religion as the manner in which the polis could unite and develop 
character (Lewis, 2010).  His ideas about political life are most thoroughly explored in 
the Republic and Laws. While Republic tells the story of the city of the soul, Laws tells 
the story of the city of the body.  Whereas the philosophers in the Republic neither have 
families nor own property, in The Laws, the city is governed by men who have children 
and own property. This “second-best” city is also a religious city (p. 20).  
            The ‘civic theology’ of the city in the Laws includes elements of conventional 
religion as well as philosophical and political arguments which seem like a ‘conspiracy 
theory’ to contemporary readers. Plato stresses the political importance of upholding the 
divine origin of the laws, yet, argues that these laws can be criticized by those ‘in the 
know’. 
…one of the finest is the law that does not allow any of the young to inquire what 
laws are finely made and which are not, but that commands all to say in 
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harmony… that all the laws are finely made by gods; if someone says otherwise, 
there is to be paid no heed at all.  And yet if some old man has been thinking over 
something in your laws, he is to make such arguments before a magistrate and 
someone his own age, with no young person present.  
      (Schofield, 2016 634d7 – e6). 
As Lewis explains, Plato thought it was a necessity to convince the people as a whole that 
the laws are divine, infallible, and that young people must never think of attempting to 
change the laws — or even know that the laws are sometimes changed.  However, old 
men should be encouraged to think about how the laws could be improved and to come 
forward and “discreetly” discuss the issues with magistrates.  Far from our lay perception 
of Plato as an idealistic philosopher, this use of religious sentiment for political ends 
seems almost Machiavellian to contemporary readers.  
            Writing in the 2nd century CE, the Greek Historian Polybius discussed the civil 
religion of the Roman Empire with great admiration. He noted that the Romans’ shared 
superstitions held them together: people were restrained and united by their fear of the 
gods and the afterlife. Whereas in Laws, Plato idealized the Greek republic, in which 
older men and magistrates are ‘in on’ the idea that the laws of the city did not have divine 
origin, Polybius notes that the Roman civil religion made even magistrates act more 
dutifully (Beiner, 1993, p. 625).  
            Like Plato, Romans such as Cicero and Seneca saw the utility of civil 
religion.  Particularly, the Romans recognized religion’s ability to unite people and create 
what Benedict Anderson (1991) later would label an “imagined community” across the 
empire. Following the lead of the Macedonian Greek imperialist Alexander the Great, the 
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Roman Empire united its disparate territories with the syncretism of identifying the gods 
of conquered territories with a god in the Roman pantheon. For example, Middle Eastern 
goddess worship was incorporated into the cult of Cybele while the Anatolian Sabazios 
became the Roman Sabazius (Scheid, 1995),  just as modern-day Christians have mixed 
Northern European Shamanic imagery with that of the Byzantine Bishop Saint Nicholas. 
This syncretism allows peoples to keep their rituals and beliefs, without a fight, as they 
are incorporated into the greater hegemonic religion. 
            The Renaissance diplomat, philosopher and author Niccolò di Bernardo dei 
Machiavelli drew inspiration from the Roman Empire’s use of religion for political ends. 
As Nietzsche’s intellectual forefather, Machiavelli admired how the Roman civil religion 
strengthened human beings and wondered if Christianity could be used in a similar 
way.  Machiavelli stressed Christianity’s incredible power to discipline its subjects — to 
“carve a beautiful statue from rough marble” as he poetically describes it (The 
Discourses, p. 141; cited in Beiner, p. 622). However, Machiavelli thought Christianity’s 
disciplinary potential had been squandered by Christians who taught the value of being 
humble and the distain of material possessions and stressed the afterlife over this life.  He 
did, however, leave open the possibility that Christianity might be re-interpreted in a way 
more fit for his ‘prince’ (p. 624). 
            Machiavelli thought that a prince should not be religious himself but must make 
use of religion. The 20th century German American political philosopher and classicist 
Leo Straus explains that, though Machiavelli was not the first political thinker to theorize 
religion in terms of political utility, it was novel for this view of religion to be 
incorporated into a ‘handbook’ for rulers such as The Prince.  Strauss went on to note 
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that Machiavelli’s view of religion as necessary for republics was widespread until the 
time of the French revolution (Strauss, 1978). 
 Like his Florentine predecessor, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1651) 
thought that Christianity was too obsessed with the afterlife to make a good civil religion 
for a republic. However, in Leviathan, Hobbes lays out the theoretical version of 
Christianity which could replace the existing forms of the religion in Europe of the 
16th century.  This Hobbesian Christianity would promote “stability and obedience” in the 
state (Mortimer, 2016). As Oxford University historian Sarah Mortimer explains, both 
Hobbes’ religious ideas and political philosophy are grounded in his understanding that 
religious belief was “natural to humans, stemmed from anxiety, and needed to be 
coordinated by a sovereign to prevent strife”.  Mortimer notes that in Leviathan, Hobbes 
theorizes “an extremely heterodox theology which could enhance the state while 
destroying the independent authority of the Church”. 
            While Machiavelli saw the solution to the opposition of Christian values and a 
bellicose state in a return to paganism, Hobbes thought of Judaizing Christianity (Beiner, 
1993).   Hobbes saw the potential of the Christian narrative to both strengthen and 
undermine the state (Mortimer, 2016). Hobbes, a Christian himself, believed that the 
Bible was literally true and, as Beiner states, read the Hebrew Bible as a political 
instruction manual (Beiner, 1993). According to the Hobbesian interpretation of the old 
testament, the Jewish theocracy was unstable because priests did not have the authority to 
decide who was a true prophet (Beiner, p. 625). The Jewish political establishment was 
not totally “undifferentiated” (Coleman, 1970) from the religion of the people. Hobbes 
believed that monarchy was the only way to fight the threat of anarchy in the Jewish 
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theocracy (Beiner, 1993) and argued that kings must be the only authority with the right 
to decide who is or is not a prophet. As Beiner states, “Hobbes affirmation of undivided 
temporal authority is, as he sees it, merely a philosophical appropriation of a truth already 
contained within the narrative of the Old Testament” (p. 625).  Hobbes drew on the 
precedent of the Hebrew Bible to argue for the necessity of the collaboration of church 
and state.   
            Early Enlightenment thinkers such as Bacon and Hobbes did not believe in the 
secularization thesis, but rather, thought that religion was part of human nature. Instead of 
attempting to get rid of religion, they wanted to craft a civil religion which might fit with 
modern science.  In De Cive, Hobbes states that establishment of a civil religion is the 
duty of the monarch. To Hobbes, this meant that the Christian prince “must affirm God’s 
existence, must not set up idols, and must affirm that Jesus is the Christ”. He states that 
beyond these basic Christian principles common to all sects, “the Christian prince can 
institute any articles of faith and any rites that he cares to” (quoted in Beiner, 1993). 
However, in Leviathan, Hobbes (Hobbes, 2002) gives a more thorough account of what 
this civil religion must entail.  He argues that Jesus should be taken to be King of the 
Jews in a worldly sense, as David was the King of the Jews. As Beiner explains, Hobbes 
Judaized Christianity as civil religion by arguing that it should “limit itself to this-worldly 
claims… until Christ comes again” (pp. 628-629).  Here, again, we see the fear that 
religion can take the subject’s concerns too far from the ‘this world’.  But in this Judaized 
Christianity, Hobbes is proposing “a Christian theocracy (concentrated in the person of 
the sovereign) [that] offers the advantages of Jewish (Mosaic) theocracy without the 
pollical drawback of Jewish prophets” (p. 629). That is, Hobbes is, in some sense, 
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advocating a return to the total consolidation of church and state into one undifferentiated 
institution: the person of the sovereign.  
Religion and the Nation State 
            In the Enlightenment and early modern era, the nation-state took on many of the 
roles that the medieval European church had filled. From this shift, the ‘religion of the 
republic’ emerged.  In the Enlightenment period in Europe, civil religion was theorized as 
a hope to end the wars between Christian sects. One response was to separate religion 
from public life. Another response was to “dilute” religion (Weed, & Von Heyking, 
2012, p. 10) so as to be vague enough that it was acceptable to Christians of all sects, and, 
perhaps, even Jews and Muslims.   
            French Enlightenment thinker Jean-Jacque Rousseau saw that religion had caused 
disunity and intolerance in western societies, including the France of his day; however, 
he firmly believed in the necessity of religion as a social cement. In book 4, chapter 8, of 
the Social Contract Rousseau states that no state has ever been founded without a religion 
at its base (Rousseau, 2014, p. 127).   Instead of separating religion from the state or 
privatizing it, as other thinkers of his time proposed, Rousseau thought that some form of 
civil religion could promote unity in society. He formulated that a civil religion could 
support “republican morality, society, and politics” (Orhan, 2013, p. 168) in a faith which 
was vague enough to welcome all sects, yet specific enough to foment national unity. 
            Rousseau first mentions a “civil profession of faith” in a 1756 letter to Voltaire 
(cited in Orhan, p. 168).  In the letter, Rousseau states, 
I would wish, then, that in every State there were a moral code, or a kind of civil 
profession of faith, containing, positively, the social maxims everyone would be 
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bound to acknowledge, and negatively, the fanatical maxims one would be bound 
to reject, not as impious, but as seditious” (quoted in Orhan, p. 168). 
Rousseau’s The Social Contract expands on these words.  The work begins with an 
overview of religion and politics, noting that ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel all were 
regimes which combined theology and politics (Rousseau, 2014). Like Hobbes, Rousseau 
was particularly scared of church leaders challenging political leaders. While Hobbes 
sees the schism of the ancient Israeli kings and prophets, Rousseau argues that it was with 
Christianity that this dangerous separation of “the theological kingdom and the political 
system” emerged (quoted in Orhan, 2015, p. 169).  And just as Hobbes saw that the 
Israelite kings’ inability to appoint and control prophets was dangerous to the Jewish 
theocracy, Rousseau saw the emergence of the Christian popes as undermining political 
union. 
            In Book 4 of The Social Contract, Rousseau restates his belief that “a purely civil 
profession of faith” was needed to satisfy the popular need for belief in, and allegiance to, 
the transcendent, while not jeopardizing political unity. As Haberski puts it “in 
philosophical terms, civil religion is the appropriation of religion for political ends” 
(Haberski, 2018, para. 1). For Rousseau, the purpose of civil religion was to use religious 
sentiments to foster pro-social behavior in the newly imagined community of the nation 
state.   
            Like Machiavelli, Rousseau argued that Christianity was a terrible framework for 
government, as it encouraged servitude, making men ready for slavery.  Moreover, like 
Machiavelli, he saw that the European brand of Christianity turned people’s attention 
completely towards the afterlife, undermining the “social spirit” (quoted in Orhan, 2013, 
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p. 170 translation mine). Rousseau recognized that many established religions, most 
notably the Catholicism of France in his day, encouraged a withdrawal from public life 
that runs counter to the ends of the state. However, this did not mean that the state should 
encourage materialist atheism: rather, Rousseau thought that government had both a right 
and a duty to uphold and protect certain beliefs –including the belief in a deity and belief 
in an afterlife in which one is either rewarded or punished.  He argued that the belief in a 
deity and an afterlife would help maintain social order. Beyond these core beliefs, 
Rousseau stressed that a citizen’s religious beliefs and practices were not a matter of 
concern for the state.  He insisted that the civil profession of faith must include a 
profession of religious tolerance.  This idea of tolerance was crucial as he thought it was 
impossible to return to the ancient system of an interconnected religion and state, like 
there had been in ancient Greece and Israel. 
            Unlike the organic forms of theocracy prominent in anthropological accounts such 
as Durkheim’s (2001) discussion of indigenous Australians, for Rousseau (2014), civil 
religion was not an organic phenomenon, but should be constructed and imposed from 
above in order to promote civic virtue. However, whereas Plato’s conception was 
implemented and maintained under strict control of the state, Rousseau’s conception 
“argued for a polity based on the sovereignty of the general will of the people and the 
necessity for the voluntary agreement of individuals to the conditions of the social 
contract” (2002, p. 245).  Although, like Plato’s conception of civil religion in Laws, 
Rousseauvian civil religion is crafted by those in power, it is not imposed, but rather, 
agreed upon with the reasoned understanding that it was ‘good’ for the polity as a whole, 
and thus the individuals within that polity.  
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Modern Study of Civil Religion: The Sociologists 
            With the birth of sociology in the late 19th century, scholars began to study 
the function of religion.  For scholars such as Emile Durkheim, often called the father of 
sociology, religion offers both cosmological answers and continuity of moral practices 
leading to social cohesion. This is expressed and maintained through ritual (Durkheim, 
2001).  This functionalist exploration of religion, as Orhan (2015, p. 172) explains, 
focuses “on what a religion does rather than what it is”.  For functionalists, “any 
collective experience that transports the individual beyond himself and binds him with 
others has a religious quality to it” (Orhan, p. 172, emphasis added).   Durkheim’s 
student, Talcott Parsons, argued that religion “or its functional equivalent” (Lemert, 
1999, 264) continues to be at the core of all societies. Although science may have taken 
over much of the role religion once held in answering cosmological questions of 
existence in post-industrial societies, societies still need ritual for social cohesion.  In 
the The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1966), religion is held up as “the prime 
integrator of society” (Coleman, 1970, p. 67).  Symbols and religious rituals reinforce 
identification with the group and commitment to moral values (Durkheim, 2001).  As 
Coleman writes, civil religion, therefore, uses the integrative force of religion by “lending 
its sacred aura to bolster the symbol system of nationalism… and commitment to national 
values such as patriotism, sacrifice for nation, honesty, and business”. As Plato, 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau all recognized, religion has the power to strengthen 
political bonds. 
            As Robert Bellah’s co-author, sociologist Philip Hammond, noted  “For Rousseau 
civil religion is a sensible thing for leaders to create and encourage; for Durkheim it is an 
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emergent property of social life itself” (Hammond, 2013, p. 139).  For Rousseau, civil 
religion is a top-down construction for the good of the nation; for Durkheim, civil 
religion emerges organically from the bottom-up.  In the second half of the 20th century, 
researchers of civil religion followed this Durkheimian tradition, but, instead of following 
Durkheim in the study of ‘primitive’ societies, they turned toward modern societies, 
particularly civil religion in the United States of America. In the next section, I look at 
the specific study of civil religion in America. 
Civil Religion in America 
“Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious 
faith – and I don’t care what it is.” President Dwight Eisenhower (cited in Henry, 
1981)    
            A 2016 Pew Research Poll found that Americans with no religious affiliation are 
the second largest ‘religious’ demographic – 22.8% of the American population 
(Cooperman & Smith, 2016).  Yet, as Susan Jacoby (Jacoby, 2017) notes in her New York 
Times piece “Sick and Tired of ‘God Bless America”, “political campaigns are still 
conducted as if all potential voters were among the faithful” (para. 2 emphasis 
added).  Unlike what might be assumed by those outside the United States, Jacoby notes 
that it is not just the Republicans who use this religious rhetoric.  Hillary Clinton and Joe 
Biden repeatedly mentioned their Christian upbringing and Jacoby notes that even Bernie 
Sanders – “a cultural Jew not known to belong to any synagogue” once referred to a 
“belief in God” that informs his attempts to follow the “golden rule”.   And, of course, 
Trump, known for his love of money and porn stars, has quoted “two Corinthians” and 
used the Bible in a now-infamous photo op (O’Neil, 2020). Echoing the sentiments of 
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many Americans, Jacoby writes, instead of ending every political speech with “God Bless 
America” – “Just once in my life, I would like the chance to vote for a presidential 
candidate who ends his or her appeals with Thomas Paine’s observation that “the most 
formidable weapon against errors of every kind is Reason.”  I’m sure, particularly in this 
time of division in American society, many Americans would echo this sentiment, hoping 
for an appeal to reason rather than God. 
            So why is it that American politicians from George Washington to Donald Trump 
have made reference to God? For the American sociologist Robert Bellah (1967), it is not 
because of the dominance of Christianity in America, but because of the unifying strength 
of the American civil religion.  He argues that these references remain ambiguous to 
implicitly remind us of the Rousseauvian religious tolerance while invoking a Pope-esque 
divine right to rule. Though Americans may not be familiar with the work of Rousseau or 
the tenets of the Catholic church, the ideas of religious tolerance and the divinely inspired 
authority of documents such as the Constitution are deeply imbedded in the American 
psyche.   
            The French diplomat Alexis de Tocqueville (1954) was one of the first to examine 
religion in American through what we would now call a sociological or anthropological, 
rather than theological, lens. Like Hobbes, Alexis de Tocqueville saw religion as an 
inextricable part of human nature. Unlike his home of 19th century France, De 
Tocqueville saw that in the United States of America, Christianity was not antagonistic to 
democracy. In the France of de Tocqueville’s day, Christianity was associated with the 
pre-1789 regime and the Bourbon Restoration. Yet, in the United States, De Tocqueville 
saw that Christianity was not antagonistic to democracy but, in fact, served to counter the 
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dangers of individualism and materialism which he thought could lead to tyranny.  He 
wrote: 
The greatest part of British America was peopled by men who, after having 
shaken off the authority of the Pope, acknowledged no other religious supremacy. 
They brought with them into the New World a form of Christianity which I 
cannot better describe than by styling it a democratic and republican religion. (p. 
311). 
De Tocqueville saw that the Christianity of the pre-civil war America supported 
democracy and the fledgling republic. 
            More than a century after de Tocqueville’s observations, Robert Bellah’s “Civil 
Religion in America” caused an almost unprecedented burst of excitement among 
sociologists and scholars of religion.  As Jones and Richey explain (1974, p. 5), “[the 
concept of] civil religion made plausible the claim that religion ought to be studied by the 
nonreligious”.  Bellah’s work is premised on Durkheim’s functional theory of religion, 
which was further developed by Bellah’s mentor, Talcott Parsons.  Bellah 
relays President Eisenhower’s comment that “government makes no sense unless it is 
founded in a deeply felt religious faith – and I don’t care what it is”.  For many who see 
religion as Truth, this comment makes no sense as it seems like a total “negation of any 
real religion” (Bellah, 1967, p. 42).  However, it makes perfect sense in an 
anthropological view of religion: it is not a negation of religion because there are 
common religious beliefs, rituals, values and symbols that all religions share. Religion 
was important to Eisenhower not because of its theological and cosmological claims, but 
rather because of its function as a social cement.   
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            The rituals, texts, holidays, saints, and values that bond all Americans is what 
Bellah refers to as American civil religion (1967, p. 42).  For Bellah, civil religion in 
America reflects a nationalistic religion distinct from Christianity yet rooted in it.  Bellah 
explains how both the notion of the Christian God and the institution of the church have 
influenced what it means to be an American.  For Bellah, abstract ideas about god have 
become reified and drive American civic consciousness.  He notes that though it draws 
from Biblical archetypes such as the Chosen People and the Promised Land, it is 
“genuinely American” with its own prophets, martyrs, sacred places, rituals, and symbols 
(Bellah, 1967, p. 18). 
            Although he has no proof that the founding fathers were influenced by Rousseau 
in particular, Bellah claims that “it is clear that similar ideas, as part of the cultural 
climate of the late eighteenth century, were to be found among the Americans”.  Authors 
such as Angrosino (2002) have noted the similarity between Ben Franklin’s self-
professed religious beliefs and Rousseau’s creed. As I discussed earlier, Rousseau 
believed that it was the right and duty of the state to demand a civil profession of faith in 
the existence of a god and an afterlife in which we are rewarded are punished, and a 
toleration of all other religious beliefs that hold to these principles – beyond this, 
religious beliefs were of no concern to the state. In his autobiography, Franklin wrote: 
I never doubted… the existence of the Deity… that our souls are immortal; and that all 
crime will be punished, and virtues rewarded, either here or hereafter.  These I esteem’d 
the essentials of every religion” (quoted in Angrosino, p. 248) 
 Angrosino refers to this as “the American prototype of Rousseau’s image of civil 
religion” (p. 248).  Franklin and his fellow framers encouraged an American belief in a 
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deity, an afterlife of reward and punishment, religious tolerance, and a total religious 
freedom beyond these basic ideas that they saw as common to all religions.  Bellah 
argues that the “words and acts of the founding fathers… shaped the form and tone of the 
civil religion as it has been maintained ever since”. 
            Bellah (1967) notes that President George Washington’s farewell address (which 
may have been written by Hamilton) explains the utilitarian function of religion for the 
nation.  Washington states “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political 
prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports”.  Now we realize the 
intellectual heritage of presidents that led to Eisenhower’s seemingly shocking statement 
that government needed religion, but that it didn’t need any particular religion.  Like 
Washington, Eisenhower saw the function of religion as a social cement which upheld a 
nation.  Like Plato, Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Hobbes, the founding fathers were not 
merely idealists but saw the utility of religious sentiment in founding and maintaining the 
republic. 
            Bellah (1967, p. 45) stresses that, for the founding fathers — with the exception 
of, perhaps, Thomas Paine4 — American civil religion was never meant to be a substitute 
for Christianity. The god of American civil religion has a particular concern for America, 
much like the god of the Old Testament had for Israel. Indeed, the comparison of 
America to Israel is frequent in the American civil religion from its founding.  As Bellah 
                                                   
4 While the other founding fathers are noted as seeing the good that Christianity could do in the nation 
(even if they were not believers themselves), Paine saw Christianity and any other religion that embraced 
miracles or other supernatural events as detrimental (Marker, 2019). 
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(p. 8) writes “Europe is Egypt; America, the promised land.  God has led his people to 
establish a new sort of social order that shall be a light unto all nations”. Bellah gives 
examples of how biblical stories such as Exodus have driven so much of American 
history from the Puritans to Martin Luther King. 
             In his discussion of President John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, Bellah argues 
that Kennedy’s whole speech is just a recap of the idea, present from the founding of the 
nation, that Americans have an “obligation, both collective and individual, to carry out 
God’s will on earth” (67, p. 44). This idea of an American right and responsibility to do 
God’s work has been part of the American identity since the founding of the nation. But 
Bellah notes that the American civil religion has not always been “invoked for worthy 
causes” (p. 14).   He notes how the doctrine of manifest destiny was used to gloss over 
imperialist exploits and the horrific treatment of indigenous peoples.  Moreover, he states 
that an ideology that “fuses God, country and flag” has been used to attack progressive 
and non-conformist ideals.  Yet he also notes that it is difficult to use the words of 
Washington and Jefferson to “support special interests and undermine personal freedom” 
— the defenders of slavery came to reject the words of the Declaration of Independence. 
He argues that despite the patriotic rhetoric of the religious right at his time of writing – 
1967 – their relation to the civil religious tradition is “tenuous”. 
 Varieties of Civil Religion in America 
            In their discussion of civil religion, Richey and Jones (1974, p. 14) note the 
differing, often conflicting, meanings of the term civil religion.  They report that the term 
has been used synonymously with “folk religion, religious nationalism, democratic faith, 
Protestant civic piety, and transcendent universal religion of the nation”. Angrosino 
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(2002b) states that civil religion can be analyzed as three overlapping frameworks: 1. folk 
religion of the American people; 2. religious nationalism; and 3. transcendental universal 
values. 
            Gehrig notes that, at times, the term American civil religion has been used 
synonymously with American folk religions (Gehrig, 1981, p. 52); that is, “as emerging 
from the daily life experiences and expressions of Americans whereby they achieve 
social integration and the legitimation of American values”.  In this definition, civil 
religion is an organic phenomenon which provides unity for the population and gives 
authority to popular values. Angrosino terms this “culture religion” and sees this view as 
coming from the French classical sociology “and its insistence on viewing society itself 
as a set of collective representations symbolizing a common identity.”  Angrosino argues 
that for those who follow this school of thought, these “representations” can be described, 
interpreted, and analyzed in the same way that an anthropologist might reconstruct the 
religious perspective that gives a certain coherence to a traditional folk or tribal society” 
(Angrosino, 2002, p. 246).  Gehrig cites Warner’s 1961 examination of Memorial Day 
and Herberg’s 1960 discussion of American civil religion as the “deification of the 
American way of life” as examples of this definition of civil religion (p. 52). As Jones 
and Richey (Richey & Jones, 1974, p. 8) explain, “Herberg’s civil religion is ‘the 
operative religion of the American people’ supplying American society ‘with is 
overarching sense of unity’ amidst conflict…” It is the “folkways” that explain what the 
people support and also what they are “intolerant about”.  For these cultural religion 
theorists, as Angrosino calls them, the diverse set of sacred symbols allows “for a degree 
of cooperation, integration, and solidarity” (p. 346). Studying American civil religion as 
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folk religion allows us to understand the organic values of the population that promote 
unity and give a sense of identity to ‘common’ Americans.    
            Agrosino defines myth as “the imaginative truths by means of which people 
construct their lives and order their thinking” (Angrosino, 2002, p. 249).  For Angrosino, 
the foundational myth of the American people is America as the New World – “pure 
Eden, a place of fresh starts”.  The story echoes biblical story of Exodos in which a 
people oppressed in a “tradition-bound” society migrate to freedom.  Angrosino goes on 
to explain the importance of myth in the view of civil religion as folk religion.  He 
explains: 
The process by which myth becomes civil religion also includes processes of 
investing symbols with transcendent significance, translating ordinary people into 
heroic legends, and creating rituals that encourage the celebration of those 
symbols and people (p. 250). 
The American flag signifies freedom itself. Washington is Moses, and July 4th a 
celebration of the new, pure Eden of liberty.  Of course, this founding myth leaves out the 
fact that this “New World” was already occupied, and that, for many, the migration was 
not voluntary and did not lead to freedom. 
            Agrosino (2002) notes that in the “culture religion” view of civil religion, civic 
virtue is inevitably embodied in patriotism.  Bellah and Hammond (2013) note the 
dangerous tendency that patriotism has to identify a certain type of person as, in 
Agrosino’s words, “the exclusive representatives of a uniquely American community of 
righteousness” (p. 253).  This ideal American is – as Bellah and Agrosino both mention – 
white, Anglo-Saxon, and protestant.  Neither Bellah or Agrosino mention gender; 
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however, we can assume that though women might be identified as members of this 
“community of righteousness”, they have no authority to be representatives of, hold 
authority in, or speak for, this community.  Agrosino mentions that the experiences of 
women and racial minorities “reveal tensions in American culture religion”, and that the 
“greatest challenge” facing American culture is the willingness to accommodate these 
‘others” (p. 254).  In some regions of the country, American folk religion is beginning to 
venerate one African-American hero (Martin Luther King) – as is evident in the 
celebration of Martin Luther King, the King Monument in Washington, and the fact that 
his “I Have a Dream” speech has entered into the ‘cannon’ of American civil religion. 
However, all women – even white women — and people of other ethnic minorities are 
excluded from playing leading roles in the narratives of American folk religion. 
            In the view of civil religion as religious nationalism, the state itself is 
worshipped (Bellah, 1967, p. 52).  In this school of thought, while the power of religious 
institutions declines with modernization, the religious sentiments themselves do not 
decline, but are instead shifted to the state. Classic examples of civil religion as religious 
nationalism are Japanese early 20th century state Shinto, and, in its most extreme form, 
Nazi Germany.   For thinkers such as Angrosino, religious nationalism in the USA comes 
from the American belief in itself as a nation of “chosen people and their manifest 
destiny” (Angrosino, 2002, p. 255). For Gehrig (1981), American civil religion makes 
simply “being America” a quasi-magical state in which one views one’s own existence as 
having profound significance in the world.  These ideas were used to support slavery and 
justify the extermination of indigenous peoples. More recently, it has supported the 
ideology of the cold war and the war on terror (p. 255), neo-liberal imperialism 
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expansion, and one might argue the contemporary demonization of recent 
immigrants.  Most importantly for the this study, religious nationalism is the most 
important predictor of opposition to gun control and support of gun rights organizations 
such as the National Rifle Association (Whitehead et al., 2018). 
            For Agrosino, an important stream of religious nationalism in America is that of 
“republican theocracy” which is associated with 19th century Calvinist theologians (2002, 
p. 255).  The 19th century Calvinists such as Nathaniel W. Taylor, Timothy Dwight, and 
Lyman Beecher believed that God could “exercise moral government over the state” (p. 
255).  God’s laws were seen as being embodied in the American Constitution and 
Americans themselves as God’s chosen people (p. 256). During the civil war, the 
republican theocrats of New England saw a “cosmic disruption of the sacred order” 
(Chidester, 1988, p. 96; quoted in Angrosino, p. 256).  Meanwhile, the southern 
republican theocrats argued that the Constitution itself had betrayed America’s mission 
by avoiding the direct discussion of God. They saw their own Constitution of the 
Confederacy as correcting this and setting America back on its divinely chosen 
path (Angrosino, p. 256).  Lincoln is said to have spent much time “in an anguished effort 
to discern God’s will” and in many of his speeches discusses the notion that God had 
chosen this time to remove slavery (ex. second inaugural address) (p. 256). 
Though proponents of religious nationalism see the power of religious sentiment to unify 
the nation, those who study civil religion as religious nationalism in America stress how 
it has divided the nation in the past and speculate on how it might divide Americans in 
the future. These are important theories to keep in mind while we examine the rhetoric of 
gun rights and control in the coming chapters. 
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            In his article on Civil Religion and the radio genre of the Western, Kip Anthony 
Wedel cites Bellah to argue that though the American civil religion does not worship the 
nation, it does “infuse it with transcendent importance” (Wedel, 2012, p. 31).  Wedel 
argues that the Western genre has “served as a vehicle of national mythology” (p. 
31).  In The Longer Ranger “The United States was depicted as an instrument of God’s 
will in history, and Americans were described as a unique people capable of performing 
God’s will”.  The association of America as a sacred, favored nation with guns and God 
gained traction through mass media. The Lone Ranger himself was an all American who 
lived in accord with God’s law and “help[ed] others to do likewise” (p. 33). The Lone 
Ranger’s eyes, as the narrator stated, had a “light that through the ages lifted the souls of 
strong men who fought for justice – for God” (quoted on Wedel, p. 33). The individual – 
and individualistic – American gunman as an earthly embodiment of God’s will became 
firmly rooted in the American national psyche. 
            In contrast to both folk religion and religious nationalism, Bellah defines civil 
religion as the manner in which everyday people interpret “historical experience in the 
light of transcendent reality” (1967, p. 3). Gehrig (1981) groups Bellah and others of this 
camp as understanding civil religion as the “transcendent universal religion of the 
nation”. As Bellah wrote, “American civil religion is not the worship of the American 
nation” as those who see American civil religion as religious nationalism see it – “but an 
understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal 
reality.”  American civil religion is not the worship of the nation, but the elevation of 
values and a worldview seen as universal.  
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 The definition of civil religion which Bellah himself puts forward is that civil 
religion honors and celebrates transcendental universal values.  Like Durkheim and 
Parsons, Bellah was interested in the function of religion.  Questions of epistemology or 
theology were not important, rather Bellah paid attention to what religion does: it holds a 
society together.  For Bellah, seeing the mundane events of our life, the lives of our 
neighbors, and the lives of all our fellow citizens as having a greater meaning, to see all 
Americans as working on the ‘great experiment’ known as the USA, binds citizens into a 
community.  As we will see in the next chapters, this is very much the view of those such 
as Obama who attempt to make gun control an American civil religious value by 
appealing to universal values. 
            American civil religion emerged from the attempts to reconcile the ideas and 
practices of the diverse American people “in a land with no provision for the legal 
establishment of religion” (Agrosino, p. 258). For this reason, it had to focus on the 
transcendent rather than sectarian particulars.  Contemporary politicians and citizens call 
upon the transcendental ideals of the Constitution such as freedom and equality of 
opportunity, but also even broader categories such as health and education – categories 
almost no one could oppose.  Angrosino gives the example of how opposing sides of the 
abortion debate rarely mention the word abortion itself, but rather discuss “choice” and 
“life”: two universal transcendent values that the state is supposed to defend (p. 
258).  More important to this study, both sides of the gun control debate invoke this civil 
religion in their use of the same language of freedom and protection of life.  The view of 
American civil religion as transcendental religion of the nation allows us to examine how 
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particular positions on current issues are framed in terms of indisputable universal 
concepts.    
            For theorists such as Angrosio, who view civil religion in terms of a 
transcendental universal religion of the state, American civil religion is best understood 
through Geertz’s definition of religion as any: 
system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting  
motivations in [a people] by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz, 1973, p. 90, quoted on 
Angrosino, 2002, pp. 241–242). 
Angrosino notes that this framework “avoid(s) the concepts of the supernatural, so 
important in other theorists’ views of religion, in favor of a framework for studying how 
people are made to feel and understand, and then to act on their feelings and 
understandings” (p. 242).  I keep these words of Angrosino in mind when examining the 
information presented by both gun rights and gun control advocates.  In avoiding 
discussion of the supernatural, both sides present their views as ‘common sense’ rather 
than based on the particular history of American values. 
            Gehrig (1981) argues that understanding American Civil Religion as the 
transcendent universal religion of the nation is the “most productive” (p. 54) definition.  
Seeing civil religion as folk religion which has, in a Durkheimian sense, emerged from 
the ground up, obfuscates the power of civil religion as a Rousseauvian tool of the elite. 
While anthropological examinations of the folk religion of the USA offer a deeper 
understanding of everyday life, these examinations tend to ignore how the powerful have 
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manipulated ‘the sacred’ either for their own benefit, or for the benefit of the nation itself.  
Ethnographies of small-town Halloween celebrations or rhetorical analyses of 4H club 
speeches can miss how rituals and practices often directed by hegemonic forces.  
 While seeing civil religion as merely folk religion can hide power dynamics, 
seeing civil religion as merely religious nationalism fails to recognize how it can bind the 
nation, particularly a national as religiously diverse as USA.  Seeing civil religion as 
merely religious nationalism limits our understanding to the worship of the state itself 
rather than to its values which transcend history and geography.   As Angrosino notes, 
unlike religious nationalism,  Bellah’s understanding of civil religion as aiming at 
universal transcendence is not the worship of the state itself, but rather “the subordination 
of the nation to ethical principles that transcend it in terms of which it should be 
evaluated” (p. 248).   
 Authors such as Gehrig (1981), Angrosino (2002), and Gorksi (2017) understand 
that Bellah’s (1967) understanding civil religion as a force which places geographically 
and historically specific events, people, and practices into a greater transcendent narrative 
allows us to understand the nation beyond the bounds of specific classes and political 
leanings. Bellah’s understanding of civil religion is attractive to both liberals and 
conservatives as it is seen to limit the power of any particular government or the 
fashionable values of a particular period. Though we will see that both gun control 
advocates and gun rights advocates quote the Constitution and other texts and people 
only relevant to the American civil religion, there is an underlying notion of natural law 
which is universal.  The state is constrained by the belief that there are principles that 
transcend the state. 
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            Not only do these universal principles constrain the state, but they also create the 
identities and shape the actions of individuals. Symbols such as the American flag or 
songs such as The Star-Spangled Banner evoke notions of universal, timeless values such 
as freedom and equality of opportunity which in turn influence the actions of individuals, 
regardless of the particular government in power at that particular time. For Bellah 
(1967), the term one nation “under god” is significant: “the will of the people is not itself 
the criterion of right and wrong. There is a higher criterion in terms of which this will can 
be judged; it is possible that the people may be wrong.” For Bellah, this means that 
American beliefs and values reveal not just what reality should be, but also how they 
should all act.  Americans actions are shaped by the symbols of the nation state and the 
universal principles that they evoke. Bellah conceived of writing his essay to promote an 
aspirational kind of civil religion which was linked to his opposition to the American war 
in Vietnam. As Kazin (2013) notes in his obituary of Bellah, Bellah’s Civil Religion in 
America cautions that “without an awareness that our nation stands under higher 
judgments, the tradition of the civil religion would be dangerous indeed”. Let us keep this 
warning in mind as we hear both gun control and gun rights advocates speak of American 
exceptionalism without tying it to America’s covenantal duties. 
            In his 1977 essay on the relevance of Bellah’s conception of civil religion to the 
secularization thesis5, Richard K. Fenn discusses the problem of the double bind of 
                                                   
5 The secularization thesis is the assumption, put forward by many in the enlightenment and into modern 
times, that religion would ‘naturally’ fade away as human beings evolved, and human society progressed. 
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patriotic Vietnam War protesters.  Many of these protestors saw that it was their patriotic 
duty not to question their own government in a time of war, but also their duty to protest 
the policies of their government which violated its transcendent values.  This is the 
double bind in which “The same symbols functioned to express both solidarity with 
American society and support for the official exercise of political power” (Fenn, 
1977).  If a Vietnam war protestor waved an American flag, were they signaling a 
complicity with the war in Vietnam, or signaling a duty to honor the universal values the 
flag represents which might oppose the war?  Here, as Fenn state, they are “caught 
between political dissent and national loyalty by the same symbol”. As we see in the 
following chapters, this is a problem for supporters of gun control: the feeling that 
protecting the vulnerable is both a universal and national civil religious value, yet 
symbols such as the flag, and more importantly, the Bill of Rights, have been repeatedly 
co-opted in support of uncontrolled gun rights.  Because of the confusion of religious 
nationalism and civil religion, there is a feeling that one cannot express patriotism and 
commitment to America’s universal values. 
            One of the transcendent values repeatedly mentioned in the literature on 
American civil religion is that of utilitarian individualism. For Agrosino, this term can be 
explained as the ideology that “things are to be used and people are to be useful” (2002, 
p. 253).  This ethos – how things ought to be and how people ought to act – has emerged 
from the “cultural forces of pragmatism, materialism, and an abiding faith in human 
progress and technological development” (p. 253).  This seems at odds with the Judeo-
Christian insistence on the intrinsic worth of an individual.  However, Angrosino explains 
that it has, in fact, created the American assumption that “any religious value must 
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ultimately be measured and justified in terms of its practical consequence”.  Thus, 
religion of any sort, civil religious or otherwise, is only held up as sacred if it “is capable 
of cultivating individual self-improvement and civic virtue” (p. 253).  This concept of 
utilitarianist individualism is important to keep in mind when examining contemporary 
controversial issues in American public discourse such as affirmative action, gun control 
or public health care as they are essentially issues in which the ethic of individualism is in 
conflict with collective utilitarianism. Whereas gun rights advocates shout the value of 
individualism, gun control advocates meekly point out the caveat of utilitarianism. 
American Civil Religion and Christianity 
            Alexis de Tocqueville’s stated that “Americans combine the notions of liberty and 
Christianity so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive of 
the one without the other” (quoted in Gorski, 2017, p. 60). Such quotations leave us 
understanding, as Bellah did, that the civil religious tradition in America is deeply 
connected to religious nationalism, and that the religion of that nationalism is 
Christianity. But Gehrig (1981) argues that this is not the full story of the historical 
situation.  She argues that the differentiation between American civil religion and 
Christianity began early in the history of American colonial life: founders 
including Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson saw there needed to be a separation 
between American civil religion and the Christian churches.  This separation was 
necessary not just as to avoid sectarian conflict but also to create a void which could be 
filled with a civil religion.  As Sidney Mead stated, “Under religious freedom, because no 
domination could plausibly claim to be, or to function as ‘the church’ in the new nation, 
the nation came more and more so to function (Mead, 1967; cited in Coleman, p. 
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174).  The separation of church and state, and the creation of a non-sectarian civil 
religion, is hailed as both unifying and empowering to the state. 
            Bellah (1967) noted that though civil religion borrowed from dominant religious 
traditions, it avoids divisive claims or symbols as it attempts to incorporate a diverse 
population.  In the writer’s guidelines for the radio program, it is stated that the Lone 
Ranger (the embodiment of American values) “is generally visualized as a Protestant, 
but… he shows respect for … every denomination, including the Indians’ veneration of 
their own Great Spirits” (p. 33). So too, the ideal American civil religious practitioner is 
Protestant, but one respectful of other religions values so long as they do not contradict 
his own. 
            However, Christianity provided the narratives of the American civil 
religion including the national martyr Lincoln, “giving his life so that many might 
become free” and the “the civil holydays [Memorial Day], recalling the truth that from 
the seed of martyred American soldiers springs the church of freedom” (Coleman, 1970, 
p. 75). Coleman notes that this reliance on Christian themes can cause problems: 
“Wherever there is a religious pluralism, a civil religion based on one highly specific 
world religion is bound to fail to provide integrating national symbols for the whole 
population in the land” (p. 70). Yet, Christian authors such as Philip Gorski attempt to 
assure the reader that the civil religious tradition is open to all.  In his 2017 
work American Covenant, Gorski writes “One need not be a Bible believer to draw 
inspiration from the life or oratory of a great civil theologian like Abraham Lincoln or 
Martin Luther King Jr” (p. 15). Yet, the reader is left wondering how a tradition so 
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deeply tied to Christianity could not alienate citizens of other religions as well as non-
believers. 
            Bellah argued that “every movement to make America more fully realize its 
professed values has grown out of some form of public theology” (1967, p. 21).  This 
public theology has Christian roots but attempts to engage with the public and the 
academy, as well as the state.  Angrosino argues that there is a “constant and creative 
tension” between the conservative and the liberal strains of public theology in 
America.  The conservative brand sees the Christian Bible as the foundation of all 
law.  In their minds, any law that contradicts their Bible is unconstitutional as “the 
Constitution is tantamount to the Word of God” (p. 261).  This is the public theology of 
gun rights advocates such as the National Rifle Association. Many major conservative 
Christian sects, particularly those founded in America, such as the Church of Latter Day 
Saints, view the Bible as divinely inspired if not the word of god itself (Slack, 1994, p. 
25-36). 
            For the liberal strain of public theology, the Constitution is not the final revelation 
of God. Liberal theologians do not assume that God stopped talking to America in 
1789 but instead see the Constitution itself is a “work in progress” (Angrosino, p. 
261). This is the public civil religious theology of gun control advocates such as Obama. 
            Liberal public theologians give human agency a role in the destiny of the nation 
and argue that it is the people’s responsibility to realize God’s plan.  Angrosino (2001) 
gives the example of differing views on the proliferation of nuclear arms. Though 
conservatives are generally uninterested in non-proliferation efforts, it is not because they 
are more bellicose, but rather that they believe a nuclear holocaust could happen only if it 
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is in God’s plan. Liberals, on the other hand, might see working towards non-
proliferation as serving God.  During the covid-19 pandemic, this is strikingly evident in 
the debate over mask-wearing.  Conservative Christian nationalists see masks as 
interfering with “God’s wonderful breathing system”, whereas liberal Christians see 
mask-wearing as a way of acting out Jesus’s ethic of care for the most 
vulnerable.  Similarly, conservative Christians who see the right to bear arms as a God-
given right enshrined in the Constitution see gun control as interfering with God’s 
plan.  Liberal Christians, on the other hand, see working to make America less violent as 
a way of serving God. 
The Cannon of American Civil Religion 
 After the flood of ethnographic work on American civil religions that immediately 
followed in the wake of Bellah’s Civil Religion in America, scholars from outside of 
sociology and anthropology began to take the notion of American civil religion into their own 
disciplines. Civil religion memorializes certain texts, people, and values giving them 
power and authority.  The revolutionary period is undoubtedly the era from which 
American civil religion draws most of its values, heroes, myths, stories, and certainly the 
written cannon. Scholars in disciplines including law and the fine arts began to look at 
specific works from this era.  In 1989, Sanford Levinson’s book Constitution Faith won 
the Scribes Book award for the most important work of legal scholarship in the previous 
year.   
 A scholar and an activist, Levinson has written extensively on the problems of 
devotion to the Constitution. Levinson notes that while Madison wrote in 1792 that the 
Constitution should be treated with “more than common reverence for authority”, as time 
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passed, presidents began to recognize the danger of the sacralization of the Constitution.  
In 1816, Jefferson complained of how some citizens "look at constitutions with 
sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the ark of covenant, too sacred to be 
touched”.  By 1885, Woodrow Wilson railed against the “almost blind worship” of the 
constitution.  
 Levinson draws attention to early 20th century recognition of the link between 
devotion to the constitution, and Protestantism.  He notes that in 1937, the Russian-born 
American journalist Max Lerner.  Quoting Lerner, Levinson writes:  
It was no coincidence with Lerner that an American culture so influenced by 
Protestant Christianity would fix on the Constitution: "The very habits of mind 
begotten by an authoritarian Bible and a religion of submission to a higher power 
have been carried over to an authoritarian Constitution and a philosophy of 
submission to a higher law." The United States, whatever the prohibition of the 
first amendment on an establishment of religion, "ends by getting a state church 
after all, although in a secular form.” (1989, p. 192) 
 Levinson asks a central question of this dissertation: “What, then, is genuinely 
learned by reference to the Constitution "worship" or comparing the Supreme Court to 
the Vatican?” Levinson specifically states that the Constitution creates a “covenanting 
community”. A scholar of law and political science, not sociology, nonetheless cites 
Bellah to argue that “the lesson has to do with the central role of the Constitution, as 
declared by the Court, in providing the basis of national unity.”  That is to say, Levinson 
recognized the function of the Constitution as binding the nation together, and he also 
recognized that it is not just the Constitution that does this, but its interpretation by the 
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Court. If the Constitution was simply a document sitting in the Smithsonian, it would 
have little power to pull together a community, it is its interpretation that gives it power 
to make e pluribus unum. 
 These founding documents are not merely unread relics, but documents which 
form the imagined community of the USA. To become an American, immigrants must 
pass a test demonstrating their knowledge of the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. 
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. If they pass, they must take an oath to support the 
U.S. Constitution.  The political scientist Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 2004) argues 
that if America abolished the Constitution, the United States itself would cease to 
exist. At least in law, if not in practice, this allegiance to the civil religious cannon 
supersedes Christianity.  In Thomas Grey’s article “The Constitution as 
Scripture” (1984), he notes that Article VI, third clause states that though no public 
official should be forced to make a religious oath, but they are “bound by oath or 
affirmation to support this Constitution.”  These are not texts that were written and 
forgotten but are the basis of public life and identity in the USA. 
            The second most important time period from which American civil religion draws 
inspiration is the civil war era. As Bellah (1967) notes, Abraham Lincoln stated that he 
“never had a feeling, politically, that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence” (p. 47).  Lincoln links the civil religion of the 
revolutionary era to that of the civil war.  Bellah argues that the symbolism of the 
revolutionary period was Hebraic without being Jewish (p. 48) – Washington was Moses, 
America the new Israel; but the themes that emerge from the civil war — of sacrifice and 
rebirth — are undoubtedly Christian in tone (p. 48).  Lincoln becomes the national 
 60 
martyr, Memorial Day became Easter, and the Gettysburg address becomes the “New 
Testament” of the American civil religion (p. 10).  From Bellah’s functionalist 
perspective, these stories unify the diverse American populous. The Christian themes of 
sacrifice and renewal thus become part of the national narrative. 
            In his discussion on the American civil religious cannon, Angrosino (2002) 
discuses not just documents from the revolutionary period and the civil war — but also 
how newer additions to the cannon have drawn from these texts. He gives the example of 
Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, arguing that Dr. King “used the 
Declaration as a homiletic text, much as he might have used the Bible when preaching in 
his church” (p. 251). He even argues that, though King’s speech has the cadence of 
African American Baptist Sermons, its rhetorical pattern is just as much “rooted in the 
language of the Declaration” (Wills, 1978, p. 175; Raboteau, 1990, cited in Angrosino, p. 
251). King’s speech contained echoes of not just these revolutionary period documents, 
but the rhetoric of the civil war era as well. Angrosino notes how King’s speech drew on 
Lincoln’s use of the Declaration in the Gettysburg Address “where it stood for the moral 
underpinning of his vision of the renewed nation”.  As Angrosino writes, all religious 
traditions are built “through a process of accretion and cross-referenced allusions” (p. 
251).  The American civil religion is no different – the Protestantism covenant theology 
of the first colonizers echo in the founding fathers’ words which reverberate in the civil 
war speeches through the civil rights era to today. 
            For C.K. Chesterton, America was founded on a creed shaped by the 
Enlightenment ideals and Puritan covenant theology. From the Puritans, Americans get 
the idea that they are a chosen people with a manifest destiny.  From the Enlightenment, 
 61 
as Agrosino explains, “equality, liberty, and justice” become “theological values” along 
with faith, hope, and charity as they “are believed to derive from the authority of a divine 
creator” (p. 252). Chesterton argues: 
The creed is set forth with dogmatic even theological lucidity in the Declaration 
of Independence.  It enunciates that all men are created equal in their claim to 
justice, and that governments exist to give them that justice, and that their 
authority is for that reason just (quoted in Mead, 1985). 
The Declaration of Independence encapsulates the values of the time it was written, 
holding Americans to these 18th century values.    
 Though he does not directly reference the Protestant doctrine of Sola Scripture 
(which I discuss more fully in Chapter 4), Levinson (1989, p. 191) discusses the 
importance of the Constitution as the “the supremacy of the Constitution over alternate 
sources of political authority”.  He notes that all public officials, as well as nationalized 
citizens, must swear an oath of allegiance not just to the USA, but to the Constitution 
itself. He notes that the history of disputes over what he terms “constitutional faith” echo 
that of the disputes among Christian sects.  He observes that of central importance to any 
religion is the question “what constitutes the body of materials that counts as 
authoritative teaching for the community organized as a faith community?”.  Levinson 
does not go as far as I do (in chapter 4) to argue that Puritanism shaped the present-day 
American attitude towards the Constitution; however, he writes:  
From an early time the Catholic church invoked the propriety of its own teachings 
as a supplement to the teachings of the Bible. That propriety, of course, was 
specifically challenged by those Protestant reformers who took “Only the 
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Scriptures” as their cry and rejected all non-scriptural teachings as totally without 
authority. 
I see Levinson’s allusion to the link between the importance of the bible as single source 
of authority, and the reliance of the American legal system and social morals on the 
Constitution as obvious.  
 Moreover, Levinson alludes to the analogy of different views of what should be 
considered the Constitution in asking the questions:  
What constitutes the Constitution? Is it composed only of the particular words of 
the canonical text associated with the outcome of the constitutional convention of 
1787, as amended thereafter, or does it also include "unwritten" materials that are 
equally authoritative? Second, does there exist a particular institution whose 
interpretations of the Constitution (however defined) are treated as authoritative? 
Both of these questions allow divergent responses, each of them with their 
Protestant and Catholic analogues.(Levinson, 1989, p. 93) 
Levinson clearly answers these questions by admitting that one strain of American 
Constitutionalism is “Protestant in as much as it emphasizes… that the Constitution 
consists only of what is written down”.  He notes that though some judges on the 
Supreme court may take the “Catholic” view of the Court as the “ultimate interpreter” of 
the Constitution, nonjudges have “have proclaimed the merits of a more Protestant 
understanding of judicial authority” (Levinson, 1989, p. 191): that is, that every citizen 
has the right and the duty to interpret the Constitution for themselves .  
            Scholars such as Pauline Maier (1998) argue that we should not look for our 
modern version of civil religion in documents such as the Constitution and the Bill of 
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Rights because of “how much Americans have transformed very secular and temporal 
documents into sacred scriptures”.  Maier writes that the idea of putting the Declaration 
of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights in bronze-framed display cases 
for tourists to come see would have struck late 18th century Americans as “idolatrous, and 
also curiously at odds with the values of the Revolution”. However, it should be noted 
that President George Washington, in his Farewell Address, argued that “the Constitution 
be sacredly maintained” (quoted in Levinson, 1979).   But by 1816, Jefferson argued that 
the Constitution should not be venerated like the “ark of the covenant” and argued that 
“institutions must advance also” (quoted in Angrosino, 2002, p. 240).  Even the ‘saints’ 
of American civil religion disagreed on the role documents should have in forming the 
American law, identity and shaping the actions of individual Americans. It is not 
surprising then, that there is such bitter debate over the Second Amendment’s place in the 
contemporary USA. 
Civil Religion in Contemporary America     
            Philip Gorksi, who complete his PhD under the supervision of Bellah and now 
teaches sociology and religious studies at Yale University, calls Bellah’s work essentially 
a “jeremiad’ about the decline of civil religion in America (2017, p. ix).  But this doesn’t 
“seem quite right” to Gorski who sees American civil religion as “evolving, rather than 
declining”.  In the mid-1970s, Bellah described American civil religion as “an empty and 
broken shell” and thought it held little relevance in the America of his day (1967). 
However, though most Americans might not recognize the term “civil religion”, in their 
1998 discussion based on survey data, Wimberly and Swatos notes that the majority of 
Americans endorse statements like “America is God’s chosen nation today” and 
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“Holidays like the Fourth of July are religious as well as patriotic (cited in Angrosino, 
2002). Such data seems to indicate that Gorski is right to criticize his mentor, civil 
religion in America is not on the decline.   
            Though most positivist sociologists, in the tradition of Comte and Marx, see civil 
religion as a transitory phase to total secularization, the re-emergence of religious 
sentiment of any kind in reaction to wide-scale social trauma brings this into question. 
Angrosino argues that though “interest in civil religion as a way to come to grips with the 
interface between divinely inspired morality and the sociopolitical realm peaked… during 
the 1970s” (2002, p. 424), in the wake of 9/11, civil religion in America came back to the 
fore of American political discourse.  For the historian Richard Slotkin, a society 
experiencing trauma will look back to its myths “for precedents… a way of getting a 
handle on crisis” (2011; quoted in Angrosino, 2002, p. 240).  Troubled people in secular 
societies seek solace in civil religions for the same reason that people in traditional 
societies seek solace in traditional religions. As Coleman argues, “At a moment of great 
social crisis like famine or war or at a time of momentous political transition, solemn 
religious symbolism – for example in the inauguration of an American president – by 
reference to what does not change, helps to make change tolerable” (1970, p. 69). 
            Angrosino argues that religious values come to the fore when a way of life seems 
threatened (p. 262). He gives the example of the anti-immigrant sentiments of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.  The 1950s saw the formation of the Christian Anti-
Communist League and the John Birch society, that not only targeted communism, but 
also civil rights for African- Americans. For theorists like Angrosino, American civil 
religion, as both a social movement and an analytical concept, is probably only salient in 
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the current situation if it provides a moral basis for establishing a new coalition of 
interests grounded in the traditional values (p. 264). Angrosino notes that while some 
religious leaders argue that the devastation of 9/11 was evidence that God had 
“withdrawn his protective shield in anger at America’s moral lapses”, everyday 
Americans found solace and unity in civil religious principles”. Here, we see a concrete 
example of Americans returning to civil religion to unite the nation; unfortunately, this 
unification is often formed through hatred of a common enemy. 
            Though Gorski (2017) and others dispute Bellah’s 1967 lament that civil religion 
was in decline, they acknowledge that it is changing. Gorski argues that the contemporary 
‘culture wars’ can be seen as the result of changes in civil religious discourse. He argues 
that Reagan (and his speechwriters) corrupted the civil religious tradition through the 
omission of “collective sin” (p. 176) – Americans were told to take pride in their country, 
but never shame.  In the coming chapter on Charlton Heston’s rhetoric of gun rights, we 
see this rhetoric at work.  Heston takes great pride in the good in America, never 
mentioning important facts such as its high gun violence and homicide rates.  This 
poisoned the tradition for many, and, in part, led liberal Democrats to abandon the 
tradition, though Gorski notes that a liberal civil religious tradition was maintained in the 
African American church (2017, p. 175). As we will see in my chapter on Obama’s 
rhetoric, Gorski’s sees Obama’s rhetoric, including his rhetoric on gun control, as part of 
this continuation of this civil religious tradition. 
Conclusion 
            Political ‘instruction manuals’ from Plato’s Laws to Machiavelli’s The Prince to 
Rousseau’s The Social Contract discuss the state use of religious sentiment to unify a 
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diverse public. The founding fathers of the United States of America were aware of this 
utility and their founding documents continue to form the largest part of the ‘cannon’ of 
American civil religion. When issues of the day create conflict in American society –
from abortion to education to gun control — both liberal and conservative thinkers draw 
on the American civil religion to shape policy and the actions of individual 
Americans. Seeing American civil religion not as religious nationalism or folk religion 
but as the transcendent universal religion of the nation, allows us to analyze current 
political rhetoric in light of the past with a hope to understand how actions are shaped by 





HISTORICAL REVIEW: THE 2ND AMENDMENT AS CIVIL RELIGIOUS TEXT  
 
 In this chapter, I attempt to give the Second Amendment some context. I divide 
the chapter into two sections: the first is a history of the Second Amendment, and the 
second is on the Second Amendment as civil religious document. I begin with a 
discussion of the right to bear arms in the 17th century English Bill of Rights, early gun 
laws and the right to bear arms in the colonies, and the passing of the Second 
Amendment.  I then move through Supreme Court decisions on the definition of the right 
to bear arms, culminating in the 2008 Supreme Court decision of Heller v. DC.  I then 
begin to address the history of the Second Amendment as a civil religious text.  
Spitzer writes: 
much of what people believe about the history and law of guns in America… [is] 
demonstrably false… If we take the past as any cue to the present, then we should 
take comfort at least in the knowledge that our past gun history is far more 
compatible with present dilemmas, and policies, than most realize (2015) 
For historians and political scientists like Spitzer, understanding the true history of 
American gun laws can help Americans solve some of the problems that they face today.  
The Right to Bear Arms 
 In the late 17th century, political life in England was dominated by the issue of 
the authority of the King to rule without the consent of parliament.  In addition, the role 
of Catholics in a country which was rapidly turning to Protestantism was unclear. In 
1688, the Catholic King James the II was overthrown in what has come to be known as 
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the Glorious Revolution. The Protestants William II and Mary II were put in power, 
accepting the conditions of the Bill of Rights. 
 The Catholic Kings Charles II and James II had both attempted, with more or less 
success, to maintain power by using militias loyal to them and disarming Protestants that 
were “suspected or knowne” of being opposed to the government (Bogus, 1997).  For 
example, in the 1671 Game Act, the Catholic King James II had ordered the general 
disarmament of Protestant regions (Malcolm, 1996, pp. 103–106).  The English Bill of 
Rights specifically states that it is an attempt to restore the rights taken away by James 
II.  The Bill states, 
Whereas the late King James the Second… did endeavour to subvert and extirpate 
the Protestant Religion and the Lawes and Liberties of this Kingdome … by 
causing several good Subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time 
when Papists were both Armed and Imployed contrary to Law … thereupon the 
said Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons pursuant to their respective 
Letters and Elections… for the Vindicating and Asserting their ancient Rights 
Declare … That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their 
Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law (Participation, n.d. 
italics added) 
The last phrase of the last sentence, (“and as allowed by Law”) stressed the fact that this 
is not a new right, but rather, a codification of an existing right.  As the British 
constitutional historian Mark Thompson writes, the English Bill of Rights did, “little more 
than set forth certain points of existing laws and simply secured to Englishmen the rights 
of which they were already legally possessed” (Glorious Revolution, 2010). The 
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American historian Joyce Lee Malcolm notes that both before and after the English Bill 
of Rights was codified, the government could disarm individuals it deemed 
dangerous (Malcolm, 1996, p. 51). 
            The right of Protestants to bear arms, codified in the English Bill of Rights, has 
long been seen as the predecessor of the Second Amendment (see Dumbauld, 1979, p. 
51).  There is no doubt that the American founding fathers were heavily influenced by the 
English Bill of Rights; however, to what extent the Second Amendment is a transposition 
of the right of groups of Protestants not to be disarmed by a King is a subject of 
debate.  That is to say, this is the beginning of the debate as to whether the American 
framers intended the right to bear arms to be a means for the states to protect themselves 
against the federal government, or whether it was assured as an individual right. 
As the American political scientist Robert J. Spitzer (2015) notes, the history of the gun 
in what would become The United States of America begins with the earliest European 
settlers in the 17th century in Jamestown and Plymouth. These settlers brought guns with 
them from Europe. Yet, “in the colonial and early federal period, guns were relatively 
rare, and seldom associated with interpersonal violence” as guns they were mainly used 
for hunting.   
  However, even in the 17th century, militias were developing and violent conflicts 
between indigenous peoples and European settlers continues. By the late 17th century, 
slave patrols were formed from the already existing militias in the colonies. These slave 
patrols were created with the intent to capture enslaved Africans attempting to escape 
from slavers. By 1727, the Virginia colony enacted laws requiring the creation of slave 
patrol militias (Hadden, 2001, pp. 25–28).  All able-bodied European adult men were 
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forced to join these patrols, commandeered by property-owners and slavers (Dunbar-
Ortiz, 2018, p. 63). Those who refused to serve faced fines (Hadden, p. 25-28). 
We cannot fully understand the original intent of the Second Amendment without 
understanding what these militias were. To do this, we must first understand the concept 
of what is referred to as ‘savage war’. The American radical historian Roxanne Dunbar-
Ortiz 2018 argues that the irregular forces in the American colonies of Virginia and 
Massachusetts 
sought to disrupt every aspect of resistance as well as to obtain intelligence 
through scouting and taking prisoners… These voluntary fighting crews made up 
of individual civilians – “rangers” are the groups references as militias, as they 
came to be called, in the Second Amendment” (p. 43). 
For Dunbar-Ortiz, “The militias referred to in the Second Amendment were intended as 
means for white people to eliminate Indigenous communities in order to take their land, 
and for slave patrols to control Black people” (p. 53).    
 Though many of those who stress the importance of the term militia in the Second 
Amendment, Dunbar-Ortiz (2018), does not only believe that the right to bear arms 
mentioned in this amendment only applied to militias as a collective entity. Rather, she 
argues that “Although the US Constitution formally instituted “militias” as state-
controlled bodies that were subsequently deployed to wage wars against Native 
Americans, the voluntary militias described in the Second Amendment entitled settlers, 
as individuals and families, to the right to combat Native Americans on their own” (p. 
53).  That is, she believed that the Second Amendment gave all white settlers the 
individual legal right to bear arms. 
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 During the pre-revolutionary period, the colonial militia was composed of 
colonists of all political affiliations, including those who supported British rule. These 
militias were made up of ordinary citizens who were willing to take up arms in order to 
defend their colony. However, many of those who did not agree with British rule, 
referred to as the Patriots, began to distrust the Loyalists in the militias.  The Patriots 
formed their own militias which excluded Loyalists and began to stock their own 
armories.  In response, the British placed a weapons embargo on the American colonies 
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 39).  In addition, King George III began disarming colonists, 
particularly in regions seen as disloyal to the crown. The colonists cited the English Bill 
of Rights and the English Common law right to self-defense (Halbrook, 1989, p. 7) in 
their attempts to remain armed. The Patriots attempted to use English law against the 
English crown itself in an attempt to retain the right to bear arms. 
 In the revolutionary period, guns were far from common.  As discontent in the 
colonies became more obvious to the British, import of guns from Europe became 
difficult (Spitzer, 2013). American military leaders including George Washington 
complained that there was a lack of not only firearms, but a lack of service-eligible males 
with basic knowledge of how to use and maintain a firearm (Spitzer).  Spitzer attributes 
the rarity of guns to the fact that guns were expensive as they were mostly hand-made by 
blacksmiths.  These blacksmiths could only produce perhaps a few dozen firearms a year, 
and, as they were made of iron, they rusted quickly – lasting perhaps five years if well-
maintained. Though we might think of these settlers as being avid hunters in need of 
guns, most were subsistence farmers whose diets consisted of produce and domesticated 
 72 
livestock. The guns of the day were expensive and difficult to maintain and operate, 
meaning the average colonists did not have the knowledge or skill to use a gun.  
Early Gun Laws in the Colonies 
 In addition to the fact that there were few guns, and even fewer people who knew 
how to use them, the American colonies had their own gun control laws. As Spitzer 
notes, the government kept tabs on its citizens’ gun possession and would “confiscate 
them for offences ranging from failing to swear an oath of loyalty to the government, to 
the violation of various hunting restrictions, to the failure to pay an obligatory gun tax” 
(Spitzer, 2015).  There were laws to ensure that the militia was effective, such as laws 
requiring armed men to muster for weapon inspection (Winkler, n.d.).  More 
importantly, the states reserved the right to take guns, including privately-owned 
guns.  The states also reserved the right “to direct that guns be kept in a central location 
for rapid accessibility” (Spitzer, 2013, para 5). Spitzer (2015, p. 30) argues that these 
laws show that “guns in the hands of early Americans to a great degree represented the 
power of the state… not power against the state”. This is to say, though gun rights 
advocates and present-day militias frequently argue that militias are critical in holding the 
government to account, an examination of these particular gun laws in the colonies show 
that militias were formed to empower the state, not the individual. 
 The second category of gun law Spitzer discusses is the laws that barred gun 
ownership by various groups including: “slaves, indentured servants, Native Americans, 
Catholics or other non-Protestants, non-property-owning whites, those who violated 
hunting laws, and those who refused to swear oaths of loyalty to the government” (2013, 
para 6). Spitzer notes that the first of these laws were those banning the distribution of 
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guns to indigenous peoples. He notes that “[a]s early as the 1600s, persons discovered 
selling guns to Indians could be subject to death” (para 6).  In 1777, Pennsylvania 
enacted a law to take guns away from citizens who refused to swear an oath of allegiance 
to the government (para. 6).  This law alone disarmed up to 40% of the state’s adult male 
settlers.  
 The third type of gun law that Spitzer discusses is more familiar: these laws 
resemble contemporary gun control measures such as restricting certain weapons and 
hunting regulations.  Most states, at some point, enacted laws prohibiting particularly 
dangerous weapons including pistols.  Other laws restricted certain kinds of hunting such 
as hunting at night by firelight. 
 The critical historian Dunbar-Ortiz (2018) has a very different take on gun laws of 
the same era.  To Dunbar-Ortiz, the 1776 Declaration of Independence symbolized not 
only the American break from Britain, but the official beginning of the wars of expansion 
westward across the North American continent.  However, the ethnic cleansing of the 
eastern part of the continent had begun much earlier: the destruction of the agricultural 
peoples of the Ohio River and Great Lakes region had begun even before the start of the 
Declaration of the French and Indian War in 1754 (p. 30). 
            To the dismay of British settlers, in the mid-1760s King George III forbade the 
expansion of British settlers west of the Allegheny-Appalachian Mountains. Those who 
had already settled there were told to return to the thirteen colonies and relinquish their 
claims to land.  Unfortunately for the indigenous peoples of the region, it soon became 
evident that the British did not have enough soldiers to enforce the King’s edict. Not only 
did many of the settlers remain, but many more came from the east, heading west of the 
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mountain chain.  They appropriated land, formed militias, and provoked wars with 
indigenous nations. As Dunbar-Ortiz writes, 
 Male colonial settlers had long formed militias for the purpose of raiding and 
razing Indigenous communities and seizing their lands and resources…  Virginia, 
the first colony, forbade any man to travel unless he was “well armed.” A few 
years later, another law required men to take arms with them to work and to 
attend church or be fined.  In 1658, the colony ordered every settler home to have 
a functioning firearm, and later even provided government loans for those who 
could not afford to buy a weapon.  Similarly, New England colonial governments 
made laws such as the 1632 requirement that each person have a functioning 
firearm plus two pounds of gun powder and ten pounds of bullets.  Householders 
were fined for missing or defective arms and ammunition.  No man was to appear 
at a public meeting unarmed (p. 35).   
These earliest gun laws were not aimed at merely fighting the oppressive rule of the 
British.  Rather, they were meant to enable America’s own imperialist project. In 
reference to such laws, Dunbar- Ortiz goes on to state that “The Second Amendment, 
ratified in 1791, enshrined these obligations as Constitutional law” (p. 35).  In this 
respect, the Second Amendment was neither a ‘God-given individual right’ as 
contemporary gun rights advocates insist, or a collective right meant to ensure freedom 
from one particular oppressive colonial power, as gun control advocates maintain; rather, 
the Second Amendment merely enshrined the white, Christian imperialist manifest 
destiny in law. 
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The Right to Bear Arms in the States 
 Even before the federal Second Amendment was ratified in 1791, many of the 
state constitutions included a right to bear arms, including Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 states 
“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state; 
and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be 
kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination, to, and governed 
by, the civil power” (Declaration of Rights, cl. XIII).  Like the federal Second 
Amendment with its references to militias, we see the direct connection between the early 
right to bear arms and the distrust of standing armies.  We can assume that the framers of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution feared a federal government that might use soldiers to 
oppress people. Taking their lessons from English history, they believed that the 
government should only raise an army when necessary to fight a foreign adversary.  In 
1790, the phrasing of the right to bear arms in Pennsylvania was shortened to “The right 
of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be 
questioned” (Art. 1, § 21, enacted 1790, art. IX, § 21).   
 The state constitution of North Carolina initially included a clause very similar to 
that in the Constitution of the State of Pennsylvania.  The version in the 1776 state Bill of 
Rights states: “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State; and, 
as standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept 
up; and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, 
the civil power” (Bill of Rights, § XVII).  However, the wording of this clause has 
changed over the history of the state.  In 1868, the article was changed to be more in 
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fitting with the Second Amendment of the federal Constitution. Indeed, it can be seen as 
a more complete version of the federal Second Amendment.  It read:  
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies, 
in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up, and the 
military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil 
power” (Art. I, § 24).  
In 1875, this sentence, “Nothing herein contained shall justify the practice of carrying 
concealed weapons or prevent the Legislature from enacting penal statutes against said 
practice” was added to the 1868 version.  In 1971, the current version was enacted 
stating: 
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies in 
time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the 
military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil 
power.  Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons or 
prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that 
practice” (Art. 1, § 30: enacted 1971).  
With the 1971 version of the North Carolina right to bear arms, we see the progression of 
the concerns of the people regarding gun rights and regulations: it begins with a 
discussion of the importance of state militias, then moves to a discussion of standing 
armies, and ends with restrictions on carrying concealed weapons. 
 
 77 
Passing the Second Amendment 
 The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America was 
passed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791.  There 
are several versions of the 2nd amendment, with slightly different grammar and 
punctuation.  The version passed by Congress, prepared by the scribe William Lambert 
reads: 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
However, the version that was ratified by the States and authenticated by then-secretary 
of state Thomas Jefferson reads: 
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
Early state constitutions, such as the constitutions of Pennsylvania and North Carolina, 
expressed the concern of the colonists regarding standing armies.  However, as George 
Mason Law Professor Nelson Lund and UCLA law professor Adam Winkler explain, the 
Revolutionary War had shown that militia forces were not enough for national 
defense.  The attendees of the Constitutional Convention thought that the federal 
government needed the authority to create and maintain a peace-time army, and to 
regulate militias (Winkler & Lund, n.d.).     
 This shift in power from the states to the federal government became a major 
conflict.  Anti-Federalists feared that the proposed Constitution would usurp the states 
means of defense.  For Lund and Winkler, the issue was not whether the federal 
government has a right to disarm citizens, but rather, “whether an armed populace could 
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adequately deter federal oppression”.  Spitzer notes that the debates of the First Congress 
in 1789 recording the Second Amendment all pertained to “military/militia/national 
defence matters”.  He notes that there was no debate regarding anything to do with a 
personal right to bear arms aside from service in a militia (p. 70). But this is not to say 
that it was not a personal right, it was just not spoken of and therefore it doesn’t help us 
settler any debate. As Lund and Winkler argue, it was not until “long after the Bill of 
Rights was adopted” that the debate became one of “whether it protects a private right of 
individuals to keep and bear arms, or a right that can be exercised only through militia 
organizations”.  
Gun Rights and Regulation in The Civil War Era 
 By the 1840s, America had become a “militaristic-capitalist powerhouse” 
(Dunbar-Ortiz, p. 39).  The nation’s wealth came from the land appropriated from 
indigenous peoples, the labour of the enslaved Africans who created wealth from this 
land, and, increasingly, industry.  Dunbar-Ortiz notes that the firearms manufacturing 
industry in America was “amongst the first successful modern corporations”.  
 During the civil war, millions of American men, black and white, became 
accustomed to guns during their military service and technological improvements made 
guns safer, easier to use, and less expensive (Spitzer, 2015, p. 71). As early as the 1850s, 
manufacturers such as Samuel Colt sold guns to the American public by “extensive 
advertising campaigns with romanticized and idealized visions of the American West” 
(Spitzer, 2013).  By the end of the 19th century, there came to be concern about the 
number of guns in America.  As Spitzer note, “the glut of handguns in America spawned 
by Colt and his competitors began to prompt calls for government action to stem the 
 79 
rising tide of gun violence found mostly in eastern cities rather than in the American 
western frontier” (para 3). Despite what “cowboy films” might lead us to believe, there 
was very little violence between settlers in the ‘wild west’.  As Spitzer notes, during the 
“height of lawlessness in the legendary cattle town of Dodge City” there was an average 
of 1.5 deaths per year. Moreover, “In the most violent year in Tombstone, Arizona, home 
of the celebrated gunfight at OK Corral, five people were killed” (para 8).  Most frontier 
cities had a system of ‘gun checks’ within city and town limits.  Those carrying guns 
would ‘check’ guns at designated locations and receive a ‘claim’ token to reclaim the 
weapon when they left.  Typical Old West towns had “stricter gun laws than many 21st 
century American states” according to Spitzer’s research. 
Militias and de facto Slave Patrols 
            Anti-police violence groups including Black Lives Matter have long noted the 
connection between slave patrols and contemporary American police forces.  Yet, the 
connection between slave patrols and contemporary gun rights activist groups such as the 
NRA are less broadly discussed.  Historians Ned and Constance Sublette write that in 
Virginia “Guns and slavery were intimately associated with each other, all slave-raiding 
relied on guns, and all slaveholding relied on armed repression” (p. 133). The legacy of 
slave patrol militias lasted long after the civil war ended, and slavery was formally 
outlawed in the South.  As Dunbar-Ortiz explains: 
The thirteenth Amendment abolished legal chattel slavery, but the surveillance of 
Black people by patrols continued, as the occupying Union army took no 
concerted action against the patrols in most places (depending on the army 
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commander), forcing formerly enslaved Africans to remain and work on 
plantations. (p. 66)  
Various groups became de facto militias following the civil war, most famously the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK).  
            The KKK is only one of the many groups that emerged out of slave 
patrols.  Many Confederate combat veterans, Confederate guerillas, plantation owners, 
and other interested white men formed what were ostensibly private ‘rifle clubs’, which 
functioned not just as elite country clubs so that those who had been in power before the 
civil war could reproduce their power through personal affiliations, but also, as slave 
patrols.   Officially, by 1876, South Carolina alone had at least 240 such clubs (Dunbar-
Ortiz,  p. 67). These clubs allowed those with training using weapons to “mobilize 
quickly”.  Groups like the KKK, though they went against formal US law, “required 
Freedmen to have written permission to travel from the plantations where many 
continued to work… established curfews for gatherings of African Americans as well as 
limits on the number who could gather… burned homes [and] confiscated the guns of 
freedmen” (p. 69).  In many ways, the KKK and other such de facto slave patrols had 
more ability to torture, maim, and murder African-Americans than before the civil war: 
when African-Americans were seen as property. These slave patrols would be responsible 
for the death or permanent disability of formally enslaved people by their former 
slavers.   After the civil war, African Americans lacked the ‘protection of property’ from 
their slavers, and also lacked any real protection from slave patrols from the police or 
federal government.  As Dunbar-Ortiz grimly concedes, the private ‘rifle clubs’ had “far 
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more freedom to torture and murder, since the Black body no longer carried monetary 
value that the murderer would have to compensate for” (p. 69). 
 In the late 19th century, the US Army continued to kill bison and move indigenous 
people across the west with Winchester rifles (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 120).  In 1876, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the previous century’s stance that “The right to bear arms is not 
granted by the Constitution”.  As the critical historian Dunbar-Ortiz notes, there was “no 
recorded negative reaction to that decision”.  But in the next century, things began to 
change.    
20th Century Gun Legislation 
 Spitzer notes that in the 20th century, gun laws were created to fight not just 
general gun-related crime, but assassinations.  Under Franklin D Roosevelt, who had 
been the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt that killed Chicago Mayor Anton 
Cermak, the USA saw its first national gun control measure: The National Firearms act of 
1934.  This law regulated “gangster-type” weapons such as sawed-off shotguns and 
machine guns (Spitzer, 2013). Four years later, the Federal Firearm Act established a 
commercial licencing system for the small arms industry including dealers, 
manufacturers and importers (para 10). 
 In the 1939 case of United States v. Miller 307 US 174, the Supreme Court sided 
firmly with the collective rights theory of the Second Amendment.  The judges ruled that 
a sawed-off shotgun could be regulated because it did not have “some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia . . ..” (quoted in 
Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 120). In their decision, the judges ruled that the Framers intended 
the Second Amendment to support the military not the individual.  
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 By the end of the 1960s, there was a reformulation of constitutional law which 
meant that the central purpose of the federal government was not to protect individuals 
from abuse by state governments, but rather to protect them from violence from other 
individual Americans (Simon, 2004, p. 344; cited in Dawson, 2019, p. 3).  Not everyone 
was comfortable with this power.  The Vietnam War was the first major conflict that 
America had lost, and it shattered many people’s faith in their government. 
 It wasn’t until 1968, with a “push” for gun laws following the Kennedy 
assassination, that a new federal gun control law was enacted. In that year, both Martin 
Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy were assassinated, providing the “final impetus” 
for the Gun Control Act.  As Spitzer notes, this act:                        
prohibited gun sales to minors; strengthened licensing and recordkeeping 
requirements for dealers and collectors; extended regulations to destructive 
devices including land mines, bombs, and hand grenades; increased penalties for 
gun crimes; and regulated importation of foreign-made firearms. 
The bill also forbids the interstate shipment of firearms to individuals, which was how 
Lee Harvey Oswald had obtained the gun used to kill Kennedy. The bill also included 
gun registration and licencing; however, President Lyndon Johnson cut this provision 
(para. 11). Many scholars have noted (ex. Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018; Winkler, n.d.) that it 
wasn’t until the 1970s that anyone – reporters, lawyers, judges, or the public – really paid 
any attention to interpreting the Second Amendment.  
            Many of the provisions of this 1968 legislation were rolled back by the Reagan 
administration. In 1986 the Firearm Owner Protections Act was championed by the 
National Rifle Association and enacted by Congress.  This act: 
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allowed interstate sale of long guns (rifles and shotguns), reduced recordkeeping 
for dealers, limited government regulatory powers over dealers and gun shows (in 
particular, limiting inspections of gun dealers to one a year), and barred firearms 
registration. 
However, the act did bar the civilian possession of new automatic weapons (para. 12). 
            The mass shootings following the 1986 Firearm Owner Protection Act led to calls 
for tighter gun control. Though many scholars note that the assassinations of the late 
1968s seemed like a prime time to pass gun control legislation (Winkler, 2013), 
substantive gun control legislations was not be passed until the Clinton Administration 
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018).  The Democratic Party first included gun control in their election 
platform during Bill Clinton’s 1992 run.  The Republican Party responded stating, “We 
note that those who seek to disarm citizens in their homes are the same liberals who tried 
to disarm our nation during the Cold War and are today seeking to cut our national 
defense below safe levels” (quoted in Dunbar Ortiz, p. 21). However, with the election of 
Bill Clinton and Democratic Control of the white House and Congress, there was no 
problem passing the “Brady Bill” requiring background checks.  The bill was named after 
Jim Brady, a Republican white house press secretary who was permanently disabled 
during an attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan in 1991.  Brady’s wife, Sarah, also a 
Republican, had worked to get the bill passed under Republican Administrations. The 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICBCS) has since blocked nearly 




Columbia V. Heller 
 As Lund and Winkler put it, until the case of Heller V. District of Columbia, the 
Second Amendment was “almost a dead letter” to the judiciary (Winkler, 2013). In this 
case, the judges ruled that a Washington, D.C. handgun ban was in violation of the US 
Constitution as it restricted an individual’s right to bear arms. Until the Heller vs. DC 
ruling “no gun law had been declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Second 
Amendment” (Spitzer, 2015, p. 71) As the critical historian Dunbar-Ortiz (2018) noted, 
“For the First time, the highest court, the ultimate interpreter of the meaning of the 
United States Constitution, decided that the Second Amendment means “the individual” 
when it says “people”. (p. 120) 
  In their ruling, the majority noted that the 1934 case of the United States v. Miller 
was not in violation of the Second Amendment because of the fact that a sawed-off 
shotgun would not to be used by a citizen for law-abiding purposes or that similar rulings 
regarding specific weapons would not be in violation of the law.  They further noted that 
this did not mean rulings could not be made to restrict criminals and the mentally ill from 
possessing weapons or that guns could be taken into “sensitive” places such as schools or 
government buildings. 
 In this 5-4 decision, the court ruled that the Second Amendment protected an 
individual’s right to bear arms for their own defense, not just the right of a 
militia.  Though Scalia and his supporters thought of themselves as originalists, liberal 
constitutional historians Spitzer argues that the decision “was actually an exercise in a 
living constitution approach.” (Spitzer, 2015, p. 71). Critics have argued that Scalia’s 
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opinion did not come from the First Congress’s debates regarding the amendment but that 
the opinion instead: 
relies on a dissenting opinion expressed at the Pennsylvania State ratifying 
convention of 1788 and similar lone dissenting opinions from the New Hampshire 
and Massachusetts conventions, all of which were ignored by those who framed 
and wrote the Second Amendment…. Worse, Scalia relied on sources that were 
not even from the founding period: two legal treatises written in the nineteenth 
century and an early-eighteenth-century British case (Spitzer). 
            However, for more libertarian legal scholars, the Heller v. DC decision is a return 
to reasonable gun laws. For Nelson Lund (n.d.), it was “During the 20th century” – 
assumedly in the Reagan era — that “the Supreme Court finally started taking the First 
Amendment seriously”.  To support this argument, Lund again draws on the analogy of 
the first amendment.  He passionately argues: 
During the nineteenth century, courts routinely refused to invalidate restrictions 
on free speech that struck the judges as reasonable. This meant that speech got 
virtually no judicial protection. Government suppression of speech can usually be 
thought to serve some reasonable purpose, such as reducing social discord or 
promoting healthy morals. Similarly, most gun control laws can be viewed as 
efforts to save lives and prevent crime, which are perfectly reasonable goals. If 
that’s enough to justify infringements on individual liberty, neither Constitutional 
guarantee means much of anything. (Lund, n.d. emphasis added) 
 In the 2008 opinion of DC V. Heller, Scalia wrote that the Second Amendment 
refers to “the inherent right to self-defence” .  However, he does note that this right “is 
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not unlimited” and that, historically, “the right was not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner and for whatever purpose”.  He gives the examples of 
weapons “that are most useful in military service – M-16 rifles and the like” as well as 
the laws which prohibit the possession of firearms by felons, children and the mentally 
ill, and laws forbidding guns in places like schools. Scalia also argues that the Second 
Amendment includes weapons “that were not in existence at the time of the founding” 
(District of Columbia v. Heller Opinion of the Court, 2008), a very peculiar inclusion in 
the decision given the advancement in weapons technologies since the Bill of Rights. 
            The dissent to Scalia’s opinion was authored by Justice Paul Stevens (District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 2008) with a collective rights hermeneutic. The dissenters argued 
that the 2nd amendment did not protect the right of individuals, but, only, “the right of the 
people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated militia” (para. 3). 
Moreover, the dissenters argued that even if the Second Amendment did protect the 
individual right to bear arms for personal self-defense, this did not mean that it should be 
interpreted as a right for the individual to own handguns in high-crime urban areas. 
            Though Heller may be a radical decision in the history of the Supreme Court, it 
was not a radical decision with regards to public opinion. Soon after the Heller decision, 
Gallup released a poll that found that 73 percent of those polled believed in an 
individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment.  As Dunbar-Ortiz notes, this is “a 
far larger percentage” of the American public than just gun owner or NRA members 
(2018, p. 121).  For Dunbar-Ortiz, this is testament to the idea that the success of Heller 
was not just due to the lobbying effort of the NRA and gun manufacturers.  Rather, she 
states, it is the other way around, “the NRA and gun manufacturers success is due to a 
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larger ideological hegemony that they did not create, but rather have exploited” (p. 
121).  This is an incredibly important point which is not understood by contemporary gun 
control activists, including President Obama. The idea that individual Americans have the 
right to bear arms has ideological roots deeper and further back than the NRA lobbying 
and Remington TV ads. 
Post-Heller America 
 Since the Heller decision, the Supreme Court has continued to strengthen this 
individual rights theory of the Second Amendment. The 2010 case of McDonald v. City 
of Chicago (08-1521) affirmed the individualistic interpretation of the right and applied it 
to the states. Writing five years after the Heller decision, Spitzer (2015, p. 73) notes that 
there have been over seven hundred challenges to gun laws, based in the Second 
Amendment, in state and federal courts.  Sixty of these have been appealed to the 
Supreme Court but all of them have been declined (p. 75).  However, as Strasser (2008) 
notes, even since the case of Heller v. DC, lower courts have upheld particular 
restrictions on gun possession including regulations prohibiting weapons on government 
property (Bennett, 2003) (US v Dorosan, 350 Fed. Appx. 874 (5th Cir. 2009), regulations 
restricting young people and convicted criminals’ access to weapons ( US v Rene, 583 
F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009) regulations requiring a permit to carry a concealed weapon 
(Kachalsky v County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012). One exception was 
the 2012 cases from the Seventh Court of Appeals Moor v. Madigan in which it was 
ruled that the state of Illinois must adopt some sort of concealed-carry law.  Until this 
point it had been the only state to completely forbid concealed-carry (p. 75).  
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 Spitzer (2013), a liberal historian in favour of a collectivist interpretation of the 
Second Amendment, argues that “the predicate of modern American gun politics are 
mostly built on quicksand.” For Spitzer, it is possible to have a debate about the 
contemporary issue of gun rights or gun safety without drawing on the past; however, this 
is not how the debate is progressing currently.  As Spitzer notes  
The Heller and McDonald rulings established, as a matter of law, an individual 
rights interpretation of the Second Amendment. But while judges can change the 
law, they cannot change history, and the historical record largely contradicts the 
bases for these two recent rulings. 
However, the point of this historical review is not to decide the original intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution.  Rather, the point of this examination of gun laws of the last 
two and a half centuries has been to give us a broader understanding of the interpretation 
of the Second Amendment and how it has become a cannon of American civil religion.  I 
now turn specifically to a discussion of the Second Amendment as a civil religious text. 
The Second Amendment as Civil Religious Text 
Why Don’t Americans Just Change the Second Amendment? 
 Throughout this section, I have hinted at reasons why many Americans have a 
fundamentalist hermeneutic towards their Constitution, and I have hopefully shown that 
this fundamentalist hermeneutic runs throughout American society, due, at least in part, 
to the founding of America by Protestants, and the importance of individualism.  Yet, I 
think it is also necessary to look at the particular reasons why Americans don’t just 
change the Constitution rather than take circuitous routes to make the 18th century Bill of 
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Rights fit today’s society. In this section, I discussion the legal reasons why Americans 
do not just change a part of the Constitution which seems outdated. 
            Before I discuss the process of changing the Constitution in the United States, I 
would like to address how it is changed in other Constitutional democracies around the 
world. In most parliamentary democracies, the Constitution can be changed via a popular 
referendum.  In Australia, for example, the proposed law must be passed through both 
houses, and then can be put to a popular referendum. If a majority of voters, in a majority 
of the states, agree to the amendment, the Constitution will be changed (Bennett, 
2003).  In other nations with even newer Constitutions, the process is even easier.  In 
Myanmar, for example, a popular referendum is not required for all changes to the 
Constitution. Instead, in some cases the Constitution can be amended if 75% of the 
members of both houses of parliament agree to the amendment (Constitutional 
Amendment in Myanmar, 2020). 
            Amending the Constitution of the USA is outlined in Article V. 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures 
of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing 
amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as 
part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the 
several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided that no 
amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and 
eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of 
 90 
the first article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
suffrage in the Senate. 
In essence, this means that there are two possible methods for changing the Constitution. 
In the first method, two-thirds of both houses of congress and three quarters of the State 
governments must ratify the change.  Given the two-party system, particularly in the 
Trump era, we can see that this would be an incredibly difficult process. On an issue 
concerning gun control, at the present time, this is impossible.  The second method is that 
two-thirds of State legislatures can request congress to call a Constitutional 
Convention.  At this convention, three-quarters of the state governments must ratify the 
change.  Again, given the division in America, I cannot imagine this happening if the 
amendment is concerning gun control. 
            Since 1789, there have been thirty-three amendments approved by Congress via 
the first method.  Of these, twenty-seven were approved by the states and are now part of 
the Constitution.  We see how difficult the task of amending the US Constitution is when 
we consider that the even the Equal Rights Amendment, which guarantees equal rights to 
women under the law, a right guaranteed in all other developed nations (including 
Switzerland, which only guaranteed women equal rights in 1996), has still not been 
ratified.  
In addition to popular referendums to completely change the Constitution, some 
nations, including Canada, have what is referred to as a “notwithstanding clause” (la 
disposition dérogatoire in French). Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which is part of the Constitution of Canada, allows the national parliament or 
a provincial legislature to temporarily override portions of the Constitution, without 
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actually changing the Constitution permanently. Often the clause is invoked for 
temporary circumstances.  For example, during an outbreak of a disease, provincial 
parliaments may pass mandatory vaccinations for children laws notwithstanding the fact 
that these may violate Constitutional right of parents.  In addition, the clause is often used 
by provinces that believe they have a culture which is different from the rest of 
Canada.  For example, politicians in Alberta – the most socially conservative province in 
the nation — have attempted to pass laws banning same-sex marriage, notwithstanding 
that this would violate the Constitutional promise of equality. Most controversially, in 
Quebec – which is steeped in the French tradition of laicity — politicians have banned 
public officials from wearing religious garments such as hijabs and turbans, 
notwithstanding that this ban would violate the Constitutional principle of freedom of 
expression. 
            In a nation as politically divided as the United States, we can see that getting an 
amendment though the house and the senate, and then having it pass by popular 
referendum would be extremely difficult.  However, I think it is clear that a temporary 
suspension of rights guaranteed in the Constitution in various states, might prove to be 
popular.  For example, New York might enforce mandatory vaccinations. California 
might decide to temporarily enact handgun bans in urban centers, much like DC had until 
it was overruled by the Supreme Court.  But because the United States does not have 
constitutional clauses like Canada’s notwithstanding clause which allows certain regions 
to temporarily over-ride the constitution, law makers are forced to perform the rhetorical 
exercise of persuading lawmakers and the public of their desired interpretation of the 
Constitution. 
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The Second Amendment as Sacred 
 One week after Robert Neelly Bellah’s death in 2013,  The New 
Republic published an article entitled “The Father of America’s ‘Civil Religion’ Has 
Died” (Kazin, 2013).  The article begins not with a discussion of Bellah or his work, but 
with a discussion of Barack Obama’s speech at the prayer vigil in Newtown, Connecticut 
which had been made the previous December. The author, Kazin calls it “one of the best 
speeches of his [Obama’s] presidency”. In the speech, Obama grieved and consoled the 
nation following the Newtown shootings. Obama held back tears stating “we cannot 
tolerate this anymore. These tragedies must end.” As the author, Michael Kazin of 
Georgetown University, notes, the President concluded in a typical fashion: asking God 
to bless America. 
 We most often think of American civil religious rhetoric as coming from 
conservatives.  The concepts of American exceptionalism and the attempts to claim that 
America was established as a Christian Nation exemplify the right’s use of civil religion. 
But, as Kazin notes “liberals and leftists” – progressives — have also used the tradition to 
justify protests against the status quo. He brings up a 1955 speech from Martin Luther 
King Jr. in which he told an audience of bus-boycotters in Montgomery, 
we are not wrong in what we are doing. If we are wrong, the Supreme Court of 
this nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is 
wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong.  
 In the last section, I discussed Angrosino’s notion that while the conservative, 
right-wing American civil religious tend to see whatever the USA does as in accord with 
God’s plan, the American civil religious left sees that it is America’s responsibility to 
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work to fulfill God’s plan. We see this leftist civil religious view clearly in Obama’s 
attempts to control small arms in America. Kazin notes that Barack Obama stated in his 
second inaugural address that “while freedom is a gift from God, it must be secured by 
his people here on Earth”.  Obama sees humanity, and Americans in particular, as having 
to actively work to fulfill ‘God’s plan’ on earth.   
 In an op-ed piece in the Seattle Times titled “More Blood at the Alter of the Gun”, 
the professor of comparative religions James K. Wellman Jr. (2017)  notes that, after the 
Las Vegas shooting, Donald Trump was asked about gun control and he dismissed the 
question saying, “another day”. The president’s spokeswoman then added that it was “not 
the time to talk about gun control”. In explanation as to why Trump refused to speak 
about gun control on a day when many considered it the most important topic of 
discussion, Wellman writes: 
the sacred demands silence… And the sacred, in all religions, always demands a 
sacrifice… The same is true for our sacred, the gun. Does anybody really know 
why we don’t have better gun control that has been proven to prevent these 
atrocities? Know no one really knows. Because the gun is sacred. And a small 
group of priests – the National rifle association – guards and protects this sacred 
… our high priests are powerful, and they demand the ultimate sacrifice the blood 
of our citizens …it is time we rise up and go into the Temple of the NRA and turn 
over the tables… (Wellman, 2017, para. 6-13) 
            Wellman’s piece is moving, but it is not the whole story.  The gun is a sacred 
symbol to many in the USA, but the Constitution is sacred to even more Americans. In 
the wake of the shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018, 
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Wayne Lapierre, executive vice-president of the National Rifle Association, did not call 
on the sacred status of the gun.  Instead, he called on the ‘genius’ of the civil religious 
cannon. 
The genius of those documents [The Declaration of Independence, The 
Constitution, and The Bill of Rights]… is that all of our freedoms in this country 
are for every single citizen. And there is no greater personal, individual freedom 
than the right to keep and bear arms, the right to protect yourself, and the right to 
survive. It is not bestowed by man, but granted by God to all Americans as our 
American birthright (C-SPAN 2018; cited in Whitehead et al., n.d., p. 1) 
Lapierre’s statement invokes a long history of the belief that the founding documents of 
the USA are divinely inspired, and therefore the right to bear arms is a God-given 
right. As Whitehead et al note, “Claiming that the U.S. Constitution was inspired by God 
serves to elevate the gun, and the right to own it, to a sacred status bestowed by a 
Christian God” (p. 1). Because Christian nationalists see The Bill of Rights as a divinely 
inspired document, “any attempts to revoke or even restrict this right could be interpreted 
as an attack on the wisdom and providence of the Christian God” (p. 9). Moreover, 
Whitehead et al note that there is a complex entanglement between the symbol of the gun 
and what it means to be a “true American” (p. 2).    
 For much of American history, “general disarmament was impossible for practical 
reasons” (p. 125).  As religious studies scholar Peter Gardella notes: 
The need for guns to hold land taken from Indians [sic], to defend against wild 
animals on farms, and to intimidate slaves created a cult of the gun. There was no 
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thought of separation between individual gun ownership and the potential to form 
a militia – or for that matter, a posse or a lynching party (2014, p. 125). 
 However, Gardella argues that this all changed with urbanization and the rise of 
organized crime. As I noted in the previous section, in the 1939 case of United States v. 
Miller, the Supreme Court decided that a law to ban sales of sawed-off shot guns did not 
violate the Second Amendment as this weapon did not have a likely role in a militia 
(2014, p. 126).  
 But soon, the gun itself began to take on meaning beyond its utility in defense 
against animals and appropriating indigenous lands and slave labour. For Gardella, the 
gun became sacred in American civil religion because it was associated with the “primary 
sacred value of personal freedom or liberty” (2014, p. 125).  He argues that with regards 
to American sacred values, the importance of the Second Amendment “can be seen in its 
position, second only to the cluster of personal freedoms in the First Amendment”.  Just 
as the right to privacy grew gradually from the fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments, 
“the right of individuals to own guns grew only gradually from the second” (p. 125).  The 
right to own guns means more to the American psyche than just the right to own the 
object of the weapon itself rather, the gun came “to stand for the inviolability of liberty 
and the individual person” (p. 126).  Any infringement on the right to own and carry a 
weapon thus becomes a symbolic assault on individual liberty and, for some, an assault 





Christian Nationalism and The Second Amendment 
Last night I heard this politician 
Talking ’bout his brand new mission 
‘Liked his plans, but they came undone when he got around with God and guns 
I don’t know how he grew up 
But it sure wasn’t down at the hunting club 
Cause if it was he’d understand a little bit more about the working man 
God and guns 
Keep us strong 
That’s what this country 
Was founded on 
Well we might as well give up and run 
If we let them take our God and guns 
   “God & Guns” by Lynyrd Skynyrd 
 
 As Whitehead, Schnabel, and Perry (2018) argue, “the gun control debate is 
complicated by deeply held moral and religious schemas that discussions focused solely 
on rational public safety calculations do not sufficiently address”.  While many studies 
have noted the negative association between self-reported religiosity and support of gun 
control, Whitehead et al. argue that the literature “has not yet grappled with a distinct 
religious disposition potentially implicated in the belief that guns are a God-given right to 
Americans” (p. 2).  Empirical researcher shows that opposition to gun control cannot be 
explained by religiosity alone, but rather that “entrenched opposition to gun control is 
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grounded in a particular symbolic system about the role of Christianity in the public 
sphere” (p. 2). Researchers such as Whitehead et al refer to this particular system 
as Christian nationalism.  
In the previous section, I discussed the view of civil religion as religious 
nationalism.  Though I do not find this definition the most productive, it must be 
addressed in regard to civil religion in America as religious nationalism, specifically 
Christian nationalism, has such a high impact on policy, including gun control. American 
Christian nationalists believe that America was founded as a Christian nation and should 
continue to be so.  Whitehead, Schnabel and Perry (2018) define Christian nationalism as 
“a religious cultural framework that mandates a symbiotic relationship between 
Christianity and civil society” (p. 1).  Moreover, most American Christian nationalists 
believe that the Founding Fathers were divinely inspired, making the texts that they 
wrote, if not divine in themselves, then at least divinely inspired. 
 In their survey analysis, Whitehead et al (2018) found “Americans who desire that 
religion, specifically Christianity, be officially promoted in the public sphere are deeply 
opposed to federal gun control laws” (p. 9).  They cite Schnabel and Bock to suggest that 
the idea of American exceptionalism may help explain Americans’ reactions to mass 
shootings. While other countries around the world turn to gun control in response to mass 
shootings, Americans are “Setting themselves apart from comparable countries, 
Americans are turning to ‘Christian values’ instead of gun control to end mass 
shootings” (p. 9).  Research from Public Religion Research Institute showed that 40% of 
Evangelicals agree with the statement that “putting more emphasis on God and morality 
in school and society is the most important thing that could be done to prevent future 
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mass shootings.” As Merino notes (2018, p. 1), in the wake of high-profile shootings, 
particularly in schools, “content and memes shared on social media often blame a 
secularizing society and the decline of traditional values”.  This blame placement is 
echoed by conservative media commentators and politicians.  After the Sandy Hook 
shooting, Mike Huckabee stated, “We ask why there’s violence in our schools but we’ve 
systematically removed God from our schools” (quoted in Merino, 2018, p. 
2).  Meanwhile, Bryan Fisher of the American Family Association argued, “We have 
mass school shootings because we don’t have enough God on our campuses and we don’t 
have enough guns,” (Fisher 2018; cited in Merino, 2018, p. 2.) At the 2018 NRA annual 
convention, Texas governor Greg Abbott stated, “The problem is not guns. The problem 
is hearts without God. It is homes without discipline and communities without values” 
(Mogensen, 2018).  For those that believe that the Constitution is divinely inspired, and 
that the nation of the USA has a divine mission, the answer to contemporary problems 
cannot be changing the Constitution.  Rather, the answer must be that America has 
somehow veered from the path of the righteous.  It must be solved by returning to the 
divine texts with a fundamentalist hermeneutic.   
 The social psychologist Stephen Merino (2018) notes that certain ideological 
factors make protestants more likely to own guns than those of other religions; including 
Judaism and Islam as well as other Christians and those who identify as not religious. He 
draws on Stroope and Tom’s (2017; cited in Merino, p. 3) work, to discuss the link 
between Evangelical Protestants and gun ownership.  Stroope and Tom suggest that the 
emphasis in Evangelical Protestantism on individual autonomy and self-sufficiency 
relates to gun ownership and gun policy in at least two ways: they correspond to less 
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government involvement in individuals lives and they make Evangelicals more prone to 
“dispositional rather than situation attributions for wrongdoing” (Grasmick and McGill, 
1994; cited in Merino, p. 3).  As Merino explains, this means that Evangelicals are more 
likely to blame or credit individuals for outcomes “rather than broader social 
circumstance or social structural factors” (p. 3).  This “anti-structuralism” is 
characterized by a reluctance to attribute an individual’s actions to greater structures. 
Here we can easily draw ties between attitudes on gun control and philosophies of 
technology: at least the technology of the gun.  Though these questions were not asked in 
the surveys, the data seem to reveal that Protestants are more likely to hold the 
philosophy of technological neutrality, rather than technological determinism with 
regards to guns.  This is to say, Protestants believe that ‘guns don’t kill people, people 
kill people’.  The gun is a neutral tool, it is the character of the person holding the gun 
which is of importance. 
 Merino draws on Celinksa (2007; cited in Merino, 2018) to situate gun control 
and gun ownership in the larger discussion of individualism vs collectivism in American 
society.  Evangelicals, as individualists, “emphasize self-reliance and person achievement 
and possess a lack of faith in the institutionalized, collective means of security” (Merino, 
p. 3). Accountable freewill individualism is the Protestant Christian ideology which sees 
individuals as accountable – both to other people and to God — for their own actions 
(Merino, p. 3).  Moreover, Merino notes Evangelical Christians strong belief in 
traditional gender roles. Evangelicals might see that it is the role of the man to protect his 
family with a gun without relying on anyone else and particularly not government 
interference. Finally, Merino cites Stroope and Tom (2003) to note that a “wariness 
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toward the information provided by secular educational institutions and scientific 
research could incline Evangelical Protestants to discount expert recommendations 
regarding gun control and safety procedures” (p. 3). Though Evangelicals may want to do 
what is best for the society as a whole, their lack of trust in groups which advocate for 
evidence-based gun laws mean that they do not believe the data showing that gun control 
reduces violence.  Evangelicals, as perhaps the most individualistic religious sect in the 
world, prefer individual solutions to crime: this includes protecting oneself with a gun 
rather than trusting government institutions to protect you.   
 Perhaps religious nationalism itself, rather than specific sectarian positions on 
freewill can help us understand Evangelicals’ views on gun control. In their study of 
attitudes towards gun control, religious scholars Landon Schnabel and Samuel L. Perry 
(cited in Merino, 2018, p. 9) found that opposition to stricter gun control is more closely 
linked to Christian nationalism, than any other factor with the exception of political 
orientation (p. 1). Whitehead et al go as far as to argue that, though it has long been 
assumed that Evangelicalism was associated with opposition to gun control 
(Winkler & Lund, n.d.) it may be that these “evangelical effects” were driven largely by 
higher average levels of Christian nationalism among Evangelicals. In fact, it is possible 
that, at least on certain social issues such as gun control, Evangelicals who are not 
Christian nationalists could be more different from Christian nationalist Evangelicals than 
from people in other religious traditions. This is to say that, if survey data were analyzed 
with race in mind, we might find that African Americans Evangelicals may be both more 
in favour of gun control, and more opposed to Christian nationalism, than their white co-
sectarians.  Or, perhaps we would find that it is rural Evangelicals who fully embrace 
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Christian nationalism that are most opposed to gun control. The evidence suggests that 
Protestant theological factors cannot be the only explanation to Evangelical opposition to 
gun control.  Instead, we should pay more attention to their identities as religious 
nationalists rather than Protestant Evangelicals.  
             Dawson draws links between gun ownership and what I call “sacred 
masculinity”.  Gun owners often see themselves as valuable in that they can defend their 
families and communities. Obert (2018, p. 148; cited in Dawson, 2019, p. 4) argued that 
this is related to older notions of civic obligation, particularly that of slave patrols and 
militia memberships which “linked private effort [with] public order”. Scholars such as 
Mencken and Frose (2017) note that gun ownership provides an identity which makes 
them feel valuable and needed.  They argue that gun ownership offers a sense of “moral 
purpose to white males who have lost, or fear losing, their economic footing” (p. 22).  In 
their analysis of surveys of American beliefs around gun control, they found that “white 
respondents who have undergone or fear economic distress tend to derive self-esteem and 
moral rectitude from their weapons” (p. 4).  
            Though scholars such as Gorski (2019) do not stress the masculinity narrative, 
they do note the importance of the ‘conquest narrative’.  The conquest narrative gives the 
individual, usually the white male, a sense that they are a ‘true American’ because they 
are able to defend their country either from the historical ‘other’ of other nations, or the 
contemporary narrative of ‘bad’ (especially black) Americans, or increasingly, from the 





 I began this section with a history of Gun Rights and Gun Control in the USA, 
noting that the English Bill of Rights, which gave Protestant militias the right to bear 
arms, was the precursor to the Second Amendment. From this, I engaged in an 
examination of the wording and peculiar grammar of the Second Amendment and the 
originalist vs. living constitutionalist hermeneutic traditions. Then, I introduced my 
concept of the fundamentalist hermeneutic. I ended this section with a discussion of the 
shift in the American Supreme Court’s decisions surrounding gun rights, from a 
collectivist interpretation to an individualist interpretation.  
 In the second section, I discussed the Second Amendment as a civil religious text. 
I discussed the right to bear arms as a “god given right”, and Christian nationalism.  I 
stressed the relationship between Evangelical Christianity and opposition to gun control 
and stressed the importance of individualism to both American Evangelical Christianity, 
and to gun rights. Yet, as Merino notes, it is not only Evangelicals who possess the 
“cultural tool kit” of individualism. He notes that though these are “uniquely strong 
elements of evangelical Protestants’ worldview” (p. 11) these are “widely held schema 
among [all] Americans” (p. 11).   For this reason, we must look elsewhere to understand 
why so many Protestant Americans hold so dearly to the individual interpretation of the 
Second Amendment.  For this reason, my next chapter is a discussion of the American 






THE AMERICAN COVENANT 
 Covenants are essential to Jewish thought and the monotheistic religions that 
followed it.  The Torah is based on the concept that Yahweh is the protective but “jealous 
god” (Exodus 20:2-6) who has made a covenant with the Jewish people: if they are loyal 
to Yahweh alone, then He will bless them.  Since Biblical times the notion of covenant 
has always been connected to notion of ‘nation’. The Mosaic covenant created the 
‘nation’ of Israel, giving land and security to the Jewish people based on obedience.  The 
American Covenant promises to make the USA a ‘shining city on a hill’ for all to admire 
should the people of the nation obey the ethical stipulations of the founding documents. 
 In Christian hermeneutics, the covenant is the central interpretive framework for 
the entire Bible.  In addition to the covenant God made with his people, Christians make 
a covenant with each other “to act together in harmony with the precepts of the gospel 
(“Covenant,” 2020). The term ‘New Testament’ itself is derived from the Greek term 
New Covenant. As the concept of the covenant is so central to Christian thought, it is not 
surprising that it is reflected in the political structure of the Judeo-Christian world. 
 In this chapter, I explore the history of the concept of the covenant with the hopes 
of illuminating the influence of the concept of the covenant, and, particularly, covenant 
theology, on American political documents and practices. I discuss Puritan covenant 
theology and settler-colonist covenants such as the Mayflower Compact which formed 
the beginnings of the law in what is now the United States of America. I then discuss the 
US Constitution as covenant and the connection to the American fundamentalist 
hermeneutic.  I argue that the American hermeneutic fundamentalism is derived from 
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Puritan covenant theology. I pay particular attention to the problem of reconciling the 
belief in Natural Law with government by the people: if the Constitution is a 
documentation of Natural Law that is always-already Truth, then how can it be amended? 
What are the limits of popular sovereignty within a Lockean Framework? 
 As David Cayley (2012) explains in “The Myth of the Secular”, secular societies 
“continually deploy a repertoire of themes and images” from religious 
sources.  Examining the similarities and differences between covenantal theology and 
secular political practices facilitate a greater understanding of the power these narratives 
hold over all of us. If we want to understand the political systems in majority Jewish, 
Christian, and Muslim countries, we must understand covenant theology.   
Covenantal Structure 
            The Old Testament scholar and biblical archeologist J.A. Thompson writes:  
The suzerain-vassal concept was deeply impressed on the social and political 
thinking of the ancient Near East from at least as early as the third millennium 
BC. To some extent it was an extension of a fundamental concept of human 
society in the Near East, namely that covenants of some kind were essential to the 
peaceful continuance and co-existence of the many and varied social groups 
which inhabited these lands. (1964, p. 1).  
 A suzerainty covenant is a documentation of the agreed upon relationship 
between a lord and vassal on an individual level or on a national level. In contemporary 
geo-political terms, a suzerainty covenant is similar to the legal agreement between a 
larger nation and a smaller nation such as the protectorate relationship between the 
United States of America and Puerto Rico. In biblical terms, the Israelites had covenantal 
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vassal-suzerain relationship with the Hittites, the Egyptians, and the Assyrians.  It is 
therefore not surprising that the covenants in the Bible follow a similar framework to 
ancient near-eastern suzerain covenants: the Israelites modeled their relationship with 
their god after their relationship with their suzerains.   
 I see examining political documents such as the U.S. Constitution in terms of the 
structure of ancient near-eastern covenants can lead to better understanding of the 
meaning of these documents. Examining American covenants — from the earliest 
compacts of the Puritans to the US Constitution to present-day political speeches — in 
light of this structure will help understand how and why they hold such power over the 
American populace.  
 I will now lay out the typical framework of such covenants in the ancient Middle 
East and an example of these covenants found in the biblical narrative of the Mosaic 
Covenant (Kline, 1960, 1997).  I find this a useful analytical tool to examining the nature 
of all covenants in the Judeo-Christian world, both ancient and contemporary, religious 
and secular, including the American covenants from the Mayflower compact to the 
federal Constitution. 
Kline’s (1960, 1997) Structure of Ancient Near Eastern Suzerainty Covenants 
1. Preamble: identifies the parties to the covenant; often identifies the great king 
 (suzerain) and vassal kings which he had conquered and which he is letting exist 
 under his control according to the obligations of the covenant; stresses the 
 greatness of the suzerain 
2. Historical Prologue: recounts the relationship of the suzerain and the vassal to date; 
 details how they came together to make the covenant 
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3. Ethical Stipulations: stresses exclusive loyalty and love; enumerates the specific 
 obligations to maintaining the relationship 
4. Witnesses: a list of the gods witnessing the covenant 
5. Sanctions: a list of blessing if the covenant is followed, and curses if it is broken 
6. Documentation, Administration, and Succession Arrangements: a statement that each 
 party is clear on the guidelines (often that both the suzerain and vassal have a 
 written copy of the covenant); a guide to the continuing the relationship for future 
 generations 
Example of Kline’s (1960, 1997) structure from the Biblical narrative as found in the 
books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy 
1. Preamble: “I am Yahweh, your God who brought you out of Egypt, out of slavery, that 
  is who I am and you are my people” (Exodus 20:2) 
2. Historical Prologue: the first half of the book of exodus is the historical prologue (often 
 referred to as the “Kingdom Prologue” (Mounce, n.d.); details how the Jews 
 started as a group of seventy people and, with God’s help, became thousands of 
 people gathered in the wilderness at Mt. Sinai to make a covenant 
3. Ethical Stipulations: the first of the ten commandments stresses exclusive loyalty and 
 love (“You shall have no other Gods before me” (Exodus 20:3); the other nine 
 commandments are specific requirements 
4. Witnesses: not needed as Judaism is monotheistic: Yahweh does not need other gods 
 as witnesses 
5. Sanctions: – list of curses and blessings in Deuteronomy 27:1-28:68 
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6. Documentation, Administration and Succession Arrangements: statement that copies 
 of the document are to be placed at religious sanctuaries (Deut. 31:26) with 
 periodic public reading of the document (Deuteronomy 31:9- 13) 
 As you read the next sections in this chapter, I ask you keep these examples of the 
ancient near-Eastern and Judeo-Christian concepts of the covenant in mind.  However, 
there is one factor which we have not discussed which is key to American covenants: 
consent. The definition of covenant given in the American Encyclopedia of Federalism is 
very similar to the Judeo-Christian definition, but it adds this notion of consent: “A 
covenant is a morally informed, perpetual, consent-based agreement that depends 
primarily on the efforts of the covenanting parties themselves for monitoring and 
enforcement” (Allen, 2006).  The conquered vassal nations which took part in suzerainty 
covenants had little choice but to agree to the terms or to surrender entirely.  Similarly, 
even the marriage covenant was most often not entered into voluntarily, particularly by 
the bride. This is not the case in contemporary covenants.  Whereas a law is forced upon 
the people from above, in contemporary parlance a covenant is entered into freely by all 
parties. Although this may not have been an important factor in ancient Jewish life, it was 
a key element of the early Americans understanding of covenant.  These settler-colonists 
were leaving England voluntarily to create community freely. 
“A City Upon a Hill”: The First Covenant of the USA 
 The Puritans understood themselves to be new Israelites.  They were founding, at 
once, a new England and a new Jerusalem.  Feeling they were persecuted like the Jews in 
Egypt; they went forth and found a new land.  In the minds of John Winthrop and his 
companions, they were crossing the Red Sea. 
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            We can trace the idea that settler-colonists were called by God to populate 
America as far back as Winthrop’s sermon “Christian Charity, A Model Hereof” 
delivered onboard the Arabella in 1620.  In its most famous passage, Winthrop makes 
clear the relationship between Puritan covenant theology and the journey of the pilgrims: 
“Thus stands the cause between God and us, we are centered into a covenant with him for 
this work… Now if the Lord shall please to hear us, and bring us in peace to the place we 
desire, then hath he ratified this covenant and sealed our commission” (Winthrop, 1630). 
            As the Pilgrims sailed to America, they saw themselves as vassals entering into a 
covenant with their suzerain: their God.  If God delivered them safely, thus keeping up 
His covenantal commitments, the Pilgrims would keep up theirs.  Winthrop continues, 
however, that if the pilgrims failed to obey the terms of the covenant, God would no 
longer bless them. 
 [If we, the Pilgrims] shall fail to embrace this present world and prosecute our 
carnal intentions, seeking great things for ourselves and our posterity, the Lord 
will surely break out in wrath against us [and] be revenged of such a perjured 
people and make us know the price of the breach of such a covenant (Winthrop, 
1630). 
 If they were to reach their destination, it would be a sign that they were ‘elected’ but, it 
would also be a sign that God would enforce the terms of the covenant into the future. 
And should they fail to live up to the obligations stated in the covenant, then they would 
face God’s wrath. 
            God’s commitments were clear, He was to guarantee the pilgrims safe passage 
and land to call their own, just as Yahweh had given the Israelites if the pilgrims fulfilled 
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their covenantal commitments.  So, what were the pilgrims’ commitments? The pilgrims 
were to fulfill their Christian commitments to God, but there was more: this covenant was 
not just made with God, it was also a covenant that the pilgrims made with each other. 
This aspect of the covenant can be summarized in one word: charity – which Winthrop 
stressed in his title, “Christian Charity, A Model Hereof”. 
We must knit together in this work as one man, we must entertain each other in 
brotherly affection, we must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, 
for the supply of others’ necessities… make one another’s conditions our own, 
rejoice together, mourn together, labor, and suffer together, always having before 
our eyes our commission and community in the work, our community as members 
of the same body (Winthrop, 1630). 
Though the Puritans wouldn’t have kind words for a secular feminist like me who 
opposes the settler-colonist state, Winthrop’s words give me goosebumps. Has a greater 
description of community ever been written?  For Winthrop, the terms of the American 
covenant were clear: individuals must give up their superfluous wants to provide for 
others’ needs.  These Puritan colonists were committing to live in charity not as 
individuals but as one body.  And if the terms of the covenant were kept, the Puritans and 
their fellow voyagers across the sea would be “as a city upon a hill [and] eyes of all 
people [would be] upon them” (Winthrop, 1630).  Winthrop saw the ‘pilgrims’ as New 
Israelites not just because they were settling a new land, but because they were ‘god’s 
chosen people chosen to participate in the covenant of charity. 
            The term ‘chosen people’ is often misunderstood by goyim. When Jews refer to 
themselves as ‘chosen people,’ it does not mean that they think of themselves as superior; 
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rather, they were chosen by the god YHWH to enter into a specific covenant.  In the 
Torah, Jews were the nation chosen to receive blessings and wrath depending on whether 
they upheld their commitments outlined in the covenant.  So too with the Puritans.  The 
Puritans saw themselves as chosen “not for special blessings but for special judgement” 
(Gorski, 2017, p. 38).  In the American civil religious tradition, Americans, too, are 
chosen to obey a covenant: from a model of charity and faithfulness to human rights to 
“The Cops of the World”, as Phil Ochs would say. Winthrop promised that if those early 
Puritan colonists could sacrifice their own desires for the good of the community, then 
they would become — as Ronald Reagan stated in 1989 alluding to Winthrop’s sermon 
— “a shining city on a hill”: a model for all the world to admire. 
            Though not as eloquent as Winthrop’s sermon, perhaps the most important 
covenant the Puritan colonists made was the Mayflower Compact: the first ‘legal’ 
document of what would become the USA. It was signed aboard the Mayflower, on 
November 11, 1620, just before the ship landed at Plymouth, Massachusetts, it became 
the ruling document of the Plymouth colony. The document itself grew out of a political 
storm on board, caused by rough weather.  The Mayflower was destined for the Hudson 
River, however, due to rough seas, it was forced towards Cape Cod.  This meant that the 
passengers were no longer in the jurisdiction of the Virginia Company Charter which had 
been granted to them in England (Mayflower Compact, n.d.). This caused a conflict 
between the English separatists (whom we now refer to as the Pilgrims) and the rest of 
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the travellers.  To resolve the conflict before landing on Plymouth Rock, the Pilgrims 
William Bradford and William Brewster drew up the Mayflower Compact6.  
            The Compact follows the structure of Ancient Near Eastern Suzerainty Covenants 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  It begins with part 1 of Kline’s structure: the naming of 
God and the King, stressing their greatness. 
In the name of God, Amen. 
It then discusses the nature of the relationship with God and the King, as well as the 
signers’ relationship to each other. 
We whose names are underwritten, the loyal subjects of our dread sovereign lord 
King James, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland King, 
Defender of the Faith, etc. having undertaken, for the glory of God, and 
advancement of the Christian faith, and honor of our king and country, a voyage 
to plant the first colony in the northern parts of Virginia, 
 It then lists the obligations, 
do by these presents solemnly and mutually in the presence of God and one of 
another, covenant, and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for 
our better ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by 
virtue hereof to enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, 
acts, constitutions, offices from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and 
                                                   
6 The original compact was lost, but the text of the document was recounted in a 1622 account of the 
Plymouth settlement written by William Bradford (one of the original writers) survives. 
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convenient for the general good of the colony: unto which we promise all due 
submission and obedience 
and ends with listing the witnesses: 
In witness whereof we have hereunder subscribed our names; Cape Cod, the 11th 
of  November, in the year of the reign of our sovereign lord King James, of 
England, France and Ireland eighteenth and of Scotland fifty-fourth, Anno 
Domini 1620. (Winthrop, 1630) 
 It does not go on to part 5 and 6, the final parts of the covenant structure discussed above 
— the punishments for violation of the covenant and the agreements for succession — 
but we know that these were worked out upon arrival.    
            The covenant did not discuss the rights to the land that the colonist settled, but 
rather, was merely an agreement between the settling parties as to how to behave.  Yet, 
the Mayflower Compact remained the ‘law of the land’ until the colony was absorbed 
into the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1691 (Mayflower Compact, n.d.).  Although it has 
been noted that, in practice, much of the power in the Plymouth Colony remained in the 
hands of a few of the elder male founders, the compact is generally agreed to be “an 
important step in the evolution of democratic government in America” (para. 4). 
            Thus, the first governing document of the settler-colonists in what is now The 
United States of America was not a constitution, but a covenant: modeled on the ancient 
covenants of the Near East.  This document was “an adaptation of a Puritan church 
covenant to a civil situation” (Mayflower Compact, n.d., para. 4). The Compact was 
signed by forty-one of the adult male passengers and bound the disparate groups aboard 
the Mayflower into a body politic (Mayflower Compact, n.d.)  It was a promise between 
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those who have travelled a rough voyage together to abide by any laws which would later 
be established “for the good of the colony”.  And, like the Abrahamic Covenant that 
founded the Judeo-Christian Faith, we may argue about the Mayflower Compact’s 
relevance, but it cannot be changed; covenants are eternal. The fact that these texts are — 
both in their etymology and in practice — covenants is the reason for American 
Constitutional hermeneutic fundamentalism.  
           Phillip Gorski (2017) writes that “the Puritan clergy cast themselves as the Latter 
Prophets, charged with calling the people back to the covenant when they strayed too far 
from their founding values.  Puritan political leaders viewed themselves as latter-day 
versions of the Biblical “judges” (p. 38).  We must keep these ‘founding fathers’ in mind 
when we hear the speeches of the likes of Heston and Obama: advocates of both gun 
rights and gun control see themselves and their leader as judges calling Americans back 
to the covenant when they believe that Americans have strayed too far.    
            The Puritans entered into a covenant with their God and with each other, to live as 
one political body, to put aside their own wants in order to fulfill their neighbours’ needs, 
to toil together and to rejoice in each other, to live in peace with the other settlers and the 
natives of America. And if they lived up to the terms of this covenant then their god 
would reward them by making them “a shining city on a hill” (Reagan, 1980) — as 
Ronald Reagan would later say in his farewell address –for all the world to admire. 
Puritan Covenant Theology 
 As the American legal historian James McClelland (2000) writes, the Mayflower 
Compact “marks the introduction into the American colonies of a compact theory of 
government which would later serve as the basis for both popularly-based State 
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Constitutions and the United States Constitution….”  The Mayflower Compact set the 
scene for all American government up to and including the present day.  As Dunbar-Ortiz 
writes, the original settlers, who set the historical and ideological tone for the coming 
centuries up to the present, were: “English Pilgrims, the Scots-Irish, and French 
Huguenots, Calvinists all, but also German Moravians and English Quakers, who took 
the land they believed had been bequeathed to them in the sacred covenant that predated 
the creation of the United states” (p. 116). 
 These settlers saw themselves as the rightful owners of the land. As Dunbar-Ortiz 
notes (2018), in place names like Bethlehem, Bethesda, and Mount Carmel we hear the 
echo of the settlers’ belief that they were the chosen people of the covenant who were 
sent “into the wilderness to build a new Israel” (p. 117).  We cannot understand 
American history -- from the monument human achievement of representative democracy 
and human rights, to the horror of indigenous genocide and slavery — without 
understanding Puritan covenant theology. 
            While the writers of the Constitution itself were “English patricians, slavers, large 
agribusiness operators, and otherwise successful businessmen” (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018 p. 
188), the people themselves were farmers and tradespeople from protestant north-western 
Europe.  As discussed in the chapter on the history of the Second Amendment, these 
protestants were the “yeoman farmers” that Thomas Jefferson romanticized (Dunbar p. 
188) for whom the English Bill of Rights guaranteed the right to bear arms and form 
militias to protect their way of life. They came to America not to make money 
speculating on appropriated indigenous land as George Washington did, but to merely to 
worship their god in the promised land and to obey the terms of the covenant.   
 115 
            Though it can be said that the notion of the covenant is central to all Judeo-
Christian religion, it is particularly important in Puritan theology.  In 1831, the French 
aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville showed his lack of understanding of this Protestant stress 
on the covenant in his profound confusion over the power of the American judiciary. Just 
as foreigners today are shocked that more is not done to control gun violence in America, 
de Tocqueville was amazed that American judges did not have to apply laws if they 
considered them unconstitutional (Hunter, 2014, 2): the Catholic Frenchman could not 
understand the fundamentalist hermeneutic which arose from the faithful adherence to the 
founding covenant. France has had dozens of changes of referendums on its Constitution 
resulting in hundreds of changes, starting with the 1793 referendum, up until the 2014 
Alsace single territorial collectivity referendum.  
            Sometimes referred to as federal theology,7 covenant theology is rooted in 
Calvinism and was developed among “the Dutch dissenting Protestants, particularly the 
Anabaptists, the English Dissenters, especially the Puritans, and Scottish Presbyterians” 
(Wardle, 1987).  These groups made up approximately 80% of the European inhabitants 
of 17th century New England (McLaughlin, 1932, p. 20). The Mormon legal scholar and 
historian Lynn Wardle points out that that covenant theology came to America not just 
with the Puritans, but with “virtually all the churches and settlements” in the 17th century 
American colonies.  
            Puritan covenant theology is based on the idea of the fundamental depravity of 
humanity and its salvation in Christ.  For the Puritans and most other Christian 
denominations, both Protestant and Catholic, humankind committed the original sin by 
                                                   
7 From the Latin feodus meaning covenant. 
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breaking the covenant with God in the garden of Eden.  The death of Christ is the ‘re-
covenanting’ that allows some humans to be saved.  Wardle (1989) succinctly explains 
Christian covenant theology in two sentences: 
God had made a covenant of works with Adam and Eve, who breached that 
covenant. Then, in his mercy, God made a covenant of grace with the descendants 
of Adam and Eve by which Christ, having voluntarily covenanted with the Father 
to be the Mediator, paid the penalty for the broken covenant… 
Thus, unlike Jewish covenant theology in which the Hebrews must follow the 
commandments in order to be granted YHWH’s blessings, in Christian covenant 
theology, salvation is not something one can work towards as it was in under the 
covenant of works in the garden of Eden; rather, salvation is the fulfillment of the 
Covenant of Grace. The Puritans believed that Eve broke the covenant of works and so 
all humans are now fundamentally depraved and none deserve salvation.  However, 
because of the sacrifice of Jesus, God established a covenant of Grace to save some – not 
all— of humankind. Who is saved and who is damned is not decided by the life they live; 
rather, one is either pre-destined to be one of the ‘elect’ who is saved by the covenant, or 
one of the damned by the original sin?  In Wardle’s summary of Puritan covenant 
theology, he is careful to note that Christ “voluntarily covenanted” with God the father to 
pay the penalty for Eve’s breach of the covenant. God did not have to save anyone.  It is 
only through Christ’s sacrifice that any are saved. This is important because, as I noted in 
the previous section, before this time in Judeo-Christian history, there had not been such 
a stress on consent in covenantal theology. 
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            As there was no longer a covenant of works, it didn’t matter whether your acts 
were holy or not.  This led to considerable anxiety as to how to know if a person, 
including oneself, was saved or not. Eventually, material wealth came to be seen as a 
manifestation of status as one of the ‘elect’ –predestined to be saved8.  As Dunbar-Ortiz 
(2018) notes, “conversely, bad fortune, not to speak of dark skin, were taken as evidence 
of damnation” (p. 113).  We can see how this was an attractive doctrine to these groups 
of colonists “for one could easily define the natives as immutably profane, and damned, 
and oneself as predestined for virtue”. (Akenson; quoted in Dunbar-Ortiz, p. 113).  The 
concept of predestination provided an explanation for why some became ill while others 
thrived, why some races were enslaved while others prospered, and an excuse as to why 
some people’s land could be taken, and labour exploited. 
            For the Puritans in the American colonies, the concept of the covenant was not 
limited just to religious doctrines, rather, it was their central way of understanding every 
aspect of their lives, from marriage to government.  The 17th century Scottish 
Presbyterian Reverend Samuel Rutherford was influential in the application of the 
theological concept of the covenant into the political sphere.  He wrote that 
although “rulers derive authority from God…, God gives this authority to rulers through 
the people” (quoted in Eidsmoe, 1995, p. 24). In the Americas, as in the rest of the world, 
political foundations followed religious ideology. As covenant theology was evident in 
almost every sect of Protestantism in the American colonies, it is not surprising that it 
became the foundation of the political system in the colonies.  Wardle (1989) writes: “It 
was inevitable that the covenant theologians who wrote about church government and 
                                                   
8 I will not go into this process here, but, of course, refer the reader to the definitive explanation presented 
in Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 1958)) 
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sacred history would also write about the origins and limitations of civil government and 
would apply the same principles”. (p. 13-14).  As they thought that human history itself 
was a history of covenants with God, it is not surprising that they thought their churches 
and eventually territorial governments should be organized by covenant. 
            The Puritans, of course, take their name from their desire to purify the Christian 
church of Catholic rituals which were not in the Bible itself.  This belief came out of their 
Sola Scriptura hermeneutic.  The Sola Scriptura – by scripture alone – hermeneutic was 
part of the Five Solae of the Protestant Reformation.  The Sola Scriptura hermeneutic 
denies that any authority, whether ecumenical creed or pope, has authority over the 
Bible.  All subordinate authority comes the authority of the Bible and is therefore subject 
to reform only from the interpretation of the Bible itself.  While Catholics see Scripture 
as equal to tradition, the majority of Protestant churches in The USA cling to the Sola 
Scriptura hermeneutic.  This Sola Scriptura hermeneutic is, of course, the basis of 
American fundamentalist Christianity and bleeds over into the legal realm with the 
fundamentalist approach to legal hermeneutics. 
The Second Covenant:  The New Testament of the Declaration of Independence, The 
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights 
[M]ost nations have had multiple founders, some mythical, some historical, and 
most somewhere in between.  Israel had Abraham, Moses, and David… England 
had Albion, the Trojans, and King Arthur.  The United States is no exception to 
the rule.  It was founded at least twice, once by the New England Puritans, and 
then again by the American revolutionaries… (Gorski, 2017, p. 37) 
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 In the Torah, the idea of the covenant is entwined with the idea of nation. The 
nation of Israel was spoken into being with the Abrahamic covenant of circumcision: if 
Jewish men are circumcised then the fruit of their loins will be blessed, and the promised 
land would be given to them. With the Mosaic covenant on Mount Sinai, the federal 
nation of Israel was born. The nation of America was spoken into being with the Puritan 
covenant of charity: if the settlers were to treat each other with charity, then the land of 
North America would be given to them. The federal nation of The United States of 
America was founded with the covenant of The Declaration of Independence, The 
Constitution, and The Bill of Rights. 
The Declaration of the King George’s Broken Covenant 
 In colonial New England, it was the clergy that popularized what has been 
referred to as “the fundamental principle of American Constitutional law” (Baldwin, 
2017, p. 2): the notion that the government itself, and not just the citizens, are bound by 
the covenant. While the gods of the Greeks and Romans were capricious and obeyed no 
rules, the God of the Puritans was different: He acted in a predictable manner.  Hercules 
or Aphrodite might curse a human out of jealousy or bless them on a whim.  This is not 
the God of the Puritans. For the Puritans, God Himself must obey the conditions of the 
covenant.   
 The universe the Puritan God rules is a “constitutional one” and this constitution 
is “binding and immutable” (Baldwin, 2017, p. 16).  When a secular covenant is set-up, 
the same rules apply: all must obey the covenant, even the government itself.  If the 
community or the government does not abide by the covenant, the whole nation will be 
damned. 
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 For the Puritans, if a government exceeds its bounds, it does not have “the 
sanction of God” (Baldwin; cited in Wardle, 1987) and not only is the government 
damned, the entire nation is damned. We are beginning to see why so many, then and 
now, so passionately fight to uphold the Constitution. It is more than just ‘the right thing 
to do’, it is a duty. Like Muslims who must fast for Ramadan, and Jews who won’t even 
turn on a light on the Sabbath, the Puritans and their ideological descendants see the fight 
to uphold the Constitution as a religious obligation. 
 The Puritans modelled their earthly lives after the kingdom of God.  God’s laws 
existed forever, so, the laws of the nation must as well.  Wardle (1989) notes that a pastor 
in colonial Massachusetts argued that the state must come up with a constitution so that it 
can be built “upon a permanent foundation that no length of time can undermine” (p. 17). 
We are now beginning to understand why, unlike many nations that have constitutional 
referendums, Americans are extremely hesitant to amend their Constitution.  The 
Constitution is not a contract with an expiry date, it is a sacred covenant that is 
immutable and everlasting.   
 With this belief in their religious Weltanschauung, it is easy to see why many – 
particularly Evangelical Christians — Americans take the Constitution so seriously: the 
Constitution is the covenant not just between the people and their rulers, it is between the 
people and their god.  If either the people or their rulers break the covenant, then they 
will be punished by God. Not only must the people themselves not break the covenant, 
they must fight to ensure that their rulers do not break the covenant or they all will suffer 
God’s wrath. 
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 We see this now in many Americans fights to oppose orders such as smoking 
bans, environmental regulations, or mandatory mask laws. They see this as the 
government overstepping its bounds. For some, anything that is not in the original 
covenant – The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights — 
is government over-reach.  Though these people may or may not be Protestants 
themselves, the fervor with which they oppose mask laws, or gun control legislation, 
shows that, whether consciously or unconsciously, they think that the nation will be 
damned if government power is not limited. For these ideological descendants of the 
Puritans, the Second Amendment states that they have the individual right to bear arms; 
therefore, restricting gun rights is breaking the covenant. For the crime of breaking the 
covenant, the punishment is not just damnation of the individual politician who allows 
the covenant to be broken, but damnation of the entire nation. 
 As Wardle writes, “Both religious and secular writers placed special emphasis on 
the broken covenant as a justification for community resistance to British laws” (1989, p. 
21). For a century before the American revolution, the clergy of the colonies had been 
teaching their churches that it was not just their right, but their duty, to rise up against 
sovereigns who do not obey the covenants.  Both secular and religious writers in pre-
revolutionary New England claimed that King George had “unkinged” himself by 
breaking the social contract (Rossiter; cited in Wardle, p. 21). In The Declaration and 
Resolves of the First Continental Congress (October 4, 1774), the colonial delegates 
argued that the King had gone beyond the limits of his authority by levying an internal 
tax on the colonies. Both this document and The Resolutions of the Stamp Act 
Congress of 1765 reference the Magna Carta, calling it the “British Constitution” and 
 122 
claiming that it applied to them because of their ancestry (Titus et al., 1987).  This 
highlights the colonists’ belief that a covenant does not just apply to those who make it, 
but to the generations that follow.  Even at this early point in American history we see the 
beginnings of the American hermeneutic fundamentalism in arguing that the covenant of 
the Constitution cannot be changed, only obeyed or disobeyed. 
  On July 4th, 1776, the Declaration of Independence was ratified by the Second 
Continental Congress.  This declaration followed the covenantal structure of previous 
compacts and constitutions within the colonies (Lutz, 1998, p. 114).  In Kline’s structure 
of ancient near-Eastern suzerainty covenants, the first section is the preamble which 
names the parties involved in the covenant and stresses the suzerain’s greatness.  In the 
Mayflower compact, I noted that this section stresses greatness of both the Christian God 
and the English King.  The Constitutional framers took a deist twist on this preamble: the 
first paragraph of The Declaration of Independence calls upon the powers of the “Laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God”.  In the second paragraph, The Declaration stresses the 
greatness, not of king or God — not even of “Nature’s God”– but of “Governments… 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed” (Jefferson et al, 1776). 
 After this, The Declaration of Independence briefly mentions what generally is 
stated in section five of the suzerainty covenants: the sanctions.  This is the list of 
blessings if the covenant is followed and curses if it is broken.  It is easy to understand 
why the framers decided to ‘skip’ to this section in only the second paragraph of the 
declaration: because the purpose of the document is to state that the previous covenant 
has been broken. 
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…whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, 
laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as 
to them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness. (para. 2) 
The framers continue the second paragraph with this appeal to the covenantal principle of 
limited authority: the principle which will be key to the founding of America, and to its 
current controversies from lack of nationalized health care, to anti-mask and anti-vaccine 
activists, to the lack of gun control and zealous gun rights activist. 
But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same 
Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their 
right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards 
for their future security.  
For the framers, the principle of limited authority is not just the justification for 
the Declaration of Independence, it is a duty to which all men are bound. 
 After stating the general covenantal principle of limited authority and stating that 
all men have a right to it and a duty to uphold it, the declaration gets more specific to the 
circumstances which necessitated its writing.  The second section of the suzerainty 
covenant structure is the historical prologue that recounts the relationship of the vassal 
and suzerainty. The Declaration of Independence inverts this structure: instead of the 
suzerain declaring the good he has done for the vassal, the vassals – i.e. the signers of The 
Declaration of Independence – declare, “The history of the present King of Great Britain 
is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the 
establishment of absolute Tyranny over these States”.  The Declaration then lists general 
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complaints against the King (i.e. “He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most 
wholesome and necessary for the public good”). It then continues with more specific 
complaints against the suzerain including how King George has deprived them of 
material good and has violated their legal rights. 
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent: 
For depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury… 
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the 
lives of our people. 
            The third section of the ancient suzerainty covenants structure stresses the ethical 
stipulations necessary to maintaining the covenant.  Again, the colonists invert 
this.  Instead of listing the ethical stipulations to maintaining a relationship with the King, 
the colonists recount how they had complained to the King that he was not living up to 
the ethical stipulations of the covenant of citizenship, and how these complaints were 
ignored. They state “In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress 
in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated 
injury…” 
 Up until this point, the colonists have only generally stated that men should rebel 
against a government that oversteps its authority, not specifically which men these are, 
and which government is being referred to.  But after enumerating the complaints against 
the king, the colonists finally, almost reluctantly, declare the future of their relationship: 
We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, 
and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. 
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 The colonists end by skipping to section 5 of Kline’s covenant structure: the 
“curses” that will occur should the covenant be broken.  In the ancient suzerainty 
covenants, the suzerains explain the wrath that they will throw upon the vassals should 
the covenant be violated. But the vassals – in this case, the colonists — are not in a 
position of power to do this, so instead, they state they are therefore breaking off their 
relationship with the King. 
We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General 
Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the 
rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People 
of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these united Colonies are, 
and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States, that they are Absolved 
from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between 
them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved… 
Instead of pledging to the king, they now pledge to each other: 
And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of 
Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and 
our sacred Honor. 
            Like the Mayflower Compact, The Declaration of Independence closes with a 
similar structure to section four of Kline’s (1956) structure: a list of the ‘gods’ who 
witnessed the covenanting.  Of course, this was the structure in the polytheistic world.  In 
the Mayflower Compact, section four consists of the signature of all the adult men aboard 
the ship.  The Declaration of Independence closes with a list of the now-saints of the 
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American civil religious tradition that were in attendance and the vassal states which they 
represent. 
            The Declaration of Independence itself was not enough to pull the new nation 
together in covenant. The Congress concurrently began writing the articles of 
confederation which would serve as the nation’s constitution/covenant. In Kline’s 
structure, section six covers the administration and succession arrangements. This is not 
laid out in The Declaration of Independence, for the terms of administration and 
succession arrangements will not be made with England, but with “We, the people”.   
Natural Law and the Secularization of Covenant Theology 
 As Wardle (1989) writes, “after the Americans had declared their independence 
from Great Britain, the influence of covenant-based theology in political philosophy was 
directly manifest in the great decade of constitutional writing. Constitutionalism was the 
logical outgrowth of covenant theology” (p. 22).   
            The Calvinist covenant theology of the Puritans was founded on the ideas of 16th 
and 17th Scottish theologians such as John Knox and Samuel Rutherford. In the late 
17th century, the philosopher John Locke secularized ideas of the covenant into the notion 
of the social contract which emerges from the consent of the governed.  Locke, who has 
been referred to as “America’s philosopher” because of his great influence on the 
founding fathers, was the most cited non-biblical writer in the decade of Constitution 
writing after the Declaration of Independence (Wardle, 1989, (Titus & Thompson, 
1987)p. 16). Although we think of him as an Enlightened advocate of secularization, we 
must remember that Locke, as Wardle poetically notes “rode into New England on the 
backs of Moses and the prophets.” (p. 16).   Locke took his parents’ Puritan covenant 
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ideology and the notion of the natural law, secularized them into notions of the social 
tract and natural rights (Hunter, 2014, p. x) to lay the foundation for the American 
founding fathers’ idea of a national constitution and a bill of rights.  
      Before going any further in explaining how Locke’s work was so critical to the 
American Constitution, I ought to give a refresher on the most important distinction 
between camps of English political theorists leading up to the American Declaration of 
Independence. Locke’s predecessor, Thomas Hobbes, believed that there was no such 
thing as law outside of human social norms.  As the American historian Kelly Hunter 
(2014) succinctly explains, for Hobbes, “justice is nothing more than a human 
contrivance” (p. 30).  In a Hobbesian Weltanschauung, terms like ‘law’ and ‘justice’ are 
socially constructed and only make sense if a sovereign is able to enforce them.  Though 
Hobbes’ work was reflective of, and influential in, England in the 17th and 18th century, 
this was not the case in the colonies.  As Hunter notes, “Hobbes' way of thinking could 
not give rise to the words … in the Declaration of Independence where Jefferson 
criticizes the king of England for failing to uphold the unalienable rights of men 
‘endowed by the Creator’ rights that preexist all human government” (p. 31) .  Instead, 
the colonists turned to Locke. 
            While human life in the Hobbesian state of nature is famously “nasty, brutish, 
short” without rhyme or reason, for Locke, nature is a finely tuned clock governed by 
natural law (Hunter, 2014, p. 31).  Concepts like law and justice are not mere social 
constructions which need to be backed by a powerful sovereign; rather, laws and justice 
precede not just government, but humans themselves (p. 32).  Locke believed that all 
government should be justified by “preexisting moral principles” (p. 32).  Here, we are 
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beginning to see that, in the Lockean tradition, the Constitution is more than just a legal 
document: The Constitution describes universal moral principles and natural law. The 
Constitution is therefore timeless and unalterable.   As Hunter describes, for Locke and 
his followers in the colonies, “individual rights of life, liberty, and property [are] 
absolutes that preexist government” (p. 34). 
            But Puritan covenant theology was not secularized through Locke’s ideas alone: 
his ideas, and that of the Enlightenment itself, needed help to spread in these 
fundamentalist religious communities.  Perhaps surprisingly, much of this was done by 
preachers. By 1780 there were more than nineteen hundred congregations of ‘covenant 
theology’ including Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Baptists in the colonies 
(Wardle, 1987).  Though newspapers were circulating in large settlements such as 
Boston, ‘the news’ was still spread in most parts of this agricultural nation in church 
settings.  In the more-than-a-century since the founding of the colonies, the Puritan 
religion had taken on an ‘Enlightenment’ character. Preachers in the colonies “taught the 
political doctrines of Locke and Milton until the members of their congregations held the 
liberal theories of government which rendered them most sensitive to governmental 
oppression” (Van Tyne, 45; quoted in Wardle, p. 15).  This, of course, complemented 
their existing rejection of absolute authority, and reinforced the belief that a consensual 
covenant should be the foundation of an independent America. 
The U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights 
Now it shall come about when [the king] sits on the throne of his kingdom, he 
shall write for himself a copy of this law on a scroll in the presence of the 
Levitical priests. And it shall be with him, and he shall read it all the days of his 
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life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, by carefully observing all the 
words of this law and these statutes, that his heart may not be lifted up above his 
countrymen and that he may not turn aside from the commandment.  
        Deuteronomy 17:18-20 
 Many countries in the world including the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Israel, 
and even Canada and New Zealand do not have written, codified constitutions. However, 
the founders of the United States saw a need for a constitution written in the language of 
the people. As discussed at length earlier, Puritan covenant theology was not limited to 
the religious sphere, covenants were the method of organizing all matters of life.  As 
Rossiter states, “the traditional American insistence on a written constitution owes 
something to the insistence of the puritan that higher law could be written law” (quoted in 
Wardle, 1989, p. 22).  If God’s covenants were written on tablets on Mt. Sinai so that 
they could be examined by all, then the law of the land, too, must be written to be known.  
 Unlike the Catholics of their day, the Puritans believed they had the right to read 
the Bible in their own language.  There was no need for any intermediaries between the 
believer and the word of God.  Again, as in heaven, so on earth: The Puritans thought that 
a thorough Constitution, written in the language of the people, could guide the nation as 
the Bible guides the church. Writing, of course, is a key component of hermeneutic 
fundamentalism. Oral traditions can bend and twist to suit their environment, but once the 
sacred text is written, it is stable and must be adhered to as such.  
 The Declaration of Independence is more than just a documentation of the 
vassal’s complaints against the suzerain, it ends with the vassals pledging allegiance “to 
each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor” (Jefferson et al, 1776).  But a 
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covenant needs more than just a pledge, as Kline’s structure informs us, it must also 
clearly state who the parties partaking in the covenant are, a brief history of their 
relationship, give the ethical stipulations of the covenant and sanctions if they are broken, 
and outline the administrations of the document (Kline, 1960, 1997).  Although the 
founding fathers were not as explicit as the Pilgrims in modeling their Constitution on 
biblical covenants, the influence of Puritan covenant theology in their documents is easy 
to find.  Christian legal scholars Herbert Titus and Gerald Thompson (1987), identify 
seven biblical covenant principles: “justification of authority, reciprocity (or mutuality), 
community, irrevocability, limited modifiability, bindingness on future generations, and 
the legal framework for the administration of law” (para. 1). In this section, I discuss the 
first five of these principles and how they help to build upon the fundamental structure of 
all covenants in the Judeo-Christian world to form the complete American Covenant. 
1. “Authority”: Like the suzerainty covenant, this is found in the preamble. As Titus and 
 Thompson (1987) explain, “The Constitution could have formed “a more perfect 
 Union” only upon ratification by the source of the various states’ authority – the 
 people” (Biblical Pattern section, para. 2).  We see this in the US Constitutional 
 “doctrine of enumerated powers”.  They note that “What has not been delegated 
 by the people is retained by them, as expressly acknowledged in the Ninth and 
 Tenth Amendments to the Constitution” (Biblical Pattern section, para. 3) 
2. “Mutuality”: This is equivalent to “the consent of the governed” in the Declaration of 
 Independence. Again, we see this in the Preamble: “We the people . . . do ordain 
 and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” It can also be 
 131 
 found in Article VII which states that the people in each state need to ratify the 
 Constitution. 
3. “Community”: Along with the references to “the people” (i.e. a single people who 
 become one by ratifying the Constitution), Titus and Thompson argue that the 
 phrase “a more perfect Union” and the reference to Union in Article IV denote 
 community in the biblical sense (Biblical Pattern Section, para. 5).  I might add 
 that we can connect the Constitutional notion of federal union of many states in 
 one nation to the twelve vassal tribes united under the suzerain – the god of Israel. 
4. “Irrevocability and bindingness on future generations”: Again, we look to the preamble 
 with “and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”  In 
 addition, Article VI Clause to notes that all Americans are bound to the 
 Constitution forever. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, unlike secular 
 contracts, covenants bind not just those alive today, but their children to come. 
 This is important in understanding the problem of amending a covenant. 
5. “The principle of limited modifiability” “bindingness on future generations”, and “the 
 legal framework for the administration of law”: In Kline’s (1960) structure, the 
 final section is devoted to administration.  This has been the most problematic 
 part of  the US Constitution due to the principle of limited modifiability.  It is also 
 the principle most relevant to the gun control debate. This is, of course, in Article 
 V: the article governing amendments.  And it is to this problem that I dedicate the 
 next section.   
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Limited Modifiability, Natural law, and Their Implications for Contemporary Law in 
the USA 
The Sacred Rights of Mankind are not to be rummaged for among old 
parchments or musty records.  They are written, as with sunbeam, in the whole 
volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself, and can never be erased or 
obscured by mortal power. 
   Alexander Hamilton (quoted in Chernow, 2004, p. 60)  
 
 Gadamer explains that all of hermeneutics is the problem of creating meaning 
from materials that foreign to us. As the contemporary legal hermeneutician Peter 
Goodrich (2016) writes, “The lawyer faces this problem in an acute form, and therefore is 
forced to resolve it in an exemplary way by reconciling the spirit of the tradition with the 
needs of contemporary communities” (section 3, para. 4). But there are philosophers, 
judges, and lawyers in the United States, and all over the world, who do not believe in 
“reconciling the spirit of the tradition with the needs of contemporary communities”. 
In this dissertation I have discussed the hermeneutic traditions associated with the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment such as the constitutional originalist tradition, 
the living constitution tradition, the individual rights hermeneutic, and the collective 
rights hermeneutic, not all of which propose that the law should be interpreted in order to 
meet the needs of contemporary communities. In fact, some might argue that the 
constitutional originalist tradition believes that the words of the Founding Fathers should 
be applied despite the needs of contemporary communities.   
 133 
 The American Political philosopher Kerry L. Hunter (2014, pp. 27–42) uses the 
case of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic constitution in order to ‘make the familiar 
strange’ as the sociologists say. Hunter contrasts and compares Iranian Mullahs with 
American Supreme Court justices so that we can better understand the contradictions of 
constitutional originalism.  
 We often forget that Islam is also a part of the Judeo-Christian tradition, including 
its legal traditions. Sharia is grounded in the same belief in natural law that grounds not 
just biblical laws, but the constitutional law of the United States of America. Because the 
Islamist regime in Iran believes that their constitution is divine (sharia) law, then, of 
course, it cannot be altered.  All that an earthly government can do is interpret and 
administer that divine law. If, therefore, we truly followed the spirit of the Lockean 
assumption that there are inalterable rights and natural laws, then there is no need for 
democracy: we only need a judiciary to interpret and apply laws, we do not need a 
legislative body to make or change them.  As Hunter (2014) notes, this is exactly the 
system in present day Iran. Though Iran is officially a constitutional democracy, elected 
officials must all be vetted by the Guardian Council who are merely interpreters of the 
law.  There is no need for elected officials to represent the populous as natural law 
already dictates the entire governmental system – the government only needs 
constitutional originalists who act as faithful interpreters of this natural law.  
 So, is the American Constitution just like Khomeini’s?  Are Justice Scalia and his 
fellow originalists justified in thinking that the Supreme Court should only make ‘neutral’ 
decisions which arise out of an originalist interpretation of the Constitution?  Hunter 
thinks that if we truly follow through on Locke’s view of natural laws and justice, then, 
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yes: there is no need for a voice of conscience in the judiciary – judges just need to 
interpret and apply the laws regardless of whether they seem morally correct.  Hunter is 
not trying to insult Scalia and other originalists by comparing them to the Islamic clerics 
of the Iranian Guardian Council.  Instead, Hunter (2014) is merely pointing out that the 
system of Iran comes from the same Judeo-Christian roots and embrace the same ideas of 
God-given laws as the American system.    
 One major difference between the Iranian legal system and the American legal 
system is that, unlike the Koran, the Constitution has been amended.  Iranian jurists may 
turn to writings such as the Hadith (reported sayings of Muhammed) when the Koran 
does not speak on an issue, but Muslims do not believe that the Koran itself has not been, 
nor can be, changed.  There is no document in Islam which can override the Koran in the 
way that constitutional amendments can override the original text of the constitution.  
 This, of course, creates enormous problems for those that see the Constitution as 
divinely-inspired. As I see the fundamentalist hermeneutic as emerging from Puritan 
covenant theology, I draw parallels between Christians understanding of the Old 
Testament in light of the New Testament which has been similarly problematic. Most 
Christians, including the Puritans9, do not believe that they are obligated to follow the 
ceremonial law of the Old Testament, only the moral law is applicable to all.  They 
believe that laws pertaining to cleanliness, diet, and the Levitical priesthood do not need 
to be followed, but moral laws, such as the ten commandments, must still be obeyed. 
                                                   
9 Like Catholics, the Puritans believed that the Mosaic Law is part of the New Covenant. However, there is 
a distinction between the law and gospel.  The sacrifice of Jesus’s death means that Christians are not all 
obliged to follow the Mosaic Laws not mentioned in the New Testament. Passages such as Mark 7:19 
(“Thus he declared all foods clean”) are cited to show that Jesus taught that particular laws were no longer 
applicable. 
 135 
Other Christians believe that none of the Old Covenant applies to Christians; instead, 
Jesus brough an entirely New Covenant. Only a small minority of Christians believe they 
must follow the laws of the Torah.  
 Similarly, constitutional originalists argue over what should and should not be 
thought of as a ‘God-given’ right guaranteed by the constitution. While I have not come 
across any constitutional originalists who believe that the Bill of Rights should not be 
considered part of the constitution10, there have been many, throughout American history, 
that consider any amendments made after the civil war, most importantly Reconstruction 
Amendments, to be not a part of the ‘true’ Constitution (Brandwein, 2016). 
Constitutional fundamentalists believe that the ‘true’ Constitution existed at a certain 
point in history, but like the sects Anabaptists which disagree as to whether a button is a 
modern technology, these Constitutional fundamentalists do not agree on where to stall 
Constitutional history.  
 There is no unified notion of what originalists believe regarding constitutional 
amendments. The originalist law professor Calabresi has some very surprising views on 
what he believes with regards to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Shockingly, he writes:  
Living constitutionalists believe that racial segregation was constitutional from 
1877 to 1954, because public opinion favored it, and that it became 
unconstitutional only as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954) – a case in which they think the Supreme Court changed and 
improved the Constitution. In contrast, originalists think that the Fourteenth 
Amendment always forbade racial segregation—from its adoption in 1868, to the 
                                                   
10 This certainly doesn’t mean they don’t exist – I would guess that there are many individuals out there – it 
means simply that I haven’t found any while conducting research for this dissertation. 
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Supreme Court’s erroneous decision upholding segregation in Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896), to the decision in Brown in 1954, down to the present day. 
Living constitutionalists think racial apartheid could become constitutional again 
if social attitudes toward race evolve. Originalists disagree and think race 
discrimination will always be unconstitutional unless the Fourteenth Amendment 
is repealed. 
Though we may see Calabresi’s suggestion that his fellow originalists believe that the 
14th amendment “always forbade racial segregation” to be an example of ‘retroactive 
continuity’11, what is important for this dissertation is that conservative legal scholars 
such as Calabresi undoubtedly accept the validity of constitutional amendments which 
have been passed using the process laid out in the Fifth amendment. Even though he 
clearly derides the view that the Constitution is a social construct, he accepts that 
amendments are possible because of Article V. This is to say, even if the Constitution is a 
part of unchanging natural law, it can be changed because those changes are also a part of 
natural law. It is an argument I find hard to wrap my head around, but Calabresi is not 
arguing that the Constitution can never be changed, simply that it must be changed in 
accord within its own internally consistent framework.   However, though Calabresi is 
self-proclaimed conservative, he is not a radical populist12 and his definition of originalist 
is not what I would refer to as fundamentalist. Calabresi argues that originalism serves to 
“restrain the passions of the moment” but Calabresi does not argue that the constitution 
cannot be changed or that the rights granted in the Constitution are “God-given”.     
                                                   
11 Retroactive continuity (retcon) is the term used in television and film studies to denote a text which 
imposes a new meaning on, or gives a different interpretation of, past events.  
12 Though Calabresi served under Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, he has criticized Trump and 
even referred to Trump’s tweet that he would delay the 2020 election “fascistic” (para. 2).  
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 It is very rare for originalist law professors or Supreme Court judges to refer to 
any right given in the constitution as ‘God-given’. But, as we know from media coverage 
of NRA conventions, anti-mask rallies, Make America Great Again campaigns, it is 
certainly not rare for politicians and activists to refer to the Second Amendment, as well 
as other rights granted in the Bill of Rights as divinely-granted.  Though such a view is 
not common in academia or amongst mainstream media pundits, it is far from rare 
amongst the American population as a whole.  Scott Bradley – a fundamentalist Mormon 
university administrator who holds a PhD in Constitutional law (and also unsuccessfully 
ran for US senate in 2006 and 2010) states the beliefs of many in America: the 
constitution “is being abused and ignored” by those who want to amend it.  For Bradley 
and others, the answers to the problems in American society are not to create new laws 
and certainly not to amend the Constitution, rather, he argues, “the solution is to return to 
it [the Constitution] and apply Article VI (the oath to abide by it), not Article V.” Instead 
of amending the Constitution, the fundamentalist approach to constitutional  
hermeneutics is to pledge to abide by it with even greater ferocity.  
 Locke writes: “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which it 
obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it” (Locke 1690, chap. 1; quoted in Hunter, 2014, p. 44).  For Locke, we just need 
to consult the natural laws.  We come together and grant power to governments solely to 
do away with the “inconvenience’ of having to personally police one’s own natural God-
given rights” (Hunter, p. 44).  Now we are beginning to hear — out of the mouth of a 
17th century British philosopher – the roots of the opinions of ‘the Second Amendment 
people’ as Trump refers to them (Kamisar, 2016): governments cannot change ‘God-
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given’ rights, they can only either protect them, or betray them.  It doesn’t matter if the 
gun control might save lives and make the USA a better place to live; the Constitution 
cannot be changed because it is a reflection of natural law.  Natural law cannot be wrong.
 John Adams wrote that the only responsibility of American legislatures is to 
protect “rights antecedent to all earthly governments: rights that cannot be repealed or 
restrained by human laws; rights derived from the Great Legislator of the Universe” 
(John Adams; quoted in Hunter, 2014, p. 45).  Is this any different from Khomeini’s 
decree that the fundamental role of the legislature is merely administrative? As Hunter 
notes, in John Adams’ day, the purpose of congress was merely “to coin money, establish 
post offices, regulate commerce… There is nothing indicating that Congress is authorized 
to revise natural law” (p. 46). If Americans want to truly follow the Lockean beliefs of 
the founding fathers, then they must adopt a system more like Khomeini’s ruling councils 
than today’s political parties.  
 The problem I am stressing which must be addressed it that the ideal of popular 
sovereignty – so fundamental to the American covenant — is compromised by the notion 
of natural law which is the basis of that covenant. We see this problem illustrated by 
center-left politicians such as Obama who, at once, call on the sacred status of the 
Constitution, and simultaneously attempt to introduce legislation that is not in accord 
with it. Syrett (1961, p. 122; cited on Hunter, 2014, p. 46) quotes Alexander Hamilton 
himself to state: “Article V of the Constitution does articulate the means for amending the 
document, but it would be absurd to conceive Article V as granting authority to rewrite 
the law Hamilton describes as written “by the hand of divinity itself”. Just as “the sacred 
rights of mankind” cannot “be rummaged for, among old parchment records”, they 
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cannot be created by new parchments and new records; they “can never be erased or 
obscured by mortal power’ (Hamilton in Syrett 1961, p. 122)”.   
 If we accept that the Constitution was written in accord with natural law, then it 
cannot be changed, for natural law is immutable and everlasting. This is the limit of 
popular sovereignty: the people can only form laws in accord with the Constitution. How 
then do we reconcile later constitutional amendments, such as the 13th amendment to end 
slavery, with the belief that the Constitution is the earthly proclamation of natural law? If 
we suggest that the Constitution was amended to be in better accord with natural law 
itself, then, as Hunter (2014) notes, we are admitting that “the original document fell 
woefully short of upholding” the “sacred rights of mankind” (p. 47).  Yet, Article V of 
the Constitution is just that.  It is an invitation to see that the original document did not 
fully encompass all of natural law, or, even, blasphemously to some, that the founding 
fathers were wrong on some points of what and what is not a sacred ‘God-given’ right. 
 The ideological descendants of the Puritans, whether mainstream evangelical 
Protestant or Mormon13, stress the need of contemporary Americans to regard The US 
Constitution as a sacred covenant that can only be interpreted, not changed.  The Mormon 
historian Lynn Wardle argues that the notion of The Constitution as sacred covenant 
“holds enormous significance for such contemporary controversies as whether judges 
hearing constitutional cases are bound to interpret the Constitution or whether they may 
take a modem “noninterpretivist” approach”. The Evangelical, born-again Christian legal 
scholars Titus and Thompson (2017) end their work on the Constitution as covenant 
stating: 




Sad to say, the covenantal heritage of the U.S. Constitution has been largely 
forgotten. From an evolutionary view14, the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution is unascertainable and irrelevant, so it becomes an eighteenth century 
legal strait jacket from which modern man seeks escape. Consequently, the 
perspective championed by Justice Brennan and others that law and the meaning 
of the Constitution evolve over time is a flimsy security for liberty. But from the 
perspective of a biblical framework, the covenantal nature of the Constitution is 
its chief security, by which we obtain the blessings of liberty. Unless we return to 
honoring the covenants of our ancestors, how can we claim the benefits of a 
written Constitution which they left to their posterity? 
 For these Christian legal scholars, even raising the question of amending the 
Constitution in light of new circumstances is sacrilegious.  Rather, as I have attempted to 
show in this chapter, the American intellectual heritage of Puritan covenant theology and 
Lockean natural law means upholding the Constitution is more important than anything, 
even human life.  Because what is at risk if we violate the Constitution, for the Puritans 
and their intellectual descendants, is not just individual life, but the soul of the 
nation.  For these believers, if Americans violate the terms of the covenant, then America 
is damned to suffer God’s wrath. 
 In their influential work Reading Law (Scalia & Garner, 2012), Justices Scalia 
and Garner made a case against “activist” judges. They argue that judges should be only 
neutral interpreters of the Constitution.  As Hunter (2014) notes, 
                                                   
14 By “evolutionary view” the authors mean the liberal hermeneutic which sees that the Constitution should 
be interpreted to fit the needs of the current day. This is the opposite of the originalist views of Justices like 
Scalia and Thomas. 
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Scalia is not the only member of the court that believes justices are obligated to 
avoid any moral consideration in their deliberations.  Justice Clarence Thomas 
may be even more committed to this position than Scalia, and Chief Justice John 
Roberts has publicly proclaimed his commitment to the ideal of judicial 
neutrality. (p. 4) 
Hunter (2014) argues that it is not just the decisions themselves that make the judges of 
the Supreme Court influential, it is also their originalist rhetoric.  “Courts can 
significantly discourage moral discourse by trumping legislation through carefully crafted 
legal reasoning that is difficult for the public to comprehend” (p. 5). The rhetoric of the 
Supreme Court as it is now discourages public engagement in ethics. Whether it is 
intentional or not, the fact is that in an attempt to maintain “neutrality” – i.e. only 
interpret the Constitution and not make adjustments to it based on contemporary 
circumstances — judges can make morally reprehensible decisions and obscure them 
behind legalese and references to sacred documents.  
 Hunter gives the-late Justice Scalia as an example of a judge who claimed to be 
making decisions neutrally: only interpreting the Constitution and not adding his own 
moral judgments.  For Scalia, the Constitution is not a living document subject to 
possible amendments.  For Scalia and others who follow the fundamentalist legal 
hermeneutic, that would be like amending the Bible – taking out the bits that allow for 
slavery and celebrate rape, for example. Rather, Scalia announced that the Constitution is 
“dead, dead, dead” (quoted in Hunter, 2014, p. 5).  He even announced that, “[t]he judge 
who always likes the results he reaches is a bad judge” (p. 6).  In essence, Scalia claims 
that he bases his judgements on the Constitution even if these decisions make him 
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uncomfortable.  He does not go so far as to say that a good judge is one that makes 
decision that he/she finds immoral, but that is the logical extension of his statements.  If I 
may be melodramatic, Scalia saw his job like the concentration camp guard who is ‘just 
obeying orders’: the job of a judge is to interpret the Constitution, not to think about the 
ethics of its application in contemporary circumstances.  
 Though the justices of the Supreme Court do not have the power to make laws, 
they hold immense powers of persuasion.  Lawmakers listen to Supreme Court Justices, 
and these lawmakers also listen to the public’s reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
rhetoric.  So, what does it mean if these judges are merely interpreters of a 250-year-old 
document unconcerned with whether their decisions are moral? As Hunter (2014) 
explains: “what this means is that anyone interested in preserving the ability for moral 
arguments to influence policy should prefer a Supreme Court that uses moral reasoning to 
justify its conclusions” (p. 5).  If we think that laws should be guided by our morals, then 
we should allow our judges to use theirs. 
Conclusion 
 The activist historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (2018) writes that, “In the forefront 
of these Second Amendment adherents are the descendants of the old British and 
Northern European settlers who say that they represent “The People” and have the right 
to bear arms, the right to have military bases around the world, and the right – even the 
duty – to overthrow the government that does not, in their view, adhere to the God-given 
covenant” (p. 107). To understand why America allows these ‘rights’ to exist, we must 
understand how God’s law was secularized through Locke to become natural law, and the 
covenant became the Constitution. 
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 Whereas legal constitutions come and go, covenants are made to last forever.  The 
covenant God made with Moses was to last forever; not merely while those who endorsed 
the covenant were alive, but for generations to come: The Bible cannot be changed or 
cherry-picked to suit modern day situations.  In the same matter, those who see The 
Declaration of Independence, The Constitution, And the Bill of Rights as the American 
Covenant must approach them will the same fundamentalist hermeneutic – they are 



















MOSES OF THE NRA 
 From the Puritans — who saw themselves as new Israelites — to Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s invocation of the promised land, the Exodus narrative has been prominent in 
American history since the first European colonists arrived. Long before I knew anything 
about the National Rifle Association, I watched the cinematic epic The Ten 
Commandments.  Charlton Heston’s portrayal of Moses resonated with me as it did with 
other viewers in America and around the world who saw themselves as persecuted by an 
unjust government.  Along with his oratory skill and his well-known personal faith, 
Heston’s association with the figure of Moses made him the perfect fit to lead the faithful 
of the National Rifle Association (NRA) through the post-Columbine era. 
 I begin this chapter by discussing how the NRA changed from a shooting and 
hunting club to a political lobby group. I then explain the NRA’s appropriation of the 
language of civil rights and begin to discuss their use of sacred rhetoric. However, before 
attempting to explain how the NRA sacralised the right to bear arms, I detour to explore 
the concept of the sacred and the process of sacralization drawing on Durkheim (2001), 
Eliade (1961), and Berger and Luckman (1966) . With the help of these theorists, I 
explore the political ramifications of sacralization.  I argue that sacred rhetoric changes 
an audience’s thought process from qualified to absolute: there is no negotiating the 
sacred.  I warn the reader of the dangers of sacralization, drawing on the previous 
chapter’s discussion of the duty to overthrow governments who violate the covenantal 
principle of limited authority.  After fleshing out these concepts, I return to the discussion 
of the NRA’s use of sacred language. 
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 In the second part of this chapter, I discuss Charlton Heston himself and the 
phrase that has become a rallying cry for gun-rights advocates: “From my cold dead 
hands!”  I discuss Heston as an archetype and his previous gun-rights rhetoric.  I 
conclude the chapter with an analysis of his speech at the 2000 NRA convention, and 
speculate on why it became a “meme”; loved and hated but not ignored.  My argument in 
this chapter is clear and simple: Heston’s speech is part of a strategy that the NRA 
leadership has undertaken since 1977 to make the ‘absolutist’ interpretation of the Second 
Amendment sacred. Heston’s (in)famous line, “from my cold dead hands” sets the sacred 
limit: the individual right to bear arms is not negotiable. 
Memory, Forgetting, and the NRA 
 In the 1970s, the NRA transformed from a shooting and hunting club to a gun 
rights advocacy association (Dawson, 2019). In 1975 Harlan Carter became head of the 
NRA and began to advocate what has been termed “Second Amendment absolutism” 
(Hodge, 2015, p. 91; cited in Dawson, 2019): an individualist interpretation of the right to 
bear arms. The fact that both those inside and outside of the NRA refer to this as 
‘absolutism’ is important; what is absolute is sacred.  There is no mid-point or room for 
negotiation.  It is one or the other. The sacred is a quantum, not incremental, leap.  Just as 
there is no space between life and death, or between being saved and being damned, there 
is no space to negotiate the terms of the Second Amendment.  Second Amendment 
absolutism is sacred rhetoric. 
 Following Carter, Neal Knox became the president of the NRA and continued to 
advocate for individuals’ unrestricted right to bear arms. At the 1977 NRA convention, 
Knox had helped Carter to orchestrate the “Revolt in Cincinnati” in which the old guard – 
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primarily hunters and sport shooters who were willing to compromise on issues of gun 
control – were pushed out by a new guard of politicized members dedicated to the idea of 
unrestricted gun rights as central to the American way of life.  The NRA began to focus 
their efforts on electing congresspeople who saw the Constitution as the earthly 
affirmation of individual American’s God-given right to bear arms (Dawson, 2019; 
Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018; Gorski, 2017). 
 For Foucault (2007), the desacralization of tradition in postmodernity left a void 
which is filled with commemorative activity that is manipulated by those in 
power . Contemporary theorists have continued in the wake of Foucault to argue that 
collective memory is always a construction of those in power.  Foucault’s compatriot, 
memory theorist Pierre Nora (1989), has argued that, with the decline of traditions in 
modernity, the elite began to produce “simulations of natural memory” (p. 13): collective 
memory detached from the past as those in power select, edit and even invent new pasts. 
 As I noted in the historical review, until the late 1960s, there was not much 
discussion of the Second Amendment by legal scholars, politicians, or the public.  But 
this changed when the Black Panthers assumed an individualist interpretation in order to 
assert their right to bear arms and patrol their neighborhoods.  The NRA seized on this, 
assuming an individualist interpretation themselves.  Though these Second Amendment 
absolutists have not always had total political power, they have used their positions of 
power to push a particular ‘simulation’ of memory forward: they have presented a 
memory of the framers of the Constitution as fierce Calvinist individualists who believed 
that the Second Amendment was an individual right like the right to free speech 
(Scalia & Garner, 2012). 
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 The German archeologist and memory theorist Jan Assmann (2011, p. 335) writes 
that “[w]hile knowledge has no form and is endlessly progressive, memory involves 
forgetting.  It is only by forgetting what lies outside of the horizon of the relevant that 
memory can perform an identity-function”. It’s perhaps not surprising that at the NRA 
headquarters in Fairfax, Virginia, the Second Amendment is written on the lobby 
wall.  But it is only part of the Second Amendment: there is no mention of the 
militia.  The writing on the wall simply reads, “The right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed” (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 125).  The mention of militia is 
omitted, but the comma remains, leaving two clauses, or one – as the NRA intends – a 
single strangely-punctuated idea. 
 Carter and Knox both focused on the goal of enshrining the Second Amendment 
as an individual right. Carter and Knox did not work on their sacred rhetoric alone in 
Monk-like solitude; in the 1980s and 1990s a small group of conservative and libertarian 
lawyers “were able to usher in a flood of individualistic studies so that they outnumbered 
the total number of militia-centric studies [regarding the Second Amendment] by almost 
two to one” (Charles 2018, p. 301; quoted in Dawson, 2019, p. 2). In 1997, Knox was 
replaced as president by Charlton Heston – a firm believer in the sacred status of this 
absolutist-individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment. 
 Currently, the NRA has approximately five million members.  Millions more 
Americans support NRA causes but are not members. The NRA has an annual budget of 
more than $300 million, but, surprisingly, only about 10% of this actually goes to direct 
lobbying.  Rather, the NRA’s real power rests in the ‘grades’ that it gives to political 
candidates based on their opinions and past-voting record on gun rights.   These “grades” 
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sway millions of voters (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018).15 In 2016, the NRA contributed 30 million 
dollars towards putting President Trump in the White House.  The NRA is often held up 
as the America’s most powerful special interest organization (Gangster Capitalism: The 
Dark Side of the American Dream, 2020). 
The Sacralization of the Individual Right to Bear Arms 
 Don’t do x because I say so has less impact than don’t do x because God says so.  
        (Tetlock, 2003, p. 320) 
 Before I discuss the NRA’s rhetorical tactic of engaging in the sacralization of the 
right to bear arm, I need to first discuss what exactly I mean by ‘the sacred’ and how it is 
constructed. For Emile Durkheim, religion was not defined by belief in an afterlife, the 
practice of rituals, or a cosmology; instead, religion was the demarcation of the sacred 
and the profane (Durkheim, 2001). As Durkheim explains, the sacred is “things set 
apart” (Durkheim, 2001). Mircea Eliade, too, stressed this notion of difference.  He 
writes, the sacred is “the manifestation of something of a wholly different order” (Eliade, 
1961).   In this definition, the sacred can be religious, but it is not limited to the 
religious. So, yes, the Pope’s ring is sacred, as is the Torah, but, so might be an intimate 
sexual relationship: it’s not religious but it is sacred because it is different — set apart — 
from their other relationships. We see violation of this sacredness as inherently wrong: 
crossing the border between the sacred and the profane is dangerous.  The Koran is like 
                                                   
15 I must mention that The NRA is currently embroiled in a leadership scandal regarding the lavish lifestyle 
of Wayne La Pierre. I will not wade into this discussion as it is not relevant to the topic of civil religion and 
the Second Amendment.  Instead, I refer the interested reader to the excellent investigative journalism on 
the topic in the Podcast Gangster Capitalism, Season 2: The NRA. 
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no other books for Muslims, a crown is like no other hat for monarchists, and a husband 
is like no other man for his wife. 
 In Kenneth Burke’s (1966) theory of the ethical negative, our desire for perfection 
means that we are constantly drawn to create broader and broader categories as our 
ethical categories are never good enough. He argues that our desire for perfection 
eventually drives us to place everything into either a positive or negative ethical 
category. For Durkheim and Eliade, all human cultures tend to envision a binary 
universe: the sacred and the profane – the positive or negative category. We rhetorically 
sort our world into sacred and profane.  By the middle of the 20th century, anthropologists 
noted that though there is great variety in the beliefs of what is and is not sacred, 
sacredness “seems to qualify as a functional universal across societies” (Tetlock, 2003, p. 
320).  Though those in the multicultural and multi-religious nation of America disagree 
on what qualifies as sacred, all of our cultures have a concept of the sacred. 
 Though thinkers since the Enlightenment have discussed the disenchantment of 
the world, even Weber recognized that the sacred not only still exists, but is still 
becoming.  For Eliade, all of humanity dwells in “a world capable of becoming 
sacred”.   Everything – people, ideas, objects, texts — is capable of becoming 
sacred.  When we employ sacred rhetoric, we sort things into one of these two categories 
and can move something from one realm to the other: we can sacralise or desacralize 
it.  For example, a covenant, as discussed in the last chapter, is one way of making a 
relationship sacred. The marriage covenant rhetorically makes an existing relationship 
sacred.  At the marriage ceremony, sacred rhetoric is used to persuade us that the 
relationship is now truly of a different order than other relationships. 
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 Durkheim (Durkheim, 2001, p. 52) recognized that “the circle of sacred objects 
cannot be fixed once and for all; its scope can vary infinitely.”  What is considered sacred 
in one society may not be considered sacred in another and vice versa. More importantly 
for this essay, what is considered sacred in one time may not be considered sacred in 
another. The sacred is constructed rhetorically and must be continually rhetorically 
maintained as sacred.  In this manner an object seems to have always-already been 
sacred.  As Durkheim states (p. xlvi), “Humans acting collectively make and remake this 
quality of sacredness but then encounter it after the fact as if it had always been built into 
objects and was ready-made”. Berger and Luckman expand on this in their canonical 
text The Social Construction of Reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  They argue that 
while previous generations have to work to sacralise things, the next generation takes 
these same things’ sacredness for granted. Indeed, they argue that the process 
of sacralization “achieves success to the degree that this taken-for-granted quality is 
internalized”.  For Berger and Luckman “the subjective reality of the world hangs on the 
thin thread of conversation”: the sacred is rhetorically constructed. 
 Durkheim, Eliade, Berger and Luckman understood that things – objects, people, 
texts – become sacred through human labour. In a Marxist sense, the fact that things are 
presented to us as either sacred or profane obscures this fact. Just like the cheap price of a 
plastic trinket made in China obscures the labour that went into it and the workers who 
created it, the fact that we see things as absolutely sacred obscures the fact that it took 
human rhetorical labour to construct them as such. 
 The sacred is not necessarily tied to religion.  As religion declines, it may be that 
a society replaces the religious sacred, with the secular sacred.  Previous generations 
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labored to make particular values, objects, people, etc. hold sacred value.  Saints were 
once just people, the Pope’s hat was once a just fabric and glue, equality of the races was 
once just a theory, religious freedom was once just an ideal.  In appealing to our God-
given right to bear arms, the NRA is actively laboring to make the right to bear arms 
sacred. And this labour takes time, skill, and money. 
 Berger and Luckman (1966, p. 6) see that Durkheim argued that what is sacred 
and profane is “inherently precarious and predestined to change”. However, Berger and 
Luckman stress, this does not mean that it is an easy process. Once something in “the 
humanly-produced world attains the character of objective reality,” it is not easy to 
change our perception of its objective reality rather than the fact it was socially 
constructed. Once something has become a social fact, it is not easy to undo. It is not an 
easy process to make a person, an object, a place, or an idea into something sacred.  The 
NRA had to devise a strategy and work tirelessly to construct and to maintain the notion 
that the right to bear arms was sacred.  
 Throughout US history, from abolitionist to suffragettes to anti-abortion activists, 
social movements have associated themselves with the sacred.  Instead of completely 
constructing the sacred anew, the NRA sought to associate itself with what was already 
considered sacred.  Had the US Constitution not already been considered the sacred 
founding text of the American people, based on natural law, it would have been nearly 
impossible for the NRA to convince even their own members that the individualist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment is a God-given right. The sacred rhetoric 
deployed by the NRA did not create new sacred ideas, but rather, it shifted the meaning 
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of a document that was already considered sacred. Also, it attempted to expand the 
language of sacred rights to encompass their definition of an existing sacred right. 
 In chapter two I discussed the history of civil religion.  As we know, for 
Durkheim, civil religion emerged organically from the bottom up.  Yet, for Rousseau, 
civil religion was an artificial tool used to manipulate the populous.  As the Canadian 
political scientist Philip E. Tetlock (2003) succinctly sums up this Rousseauvian 
approach to civil religion: 
Political philosophers – from Aristotle to Marx and Nietzsche – have long 
speculated that citizens are more likely to do what they are supposed to do if they 
believe the moral codes that regulate their lives are not arbitrary social 
constructions but rather are anchored in bedrock values that transcend the whims 
of mere mortals. 
Why is this such an important strategy for the NRA? What are the political ramifications 
of pushing a concept from the realm of the mundane to the realm of the sacred?  Much as 
Marxists argue that commodity fetishism obscures human labour, we can see that, for 
Durkheimians, the Judeo-Christian concept of God’s law and the Lockean tradition of 
natural law (discussed in the previous chapter) obscure the fact that these laws have been 
rhetorically constructed by human labour.  Durkheim’s explanation of the construction of 
the sacred is more in line with a Hobbesian realpolitik than the American Lockean 
covenantal Constitution founded on the assumption of natural law. 
 Once something is deemed sacred, it is difficult to de-sacralise.  Take, for 
example, the notion of racial purity. The idea of race is a very modern concept.  It is the 
product of the modernist worldview that sought to categorize everything, even 
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humans.  Once the concept emerged, there were many who then insisted that racial purity 
was a sacred value which must be upheld through law.  Though the idea of racial purity 
was not a sacred concept in America for very long, there are still many who feel disgust 
when the boundary between the races is crossed.  Though the anti-miscegenation laws in 
Pennsylvania were dropped more than a century ago, there are still many who see racial 
purity as somehow sacred.  Sacralization ensures that an idea has a long future. Once the 
fire is lit, it is hard to extinguish. 
 But perhaps the most important reason that an organization may push for an idea 
to be deemed sacred is that sacralization alters our thinking. Sacralization does away with 
utilitarian arguments, statistics and data, even, some might say, logic.  Our thinking is 
changed from consequentialist to absolutist. If the right to bear arms is a God-given right, 
enshrined in the Constitution, then it doesn’t matter that the US has more mass shootings 
than other countries.   If the right to bear arms is sacred, then it doesn’t matter than the 
United States loses more lives to firearms than any other industrialized country.  If the 
right to bear arms is sacred, then it cannot be questioned with facts, data, or even death. It 
doesn’t matter that no one needs a bump stock to go deer hunting.  It doesn’t matter that 
epidemiologists tell you that background checks could save thousands of lives every 
year.  What is sacred cannot be qualified. 
 The NRA has managed to turn “politics into religious obligation” (Friedland, 
2001, p. 126; quoted in Dawson, 2019, p. 10).  Although they are, in fact, a political 
lobbying group, the NRA has linked itself not to political power, but to divine power.  In 
announcing their ‘God-given’ right to bear arms, they are implicitly stating that no 
secular authority has the right to take their right away.  In doing this, as Dawson 
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succinctly states, “the NRA has elevated the defense of the Second Amendment to 
religious obligation” (p. 10). 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, for those who believe in the Constitution as 
covenant, if the government attempts to violate a right, then it is violating the covenantal 
principle of limited authority and is thus breaking the covenant. If this interpretation is 
accepted as the true interpretation, then it follows that it is not just a right, but a duty to 
overthrow that government.  For, as we learned in our study of covenantal authority, Jehu 
had an obligation to overthrow Ahab or the entire nation of Israel would be damned.  If 
the individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment is sacred, and if it is violated, 
and the people do not rise up to overthrow their government, then the entire nation of the 
USA will suffer God’s wrath. In their discourse analysis of the magazine Soldier of 
Fortune, Yamane et al (cited in Dawson, 2019, p. 2) note the overwhelming narrative of 
apocalyptic millennialism among gun enthusiasts in the USA.  There are many who 
believe that God’s wrath is imminent. There are already Americans who believe that 
unless, in the time of this wrath, we do not rise up to overthrow those who violate the 
covenant, then the whole nation will be damned. 
 Finally, sacralization allows for violence.  In his discussion of the sociology of 
terrorism, Austin Turk (2004, p. 271) notes that all of the world’s major religions “permit 
and even require violence in defense of the faith.”  Turk Dawson argues that “The NRA 
advocated protection of the individual means to engage in violence as a means of 
‘restoring the moral order”.  Not only does the American who believes in the 
individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment have a sacred right to overthrow 
the government which breaks the covenant, they have a sacred duty to overthrow 
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it.  Moreover, the sacred gives them permission to use violence.  The political 
ramifications of this sacralization are no joke.  Though Trump jokingly threatened Hilary 
Clinton with “the Second Amendment people”, there is a real threat of violence when we 
sacralise anything. 
 Many scholars have looked at the NRA through a religious lens, particularly that 
of Evangelical Protestant Christianity.  Even members of the NRA leadership itself have 
argued that “you would get a far better understanding if you approached [the NRA] as if 
you were approaching one of the great religions of the world” (Gibson, 1994, p. 253; 
cited in Dawson, 2019, p. 2). In her work on the NRA, West Point Professor Jessica 
Dawson notes how the NRA “capitalized on the religious nationalism that arose in the 
late 1970s alongside the Moral Majority and has increasingly used religious language to 
shape the discourse surrounding the Second Amendment” (Dawson, 2019, p. 1).  Dawson 
notes how the NRA repeatedly draws on themes of “evil” as well as “civic obligation”. 
 In her content analysis of the NRA’s magazine American Rifleman, (Dawson, 
2019, p. 5) Dawson documents a continual increase in the use of the term “God-given” 
in The American Rifleman from 1977 to 2018.  However, she notes that what the term 
actually referred to changed significantly.  In the 1980s, it was often “tied to shooting 
ability and raw talent” (p. 5).  However, in 1994, she notes the term began to refer to the 
right to bear arms itself.  She quotes the magazine’s assertion that there was an attempt 
by some in the society of the day to turn a “God-given right to a government privilege” 
(NRA Staff, 1994, p. 52; cited in Dawson, p. 5).  The NRA is arguing that the right to 
bear arms has been an eternal right given by the creator and that the government of the 
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day [the Clinton Administration] was attempting to claim is just a privilege given by the 
government. 
 With secularization of governments, discussion of evil has fallen out of 
favour.  Although politicians on both sides are keen to discuss what is ‘good’, ‘evil’ is a 
word which even the right rarely uses.  Reagan famously referred to the Soviets as the 
‘evil empire’, and George Bush drew ire for labelling his enemies the ‘axis of evil’.  But 
even the right tends not to use the word to discuss happenings inside the USA.  But for 
those groups which are attempting to sacralise a belief, then the rhetoric of evil is a 
necessary tool. There is one group for which the idea of evil has not fallen out of favour, 
even in domestic discussions: the ‘New Right’16 including the NRA.  From my 
observations, the rhetoric of the New Right can be characterized by three things: 1. a 
belief that we are in a state of moral decay which harkens back to the protestant stress on 
humans as fundamentally depraved; 2. A distrust in government which coming from the 
Puritan covenantal theological principle of limited authority (even God obeys his laws, so 
worldly governments must obey the covenant too); and, 3. a belief in evil. 
In Dawson’s content analysis of American Rifleman, she argues that the concept of evil 
also serves to merge American civil religion with “the New Christian Right’s 
rhetoric”, pointing to then-NRA president Neal Knox’s 1979 description of gun control 
as “evil” laws.  In stating that laws can be evil, there is “the implication” that “anyone 
who would deprive a law-abiding citizen of this fundamental human right is not merely 
expressing an opposing political view but is also promoting an evil agenda meant to 
                                                   
16 I use the term New Right to describe the political movement beginning in the 2nd half of the 20th century, 
characterized by leaders such as Ronald Reagan in the United States, “made up especially of Protestants, 
opposed especially to secular humanism, and concerned with issues especially of church and state, 
patriotism, laissez-faire economics, pornography, and abortion” (Definition of NEW RIGHT, n.d.) 
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undermine American sovereignty” (p. 9).  She notes that later, LaPierre begins to call 
criminals “evil”. In so doing, criminals were no longer “other citizens subject to the rule 
of law; they were creatures to be violently removed.  The legal institution could no longer 
be trusted to uphold the moral order, so it was left to the armed, law-abiding citizens to 
cleanse the streets of evil” (p. 9) 
 Dawson argues that the notion of asking citizens to take the law into their own 
hands by removing ‘evil’ “represents another merging of civic and religious 
obligations” (p.9).  We see this in LaPierre’s argument that the “right to self-defence was 
not invented by the American founders” it is much older and common to every human. It 
is not just a right but a “sacred responsibility” (LaPierre, 2008, p. 12; cited in Dawson, p. 
9). Here, we see the same strategy at play that we saw in the NRA referring to the 
individual right to bear arms a “God-given right’.  LaPierre is attempting to sacralise self-
defense.  As discussed above, it is easier to sacralise a concept by associating it with 
another existing sacred than to create a new sacred.  LaPierre is associating (or perhaps 
purposefully conflating) the right to individual self-defense with the principle of limited 
authority that the Puritans held so dear.   In the decades following Columbine, the NRA 
drew more and more on the theme of “sacred responsibility” to, in Turk’s language, 
“restore the moral order” (Turk, 2004, p. 277) 
 Dawson notes that this echoes New Right leaders’ attempts to label political 
opponents as evil.  For Jerry Fallwell, who painted his opponents as agents of Satan, 
political victories were not as important as “dehumanizing” America’s enemies” 
(Dawson, p. 9). For the NRA, establishing the Columbine shooters as evil was 
imperative.  As Dawson notes, this not only builds on born-again Christians’ belief in evil 
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and a literal Devil, but also “requires violent defensive actions rather than a reliance on 
the law to restrain the lawless” (p.9). The sacred permits us to use violence. The NRA 
attempted to create a narrative in which these boys were unstoppable by law. The boys 
were not of this world, but totally ‘other’ evil beings. As LaPierre put it, these were not 
just “kids”, and the guns did not “[make] them do it”. As he stated, the shooters were “not 
America’s children. They were a stone-hearted giggling death squad” (1997, p. 10; cited 
in Dawson, p. 10). With these statements, LaPierre fights back against the technological 
determinism of gun-control advocates. La Pierre argues that guns do not have agency in 
themselves.  For Pierre, at Columbine, the guns did not commit the crimes; the shooters 
themselves were responsible for the crimes. The shooters are evil, not the guns.  
 In their 2015 ad, “Demons at the Door”, the NRA characterize all the mass 
shooters as monsters.  They portray a grim world view of an evil ‘them’ out to get 
‘us’.  Laws cannot stop evil.  Only a God-given right can stop this evil.  As the 
organization’s spokesperson says in the 2015 ad, “But when evil knocks on our doors, 
Americans have a power no other people on our planet share – the full-throated right to 
defend our families and ourselves with our Second Amendment” (cited in Dawson, p. 
10).  As Harding (2000, cited in Dawson, p. 10) notes, this portrayal of the mass shooters 
as evil murders is in line with traditional Protestant notions of the fallen nature of 
humans. 
Enter Moses 
 In their work, The Invention of Sacred Tradition, religious historians James Lewis 
and Olav Hammer note that “in Weberian terms, emergent movements typically gather 
around charismatic figures” (2011, p. 4 cited in Dawson, 2019).  Charlton Heston is 
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nothing if not charismatic.  Like Reagan, Heston was an actor before delving into 
advocacy and politics.  But while Reagan embodied the archetype of the cowboy 
explorer, since a very young age, Heston embodied the archetype of the wise 
warrior. Both Heston himself, and his supporters at the NRA, understood the value in 
stressing Heston’s association with the exodus story of fleeing oppression to freedom. 
 In the wake of Clinton’s ‘sex scandal’, Heston presented himself as “a model of 
virtue and moral conviction” (Raymond, 2006, p. 299).  Still playing off his 1956 Role as 
Moses, Heston presented his “Ten Covenants of Courage”.  In these ten statements, we 
see an updated version of not just the Mosaic Ten Commandments, but the Puritan 
covenantal principles and the Lockean natural law of the Constitution. Three of the ten 
‘covenants’ hearken back to the importance of government being “by the people, for the 
people” 
“Find ways to influence government in all its forms.” 
 “Find the way to your loudest possible voice, and speak 
 “Find myriad avenues to pass on your convictions” 
Four of the commandments allude to the importance of standing up for what you think is 
right and also connote rebellion against a government that breaks the covenant of the 
Constitution. 
 “Take absolute and resolute pride in your own values. 
 Defend America as the peerless ideal – period. 
 Fiercely preserve all the rights outlined in the Bill of Rights.” 
More importantly, these commands reinforce sacred rhetoric’s call to change our thinking 
from qualified to categorical. 
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 With his commandment 2. “Be willing to disobey,” Heston does not tell us who or 
what we are to disobey, but, given his status as president of the NRA, we can assume that 
he is alluding to disobeying a government which breaks its covenant. 
 The seventh commandment, “Embrace change” seems like an unusual statement 
for a conservative who harps on the importance of tradition; however, we must remember 
that this set of ‘covenants’ was a reaction to Clinton’s scandals (and continued popularity 
despite scandals) and the alleged liberalism that had ‘overrun’ Hollywood and the White 
House. 
 The ninth covenant, “Accept that sacrifice is just part of the deal” can be read 
many ways.  Perhaps Heston is attempting to prepare his followers at the NRA to lose 
some battles.  Perhaps he is alluding that they may have to physically fight for their 
cause.  But whatever is meant by that, it is not alluding to any sort of negotiation.  You 
might lose, but you should not compromise. 
 The tenth commandment is a simple invocation of religious commitment – wide 
enough to encompass all people of faith: “Commit to the daily process of private prayer”. 
Heston did have a strong Christian faith, and he also knew the importance of tying that 
faith to his public persona.  As discussed earlier, it is easier to associate something with 
the sacred than to make the sacred anew. In associating himself so closely with prayer, 
he, himself, becomes an object of worship. 
 Heston also urged NRA members to become active in the ‘culture wars’.  During 
his tenure as president, the NRA “increasingly promoted the upholding of the Second 
Amendment as reflecting a certain lifestyle – one that respected tradition, individuality, 
responsibility and masculinity” (Raymond, 2006). The historian Bruce Schullman refers 
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to this trend as the “Southernization” of America of which the NRA’s role was central 
(cited in Raymond, 2006, p. 289).  This “Southernization” included the promotion of 
country music, Evangelical Christianity, and NASCAR racing.  As Raymond put it, “In 
walked the ‘Bubba”.  This ‘Bubba’ was set up in opposition to the Bobo – the urban 
dwelling bohemian yuppie. But Heston himself was not keen to embrace this 
stereotype.  Indeed, while others around him railed against intellectuals, Heston bemoans 
the fact that ‘elite’ had become a pejorative term in right-wing circles (p. 291).17 Heston 
maintained that gun-rights were not merely the norm of uneducated red-necks, but that 
the right to bear arms was a sacred right associated with men such as Andrew Jackson 
and Thomas Jefferson, whom he referred to as the only “genius” to have inhabited the 
White House (p. 292). 
 Dawson states that in the beginning of the culture wars: “The NRA adopted two 
critical frames that helped align the Second Amendment with the New Christian Right’s 
religious nationalism: distrust in the government and rugged individualism” (2019, p. 
10).  Dawson cites Bellah et al. (2011, p. 16) to argue that that this distrust of government 
is connected to the protestant idea that “the state and larger society are unnecessary 
because the saved take care of themselves” Moreover, the rugged individualism draws on 
this distrust of government and Jeffersonian and Madisonian republicanism which 
“viewed with hostility not only cities, but also taxation and virtually any function of the 
                                                   
17 Later, Heston himself would give in to the cultural pressure to use the term “elite” as a pejorative, 
though he bemoaned that the terms meaning had been “inverted” and now referred to people with a narrow 
politically correct agenda. 
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state”.  Though Heston did not embody the rugged individualism of the cowboy, he was 
still seen as a rugged individual in the sense of a leader who needed no help.  Moses 
brought the tablets down from the Mountain himself, and the saved do not need the 
government to decide how to spend their money or to limit their guns. 
 In the September 1997 edition of the NRA magazine American Rifleman, Heston 
echoed Billy Graham’s “Crusade for Christ” by declaring his “crusade to Save the 
Second Amendment” (Heston, 1999b).  In this same article, he states that Wayne 
LaPierre had asked him to “come back to the arena” (p. 12) with an illusion of the 
Christians who battled in the Roman arenas.   Heston refers to the amendment as “this 
sacred text”, and to American’s sacred role by declaring that there is “something 
inherently special about our nation” (p. 32).  The article also explicitly declared, and 
encouraged, the political divide in America by stating that there is “no room in the 
middle” when it comes to gun rights.  He declares that “you must either stand aside or 
step forward with us in partnership to save the Second Amendment” (p.34).  There is no 
negotiation when it comes to the sacred. 
 Heston’s media campaign was not just aimed at luring current gun-owners and 
second-amendment absolutists into the NRA, his mission was much broader.  In a letter 
to the New York Times in the first year of his tenure as NRA president, Heston presented 
the argument that would define that tenure: 
The Founder’s intent in framing the Second Amendment is perfectly clear and 
undeniable.  Thomas Jefferson wrote, ‘No man shall ever be debarred the use of 
arms’.  Some anti-gun elitists declare this notion outdated.  However… the 
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Founders intent is clear and irreversible: To ‘keep and bear arms’ is a right for all 
law-abiding citizens. 
 We don’t know how much of this letter, or anything else, in Heston’s media 
campaign was really his own writing.  But we certainly do know that Heston was keen to 
do what the NRA leadership had been doing since 1977 – to promote an individualist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment and to associate this with the sacred. 
The Language of ‘Rights’ 
 With the relative success of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s, many 
groups and organizations sought to appropriate the language of ‘rights’ for their 
cause.  Many groups including Christian sects, anti-abortion activists, and the NRA 
began to actively study how the language of rights was invoked and how existing laws 
had been used to protect the rights of minorities and special interest groups (Waldman 
2015; cited in Dawson, 2019, p. 5). They even praised civil rights activists for their 
sacred qualities of bravery and sacrifice.  Jerry Falwell stated that he “hoped Christians 
would have the kind of backbone to stand up for their rights that Civil Rights people [sic] 
had” (Harding, 2000, p. 22; cited Dawson, 2019, p. 5) encouraging his followers to both 
display these sacred qualities, and to appropriate the techniques they used. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, we can trace the western conception of 
rights in the US Constitution back to two sources: the Judeo-Christian tradition and the 
Enlightenment.  The Judeo-Christian conception of God’s law was secularized by Locke 
and others into the notion of natural law and inalienable rights.  While not going as far as 
fringe religious sects such as the Mormons who proclaim that the Constitution was 
divinely inspired, the NRA leadership drew on the civil religious sainthood of the of the 
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framers to establish that the right to bear arms was God-given, and that this God-given 
right was enshrined in the US Constitution. Moreover, they framed their individualistic 
interpretation as the framers’ original intent.  Because they claim the individualist 
interpretation was the Founding Fathers’ original interpretation, and because the 
Founding Fathers are saints in the civil religion of America, the individualist 
interpretation is therefore a sacred absolute.  There is no other possible interpretation; all 
others are not just wrong, but heresy.  Moreover, those who put forward other 
interpretations, are not just wrong, but are apostates. They are apostates who are not only 
damned, but who will damn the whole nation should their beliefs be followed. 
 As Marietta explains, both the civil rights movement and the gun rights 
movement “accrued additional advantage” though the use of sacred rhetoric.  The gun 
rights movement sought to further strengthen this advantage by tying itself to the civil 
rights movement which had already attained sacred status. Do we know if this was a 
calculated move by the gun rights movement?  As we don’t have access to the planning 
meetings of the time, perhaps we will never know, but Marietta notes that the use of 
sacred rhetoric for political purposes is “often calculated as well as organic” (p. 102). 
 The visual similarity between Heston’s iconic pose, musket raised above his head, 
and the famous depiction of John Brown with a raised rifle in his right hand is 
striking.  An important difference is that Brown has a Bible in his other hand.  But in a 
metaphorical sense, so did Heston, and so did King.  The tie of a secular cause to sacred 
rhetoric gives it greater power in American politics. 
 In the mid 20th century, Maurice Halbwachs (1992), a student of both Henri 
Bergson and Emile Durkheim, coined the term “collective memory” – a concept 
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Durkheim had discussed but a term he didn’t actually use. Halbwachs also expanded 
Durkheim’s ideas of totems – which serve as a reminder of collective effervescence – to 
include commemorative events.  But Halbwachs departed from the Durkheimian 
approach with the development of his idea of instrumental presentism.  Presentism 
stresses that those in power shape collective memory to influence the needs of the 
present. 
 In the late 20th century and early 21st century, historians, memory theorists, and 
social activist continued to use Halbwachs’ notions of instrumental presentism.  Theorists 
such David Lowenthal (1982) argued that national histories are invented to meet the 
needs of the present while John Bodnar (1992) pushed into the future to argue that 
official memory is created to allow the status quo to continue into the future.  In this 
chapter we will see how Charlton Heston, the NRA’s greatest orator, continually used the 
civil religious figures not just of the founding fathers, but of perhaps the only African-
American civil religious saint, to further his attempt to make the individualist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment civil religious dogma.  He then used this official 
memory to maintain the status quo of lack of gun control. 
 At numerous times during his tenure as NRA president, Heston brought up 
the fact that he had marched on Washington during the civil rights protests of the 
1960s.   Particularly at universities, Heston used this fact to draw connections between 
gun rights and civil rights.  In his address at Yale in 1999, Heston claimed that “If Dr. 
King were here today, I think he would agree [that gun rights are civil rights]”.  Heston 
was a clever rhetor who knew his audience: it was not enough to associate gun rights with 
masculinity and patriotism as he had with other audiences, he needed to associate gun 
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rights with the rights valued by his (presumable liberal, educated, progressive) 
audience.  Heston is implicitly associating gun rights within the “broader realm of social 
justice. Just as King explicitly connected the newer argument of civil rights to the 
Founding symbolism of liberty, Heston ties gun rights to both” (Marietta, 2012, p. 93). 
 Heston, of course, anticipates his audience’s dismay at the idea that King – known 
for his non-violent stance – would agree with Heston’s opinions on gun rights. So, 
instead, Heston attempts to associate King’s movement not with civil rights for African 
Americans particularly, but with a grander notion of ‘liberty’ put forward by the founding 
fathers.  Heston argues that just as King’s movement relied on the First Amendment right 
of free assembly, he would support the Second Amendment right to bear arms (Heston, 
1999). 
 Again, it is important to note that Heston never mentions the possibility of any 
other interpretation of the 2nd Amendment other than the individualist interpretation.  He 
is setting the sacred binary of being for liberty or against liberty: there is no room for in-
between.  As Marietta states, Heston “invokes the protected status of nonconsequentialist 
values, especially freedom… rather than instrumental reasoning or promised benefits, he 
urges noninstrumentality” (Marietta, 2012, p. 94).  This invocation of the sacred means 
that there is no need for data, statistics, and logic because the decision has already been 
made: the individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment is an untouchable sacred 
right. 
The Sacred Power of the Victim 
 One of the strategies of the NRA leadership which began to appear during 
Heston’s tenure as president was the association of the right to bear arms with the right to 
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free speech.  Marietta notes that Heston repeatedly spoke to elite university 
audiences.  These talks were usually on the theme of ‘political correctness’ as much as 
they were about gun rights (Marietta, 2012, p. 92).  The speeches sought to promote the 
notion of a sacred duty to disobey.  Heston began his 1999 speech at Yale with, “I 
marched with Martin Luther King in 1963, long before Hollywood found it 
fashionable.”  But actually, it was extremely fashionable in Hollywood to march on 
Washington with King.  Indeed, almost every picture we see of Heston during the march 
he is surrounded by other Hollywood actors and musicians. Since the McCarthy kangaroo 
courts, we have known that ‘Hollywood’ was, and continues to be, much more liberal 
than the rest of America. Immediately after telling the Yale audience that he had been at 
the march, he states, “Supporting civil rights then was about as popular as supporting gun 
rights now.”   Heston is, of course, stating that neither were popular. Yet he is speaking at 
a time when more than half of Americans believe that the 2nd amendment grants the 
individual right to bear arms.  So why does Heston want to make it seem as though civil 
rights were unfashionable in the early 1960s and gun rights are not popular now? I 
believe the answer lies in the power of victimhood. 
 We can assume that Heston saw the audiences at elite universities as 
unsympathetic to his position on gun rights, so Heston focused on not only on gun rights, 
but on the idea of liberty.  As was en vogue at the time, Heston’s boogeyman was 
“political correctness” and how it violated free speech.  In his speech at Harvard 
University, he called his audience “cowards” for not standing up to this boogeyman – 
even though he doesn’t give any example of this alleged cowardice. As Marietta states, 
Heston is “shaming them [his audience] into action rather than reasoning them into 
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agreement” (Marietta, 2012, p. 95).   He uses the language of rights, again, to argue that 
political correctness stifles free speech, and hints that political correctness is 
somehow equivalent to slavery. In his article on open-carry laws in Texas, the University 
of Austin professor Joshua Gunn notes, there is a “staged perception of oppression” in 
many pro-gun speeches: “they’re taking your hap-penis away!” (Gunn, 2016, para. 
4).  The ‘liberals’ are taking away not just your gun but your masculinity.                                       
 In reference to political correctness, Heston asks his audience, “How can you 
prevail against such pervasive social subjugation?” (Heston, 1999).  Once again 
referencing his march on Washington “with” King, Heston states, “[t]he answer’s been 
here all along.  I learned it 36 years ago, on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 
Washington, DC, standing with Dr. Martin Luther King and two hundred thousand 
people.  You simply disobey” (para. 42).  With this, Heston brings up the next theme of 
his speech: disobedience.  As Gunn argues, this “underdog status” shows an important 
cultural shift: “Insecurity… is now expressed in what amounts to a tantrum…it betrays an 
inability to accept limitation or the answer “no” (Gunn, 2016, para. 4). Portraying oneself 
as the victim and then acting out instead of discussing solutions has become a rhetorical 
strategy.  Heston does not lay out reasons to oppose gun control, nor does he encourage 
his audience to engage in reasoned discourse with those across the political aisle, instead, 
he just urges them to disobey. Heston states: “When told how to think or what to say or 
how to behave, we don’t.  We disobey social protocol that stifles and stigmatizes personal 
freedom” (para. 37).  
 From the speech itself, it’s not really clear what Heston (1999) is telling the 
Harvard students to disobey.  Earlier in the speech he had spoken about freedom of 
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speech, but as he doesn’t actually mention at any time that someone’s freedom of speech 
has been violated, but rather, mentions implicit (not formally written down or stated) 
“campus speech codes”.  He seems to be, perhaps, implying that ‘political correctness’ is 
stifling people’s ability to advocate for gun rights, but despite the fact that I have 
examined the situation surrounding the speech, I’m still not sure if this is what he 
means.  Heston then states 
I learned the awesome power of disobedience from Dr. King, who learned it from 
Gandhi, and Thoreau, and Jesus, and every other great man who led those in the 
right against those with might! (para. 39) 
Heston is creating a genealogy of sacred disobedience.  He then immediately returns to 
the theme of victimhood.  He states, “Disobedience demands that you put yourself at risk: 
Dr. King stood on lots of balconies” (para. 42).  Heston is putting himself not just in the 
genealogy of sacred disobedience but also sacred victims: Jesus, Gandhi, and King.
 In her essay on the Second Amendment, Laura J. Collins called this “demand 
politics” (Collins, 2014): it is a politics that is addicted to victimhood.  The victim cannot 
reason, it can only demand. Collins warns us this demand politics is addictive, and that 
addiction, whether personal or political, trends towards violence. The fact that Heston 
compares the gun rights movement to the stories of Jesus, Gandhi, and King shows his 
belief in the power of the narrative of martyrdom.  As Gunn (2016) notes, the history of 
the NRA shows this: what started as a sporting association has become “intolerant, 
aggressive, and mean” (para. 6).  Nothing is ever enough.  Gunn notes that rather than 
celebrating Texas’s open carry laws, the gun lobby just got even angrier about bans on 
open carry in other states. With his remark about balconies, Heston is calling on his 
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audience to put themselves up for sacrifice.  He states, “You must be willing to be 
humiliated, to endure the modern-day equivalent of the police dogs at Montgomery and 
the water cannons at Selma” (Heston, 1999). It is unclear to me whether Heston is telling 
the students to disobey political correctness, or to disobey gun control laws. If he is 
calling on them to disobey political correctness, is he saying that having other students 
and professors calling them racists, misogynists, homophobes, etc. is the equivalent of 
police dogs?  Or, if he is calling on them to disobey gun control regulations, is being 
fined or charged with carrying a concealed weapon the equivalent of water-cannons? 
Heston never clearly states what they are to disobey, or what the punishment for this 
disobedience will be, because that is not the point of the speech: the goal of his speech is 
to establish an association between civil rights, freedom of speech, and gun rights.    
 Later in the speech, Heston (1999) asks the students to not “let America’s 
universities continue to serve as incubators for this rampant epidemic of New 
McCarthyism”.  He asks them to “disavow cultural correctness” and also “social 
directives and onerous law that weaken personal freedom”.  Again, it’s not clear what the 
“onerous law” is, but what is clear is that Heston is invoking the Puritan covenantal 
concept of limited authority.  In the beginning of the speech he made the connection 
between free speech and gun rights, attempting to make both of these sacred for the 
audience.  Now, Heston seems to be making the association between political correctness 
and gun regulation in that he sees both as overstepping the limitations of 
government.  Perhaps he is arguing that university speech codes are an overstepping of 
university administrations governing of students, and gun regulations are an overstepping 
of the state and federal governments’ authority and in so doing, he is invoking the Puritan 
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idea of Americans’ sacred obligation to disobey (and overthrow) government that 
oversteps its bounds.         
 Heston (1999) ends his speech saying, “If Dr. King were here, I think he would 
agree”.  Heston is creating an enthymeme which the audience needs to complete. Maybe 
Heston is saying that King would support the right to bear arms in order to protect free 
speech, or maybe he is saying that King would be against ‘political correctness’, or 
maybe he’s just stating that King would agree that we should disobey unjust laws.  
 Gunn (2016), and other rhetorical theorists (ex. Hogan & Rood, 2015), who 
responded to Collins’ examination of the contemporary gun rights movement agree with 
Collins in that they see that the “adolescent tantrums about guns” from 2nd amendment 
absolutists, “rest on the right to one’s feelings”.  Gunn notes that at the 2019 NRA 
Convention, the NRA second-in-command Chris Cox declared that, “There has never 
been a tougher time to believe in American freedom than right here, right now.” Using 
the military analogy of an army under siege, Cox claimed “never in the history of the 
NRA have so many different groups attacked us on so many different fronts.” In my 
view, Cox’s argument is simply counter-factional for at least three reasons: 1. we are 
living in the wake of the 2008 ruling of DC v Heller which, for the first time in the 
history of the Supreme Court, agreed with the NRA’s individualist interpretation of the 
Second Amendment; 2. the NRA gave thirty million dollars to the Trump campaign to 
make sure he was elected and supported them once elected; 3. Since the DC v Heller 
ruling, there has been a steady progression of states allowing more powerful weapons to 
be owned, and expanded open-carry laws. But in sacred rhetoric, facts are not as 
powerful as feelings.  I see this as connected to the contrived victimhood and 
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unpopularity which Heston so commonly put forth in his argument that gun rights are 
now “unfashionable” in the same way that civil rights were unfashionable in the early 
1960s.  Sacred victimhood trumps reasoned argument.     
 I take my understanding of sacred victimage from Kenneth Burke and from the 
French philosopher and literary theorist René Girard (1989; René Girard et al., 1987). In 
Leviticus 16, the ancient Israelites — the model for the Puritans — confessed the sins of 
the community to a goat, then cast the goat into the desert leaving the community free of 
sin. The Hebrew term la-aza’zeyl, commonly translated as ‘scapegoat’, literally means 
“the sender away (of sins)”. Unlike the current, popular usage of the term, a scapegoat is 
not simply an innocent victim, rather, the scapegoat symbolically takes on the sins of the 
community so that that community can be cleansed, and order can be restored. 
 Kenneth Burke goes so far as to say that in performing “the role of vicarious 
atonement,” the scapegoat “serves as the overall category for all human relations” 
(Carter, 1996, p. 83).  Burke’s explanation of the scapegoat mechanism can be simplified 
to a cycle of order, pollution, guilt, purification, and redemption. In his Rhetoric of 
Religion, Burke (1970) gives this more complex explanation of his general theories using 
the Old Testament as an example: 
One can start with the creation of a natural order (though conceiving it as infused 
with a verbal principle): one can next proceed to an idea of innocence untroubled 
by thou-shalt-not’s, one can next introduce a thou-shalt-not; one can depict a new 
Covenant propounded on the basis of this violation, and with capital punishment; 
one can later introduce the principle of sacrifice… Then gradually thereafter, 
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more and more clearly, comes the emergence of the turn from mere sacrifice to 
the idea of outright redemption by victimage. (p. 216) 
The ultimate example of this, at least in Christendom, is Christ himself.  Christ and his 
followers portrayed him as the victim, unjustly vilified.  The community blamed all of 
their sins on him, but when he was killed, their sins were killed as well, and they were 
thus purified.  The Christ, then was elevated to the status of God18.  
 What I am stressing here is not that the NRA want to be literal ritual 
victims.  Rather, I am pointing out what Nietzsche and others have noted for centuries, 
that western culture, and, particularly, nations like America that rely so heavily on 
biblical narratives, heroize the victim.  With the fall of class solidarity in the neoliberal 
Reagan-Bush era and the rise of identity politics in the 1990s, the role of victim has taken 
on an even more heroic status.  Heston and his ilk are engaging in the oppression 
Olympics that they claim to despise so much.  So why do they engage in it?  Because 
claiming the role of victim pushes one into the sacred category and thus changes the 
audience’s thinking, securing the future of the movement and doing away with the need 
for evidence-based arguments.   
 In his speech at Harvard Law School, Heston (1999) makes his greatest attempt to 
tie gun rights to the other individual rights granted in the Bill of Rights.  Heston states: 
“Who will guard the raw material of unfettered ideas, if you will not?  Who will defend 
the core value of academia, if you supposed soldiers of free thought and expression lay 
                                                   
18 It must be noted that Girard, himself a Christian, argued that Jesus’s story was different in that the 
innocence of the victim is recognized by the text and the writer.  The typical scapegoat narrative is built on 
the lie of the assumption of guilt of the scapegoat (Girard, 1989). 
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down your arms and plead ‘Don’t shoot me’”(para. 33)? Heston is claiming that we need 
the right to bear arms in order to guard the right to free speech. 
            At the NRA conventions, Heston goes even further.  He states: 
If you like your freedoms of speech and religion, freedom from search and 
seizure, freedom of the press and of privacy, to assemble and to redress 
grievances, then you’d better give them that eternal bodyguard called the Second 
Amendment.  The individual right to bear arms is freedom’s insurance policy, not 
just for your children but for infinite generations to come. (para. 2) 
Like the covenant of circumcision marked Jewish men’s reproductive organs19 as a 
symbol that even unborn generations were participating in the covenant, Heston 
repeatedly mentions children and “infinite generations” to stress that the covenant is not 
just for those in the audience that night.  The Constitution is not just a law that can be 
passed and then changed by the government, the Constitution is a covenant that was 
made between the people and their God.  
The Tragedy 
 In 1999, two teen-age boys used multiple, legally bought guns to murder twelve 
students and one teacher at their high school at Columbine High School in 
Colorado.  Though the news media and politicians attempted to blame the mass shooting 
on everything from Marilyn Manson lyrics to an imaginary “Trench Coat Mafia”, the 
NRA rightly suspected that they would come under attack too. 
                                                   
19 In the ancient Near east it was not known that both sperm and an egg were necessary to produce a child. 
Rather, it was assumed that all future children were in the semen (from the Latin, meaning seed). The only 
contribution females made to reproduction to offer a womb — a place for the seed to grow. Thus, marking 
the male reproductive organ (in an act like circumcision) was marking all the future generations. 
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 The 1999 NRA convention was planned to occur a few days after the shooting in 
Denver, Colorado, just a fifteen-minute drive from the site of the massacre.  Many argued 
that holding the convention would be an insult to the local community.  However, the 
NRA were worried that cancelling the convention was tantamount to an admission of 
guilt. The NRA decided to take a middle path by continuing to conduct their business 
meetings but cancelling the gun shows, music concerts, and other events that make the 
convention feel more like a festival than a meeting of a political lobbying group. 
 Heston (2000; cited in Raymond, 2006, pp. 5–7) addressed the controversy 
directly by again invoking Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. He opened his speech: 
I have been admonished not to be here, not to speak to you here.  It’s not the first 
time. In 1963 I marched on Washington with Dr. Martin Luther King, long before 
Hollywood found civil rights fashionable.  My associates advised me not to 
go.  They said it would be unpopular and maybe dangerous.  Thirty-six years later 
my associates advised me not to come to Denver.  They said it would be 
unpopular and dangerous. But I am here. 
Heston repeats the exact words that he had used at Yale, claiming that supporting civil 
rights in Hollywood in 1963 had not been “fashionable”.  Of course, this is not what 
conservatives of the 1960s were saying: they were accusing Hollywood actresses of being 
negro-loving degenerates and actors of being pinko queers. Indeed, the fact that so many 
in Hollywood supported civil rights was one of the reasons McCarthy began his witch 
hunts.  So why is Heston so keen on convincing this audience that what he was doing was 
and is unpopular?  Because Heston wants his audience to feel as though they are the 
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underdog heroes fighting for justice.  This way, when they lose, they become sacred 
victims. 
 Later on in the speech, Heston (2000; quoted in 2006, pp. 5–7) elaborates on how 
unfairly gun owners have been treated by the media and liberal politicians. He states that 
he thinks the debate is between those who believe in the Second Amendment, versus 
those who don’t. But instead it is spun as those who believe in murder, versus those who 
don’t.  A struggle between the reckless and the prudent, between the dimwitted and the 
enlightened, between the archaic and the progressive, between the inferior citizens and 
elitists… 
 Even though he is stating what the imaginary “other” assumes about his audience, 
Heston is none the less setting up the important binary opposition of us and 
them.  In Burke’s “theory of linguistic diacritics” (or “principle of the social diacritics of 
identity”) (Carter, 1996, p. 138), we define ourselves in opposition to others, just as we 
define terms, through opposites (Burke, 1969). Just as, in the previous chapter, we saw 
how Durkheim and Eliade saw that humans structured their world in terms of the binary 
opposition, Burke views our own identities as oppositional word-constructions. Burke 
repeatedly stresses the importance of the negative in identity formation. He notes that 
etymologically the word country comes from contra meaning “over against” (Burke, 
1966, p. 423): we are united as a nation by what we oppose. In addition, in keeping with 
his linguistic theory of perfectionism, we are constantly striving for the perfection of 
these opposing terms. As noted earlier, our drive for perfection eventually leads us to 
place everything on one or the other side of the equation; with us or against us. We even 
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place god on one side, assumedly, our side, leading to the idea that we are god’s chosen 
people (Carter, p. 7). 
 At the 2019 NRA convention, Chris Crox didn’t describe anything about this 
enemy other than the fact that, “They hate us. They hate our trucks. They hate our plastic 
straws and, yes, they hate our guns” (quoted in; McGowan, 2019).  During Heston’s 
tenure, the tone hadn’t quite reached that of hate, but Heston knew how to push the 
audience’s buttons with words like ‘dimwitted’ (Heston, 1999, para. 2). While arguing 
that he wants to stop the “Balkanization” of America, he is playing into the audience’s 
fear that the ‘elitists’ are mocking them.  The enemy are not just those who have a 
different interpretation of the Bill of Rights, they are a secret cabal of these elitists.  He 
states “Somewhere right now, evil people are scheming evil things… But each horrible 
act [ex. the Columbine Shooting] can’t become an axe for opportunists to cleave the very 
Bill of Rights that binds us” (para. 2).  Here, we see Heston set up the imaginary enemy. 
Scholars such as Burke have followed Aristotle’s rhetorical analysis seeing antithesis as 
an “exceptionally effective rhetorical device… giving dramatic saliency and at least 
apparent clarity to any issue” (1966, p.19). The audience at the convention and the 
audience at home can see themselves as unified against this common enemy. 
            Aside from stressing that the NRA will not accept responsibility for the 
Columbine shooting, and that the NRA were being unjustly vilified, Heston speech 
centered on the Bill of Rights.  Heston stressed that the Bill of Rights ought to unite the 
nation, and that the Bill of Rights designates sacred limits which cannot be crossed. 
Heston criticizes the use of the ‘warrant of the dead’ in relation to gun control.  As I will 
discuss further in the next chapter, many gun control advocates use the rhetorical tactic of 
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the warrant of the dead to call for gun control.  There is an implicit or sometimes explicit 
argument that the deaths will not be in vain if we enact gun control.  Heston, however, 
states: “The dirty secret of this day and age is that political gain and media ratings all too 
often bloom upon fresh graves.  I remember a better day, when no one dared politicize or 
profiteer on trauma” (p. 96). 
 Heston (1999) ends his speech with his common refrain that the Second 
Amendment is the most important right in the Bill of Rights because it is necessary to 
protect all the other rights.  He ends his speech by proclaiming: 
We cannot let tragedy [the Columbine shooting] lay waste to the most rare and 
hard-won human right in history… Our essential reason for being is this: As long 
as there is a Second Amendment, evil can never conquer us.  Tyranny, in any 
form, can never find footing within a society of law-abiding, armed, ethical 
people.  The majesty of the Second Amendment, that our Founders so divinely 
captured and crafted into your birthright, guarantees that no government despot, 
no renegade faction of armed forces, no roving gangs of criminals, no breakdown 
of law and order, no massive anarchy, no force of evil or crime or oppression 
from within or from without, can ever rob you of the liberties that define your 
Americanism… The Founding Fathers guaranteed this freedom because they 
knew no tyranny can ever arise among a people endowed with the right to keep 
and bear arms (para. 2). 
Of course, Heston is invoking the covenantal principle of limited government and 
arguing that the Second Amendment is necessary to protect it: the right to bear arms is 
necessary to maintain this Puritan ideal. 
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 In the next section I discuss the importance of maintaining this Puritan ideal.  This 
ideal is not just a matter of the of part of the identity of the nation; it is the totem of the 
nation.  As Durkheim (2001) explains, the repeated worship of the totem is necessary for 
social cohesion. It the reverence to this totem is not maintained then the nation will be 
torn apart.  
Worship the Totem or Be Damned 
The smoke in the air of our Concord bridges and Pearl Harbors is always smelled 
first by the farmers, who come from their simple homes to find the fire, and fight, 
because they know that sacred stuff resides in that wooden stock and blued steel 
— something that gives the most common man the most uncommon of freedoms. 
When ordinary hands can possess such an extraordinary instrument, that 
symbolizes the full measure of human dignity and liberty. 
                                                                                 Heston (2000; quoted in Smyth, 2020) 
 Durkheim (2001) saw totemism as the most basic form of all religion. The 
totem is not just an anthropomorphised creature, or even a god, it is the ultimate symbol 
of the group’s commitment to itself. We sometimes mistakenly think that other cultures’ 
sacred objects are all gods, but this is not usually the case.  For example, the totem poles 
of the indigenous peoples of the Pacific northwest such as the Haida and Nuu-Chah Nulth 
are carved with images representing figures that symbolize characteristics and embody 
clans, not gods – for example, an orca may represent strength and an eagle may represent 
 180 
peace20.  They do not worship figures like Raven or Bear, rather they are archetypes and 
references to themselves. The feelings inspired by society are transferred onto the 
totem. The totem allows us to better imagine our society by distilling and focusing our 
feelings toward it onto a single thing. 
 Some more familiar totems to us are the Muslim star and crescent moon, or the 
Christian cross. Muslims and Christians do not worship these objects, rather, these totems 
are a short cut for identifying and consolidating beliefs. For Durkheim, the totem was the 
“flag” of ‘primitive’ (i.e. non-industrial) societies. Unfortunately, Durkheim himself 
didn’t discuss the flag as our totem.  But now, sociologists recognize that objects and 
symbols such as the flag, the Constitution, and the Lincoln memorial are the totems of the 
United States.  The gun may not yet be the totem of America, but it is the totem of some 
Americans.  As Marietta (2012) explains: 
the gun for the NRA can be described as a mild but meaningful form of totemism. 
When Heston speaks of “the sacred stuff in that wooden stock and blued steel” he 
is placing the gun in a particular role, “when ordinary hands can hold such an 
extraordinary instrument” (p. 99). 
Marietta states that although this totemism in the USA is not as developed as the religions 
of the Australian or North American indigenous peoples, it still holds “two central facets 
of [Durkheimian] totemism[:] the sacredness of a specific object and the social 
                                                   
20  The meanings of these figures differ between tribes and even between time periods. 
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organization around it by its identifiers” (p. 99).  The gun rights movement sees the gun 
itself as sacred and organizes itself around the gun.  
 In his inaugural speech, Lyndon Johnson pronounced that America was a nation 
of “believers who believed in themselves” (quoted in Marvin et al., 1999, p. 18). 
Inadvertently or not, Johnson was making the Durkheimian pronouncement that nations 
are defined as believers in the totem of themselves.  With the exception of some on the 
far-left — perhaps including my readers — Americans believe the Constitution, the 
Lincoln Monument, the ‘dream’ of Martin Luther King Jr., all represent them in abstract 
form.  The NRA is attempting to push the gun into this category of sacred totem: the 
symbol of America itself.  As the American historian and journalist Gary Wills 
suggests, guns are like the god of Moloch in the Torah – an object of veneration and 
immune to questioning (cited in Frank, 2014). 
 Durkheim (2001) argued that the profane routines of daily life weaken 
commitment of the individual to the group and thus, weaken the power of the totem. For 
societies to overcome their individualistic tendencies, they must repeatedly come together 
in ritual to regenerate the power of the totem. With the yearly NRA conventions, the 
contingent festivities, and their media coverage, Americans are invited to renew their 
patriotism in the consecration and regeneration of the gun as totem.  In regenerating the 
totem, the group regenerates itself, redefining and strengthening its own identity and 
values of its covenant. 
 At the NRA Convention a year after the Columbine shooting, six months before 
the 2000 presidential election, Heston addressed the shooting again. Regardless of one’s 
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views on the topic, or opinion on Charlton Heston’s character, it is hard to argue against 
the beauty and power of the speech. Heston (2000) began the speech: 
Every time our country stands in the path of danger, an instinct seems to summon 
her finest first — those who truly understand her. When freedom shivers in the 
cold shadow of true peril, it’s always the patriots who first hear the call. When 
loss of liberty is looming, as it is now, the siren sounds first in the hearts of 
freedom’s vanguard. (para. 11)  
Whether it is advertising or politics, the first thing that modern rhetoricians do to inspire 
action is establish that there is a problem. It is the same step whether it is a student using 
Monroe’s Motivated Sequence, an infomercial, or a preacher giving a moralizing sermon. 
Following Luckmann’s (2007) categorization of moralizing sermons, this is the 
predictable introduction, the description of the present evil.  
 But the audience need not worry, because whether it was in the late 18th century 
revolutionary era, or the present moment, the same hero is alerted: “the patriot… first 
hears the call”… “the siren sound first in the hearts of freedom’s vanguard.” 
Heston wants his audience of gun-owners to identify with the American revolutionary 
soldiers; however, Heston is not speaking to an audience of contemporary soldiers.  He is 
speaking to the membership of the NRA and those watching the convention on 
television.  Demographic data shows us that the ‘typical’ NRA members is white, male, 
and not from a large city (Parker, 2017).  We can guess that those at the convention are 
wealthy, while those watching Heston’s speech on their televisions at home are likely less 
wealthy and perhaps less educated than the average white American.  For this reason, we 
can understand why Heston valorized “the farmer” with his “simple” home.  These men 
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may not be soldiers, but Charlton Heston wants them to believe that they could be just as 
heroic as the revolutionary soldiers if they were needed, because they have guns.   The 
reference to the wooden stock and blued steel is a dog-whistle to the Christians who 
recognize the allusion to the wooden cross and iron nails of the crucifixion.  As Marietta 
states, “this is subtle enough to be missed by the irreligious but clear enough to be 
maintained for the devout” (p. 102). The gun is the totem of these men as the cross is the 
totem of Christianity.  It is not an item to be worshipped, but a representative summary of 
all they are and all they believe.  Heston goes on to sacralise the gun itself. Like the 
crucifix - an instrument of Roman state torture - is imbued with the Christian values of 
sacrifice and brotherly love, the gun – a deadly weapon - becomes a fetish object imbued 
with the American value of freedom.  Heston states “sacred stuff resides in that wooden 
stock and blued steel”.  The gun not just facilitates freedom, it becomes a symbol of 
freedom itself. 
 Heston reminds his listeners that they may be “ordinary” now, but gun-ownership 
magically imbues the bearer with “dignity and liberty.” Heston has created a visual 
fantasy world in which each of his listeners can insert themselves as the 
protagonist.  They may be “ordinary” “farmers” from “simple homes” but, like the sword 
that made Arthur King, or the cape that transforms Clark Kent into Superman, the gun 
can make these “ordinary” men heroes. 
Heston had used the visual rhetoric of holding up a musket, accompanied by the 
phrase “from my cold dead hands” many times before.  But, at the convention a year after 
the Columbine massacre, this defensive rhetoric was particularly powerful as the 
NRA did have valid reason to feel it was being attacked by outsiders – legislatures on 
 184 
both sides of the aisle were discussing gun control. Heston began the conclusion to his 
speech by foreshadowing the use of the most iconic phrase of the gun rights movement in 
America. He begins “That’s why those five words issue an irresistible call to us all, and 
we muster.” Heston then motioned off camera and paused as he was handed a replica 
flintlock long rifle, an allusion to the weapons used in the American revolutionary 
war.  Heston continued: 
So, as we set out this year to defeat the divisive forces that would take freedom 
away, I want to say those fighting words for everyone within the sound of my 
voice to hear and to heed, and especially for you, Mr. Gore: (para. 12) 
At this point Heston raised the musket above his head and cried out: 
‘From my cold, dead hands!’(para. 12) 
Though the speech is full of poetic allusion, it is the last phrase that became, as we now 
say, a meme.  The phrase was not a new one.  It has been used as far back as the 1970s 
with a campaign by the group The Right to Keep and Bear Arms which distributed 
bumper stickers with the slogan: “I’ll give you my gun when you pry it from my cold, 
dead hands”. This is the group whose members that seized leadership of the NRA at the 
1977 “Revolt in Cincinnati” (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 124) during which the Second 
Amendment absolutists come to power.  Unlike the rest of the speech, which was full of 
sophisticated historical references, open to fantastic interpretation to the listener, this last 
sentence is absolute: it is the sacred boundary.  It reveals the non-negotiable status of the 
Second Amendment for gun right activists.  There is no negotiation of the sacred. It 
upholds a sacred set of values while completely dismissing the possibility of any 
other. The sacred changes our mode of thinking from consequentialist to absolute. Heston 
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does not need to lay out reasoned consequence, be merely needs to allude to a 
transcendent authority.  Heston’s statement sets a sacred limit – as long as I am alive, I 
will have my right to bear arms. 
 Politicians have never shied from invoking the sacred limit.  In 1775, Patrick 
Henry declared “give me liberty or give me death” (quoted in Marietta, 2012, p. 7).  This 
was the sacred limit of the American revolution and is the rallying cry of patriotic 
Americans to this day.  Winston Churchill declared: “we shall defend our island, 
whatever the cost may be… we shall never surrender”.  The sacred limit was the island of 
Great Britain. When Ronald Reagan declared, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”, 
there was no thought of negotiation. 
 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. invoked this sacred limit in his “I Have a Dream” 
speech of August 28th, 1963 (which Heston was so fond of saying he 
witnessed).  Marietta (2012) explains that King’s speech “invokes explicit boundaries of 
what can and will be tolerated” (p. 101) .  King declared: 
We can never be satisfied as long as our children are stripped of their self-hood 
and robbed of their dignity by a sign stating, “For Whites Only”. We cannot be 
satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot vote… No, no, we are not 
satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until ‘justice rolls down like waters, and 
righteousness like a mighty stream. (quoted in Marietta, p. 101)  
Marietta (2012) goes on to explain that “King explicitly states the nonnegotiable nature 
of his position, emphasizing the fierce ‘urgency of Now” as King declares: 
It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment.  This 
sweltering summer of the Negro’s legitimate discontent will not pass until there is 
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an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality.  There will be neither rest nor 
tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. (quoted in 
Marietta, 2012, p. 101)  
 King sets the limit of the sacred with poetic allusions to the Bible, to negro 
spirituals, and, of course, to the US Constitution and to the Declaration of Independence. 
Heston too begins his speech with similar poetic allusions.  But Heston ends his speech 
with something entirely different, with an illusion to the statement on a bumper 
sticker.  With the grand oratory style of a Shakespearean actor, Heston’s cry of “from my 
cold dead hands” gives dignity not just to the bumper-sticker, but to all those who feel a 
kinship with that culture.  It is a rallying cry that elevates those who suspect they are 
being called “dimwitted” by the elite. 
 Marietta (2012) writes that this “shift in contemporary (American) political 
discourse from a politics of redistribution to a politics of identity has included the 
prominence of intense, unyielding, and non-negotiable claims” (p. 8).  Though the 
literature on American political psychology demonstrates a great deal of ambivalence in 
the citizenry, this is not the case with political rhetoric of the last forty years: “it is 
unconflicted, extreme, and strident, taking positions that ignore compromise or 
negotiation, upholding a favored set of values while dismissing others” (p. 8).  
 The biblical scholar Bart Ehrman (2014) explains that fundamentalism is an 
“internally coherent system”.  Ehrman is specifically referring to evangelical Christian 
Bible literalists and militant mythicist Atheists21; however, the same can be said of 
                                                   
21 Mythicist atheists believe the ‘Christ myth theory’ that claims that the story of Jesus’s life is a myth and 
that there is no evidence that a man called Jesus who was crucified in Roman occupied Palestine existed at 
all. They do not believe that Jesus is the son of God and they believe that the entire biblical story of the 
man and his disciples is based on myth, lies, and historical inaccuracies (Ehrman, 2014). 
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anyone who uses the fundamentalist hermeneutic. Looking in from the outside, it may be 
completely nonsensical, but from the inside, there are no contradictions. There is no room 
for negotiation because you cannot add or subtract from the closed system of the text. 
Changing just would mean the entire belief system would fall apart.  If Bible literalists 
accept that, in light of contemporary archeological evidence, we should accept that 
humans and apes evolved from a common ancestor, then it would mean that the Bible 
was wrong on this point, and thus could not be the eternal word of an omniscient 
God.  Just one prick would bust the fundamentalist bubble.  If constitutional originalists 
believe that some gun control is necessary in light of advancements in weapons high-
powered portable weapons technology, it would mean that the Constitution was not a 
reflection of eternal natural laws written by divinely inspired hands, all precedent law 
based on the Constitution is a sham. 
The Disgust and Comedy of Mingling of the Sacred and the Profane 
 The sacred is the thing that we hold non-negotiable.  Durkheim (2001) noted that 
the transgression of the boundary of the sacred and profane is deeply troubling for 
humans. He writes: “the mind experiences deep repugnance about mingling” (p. 37). 
Think of the disgust that we feel at the commercialization of Christmas: even those of us 
who are not religious find something repulsive in the image of the baby Jesus being used 
to sell Nintendo switch consoles.   We even feel disgusted by the use of contemporary 
values, such as environmentalism, to sell products or promote an unrelated political 
agenda. Though we may think that the world is rapidly secularizing, when someone 
attempts to mingle the sacred with the profane, we realize how strongly we feel that these 
categories should be kept separate.  Likewise, even those of us that are not American, or 
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Christian are disgusted that American patriotism and Christianity are used to promote gun 
rights. 
Perhaps our own disgust at the crossing of the boundary between why Charlton Heston’s 
speech was so roundly mocked by those who do not support his ideology.  Heston 
invoked all the sacred values of America – freedom, self-reliance, distrust of authority — 
to justify the NRAs policies such as allowing teenagers to buy AR 15s; so, perhaps it is 
fitting that his speech was met with similarly transgressive and revolting jokes.  In 
perhaps the most transgressive jokes, Heston was implicated in firearms deaths, 
particularly the deaths of innocents. Anthony Jeselnik (2013) mocked Heston’s ‘sacred 
limit’ joking: “They can have my gun when they pry it from my curious six-year-old’s 
cold dead hands.” 
 But this was not the joke that brought the most ire from Heston’s fans and gun 
rights advocates.  The most hated joke about Heston’s “Cold Dead Hands” speech was 
Jim Carrey’s (2013) skit on Funny Or Die mocking gun culture and the accompanying 
parody song “Cold Dead Hand”.  The skit takes place on a mock episode of Hee-Haw 
with Carrey impersonating Charlton Heston. Carrey uses the same solemn authoritative 
tone with which Heston began his speech at the NRA convention on “the enemy” (the 
“evil people scheming evil things”), to begin his talk of the enemy. But the enemy is not 
who we expect: it is not the elite; it is not the urban intellectuals who call you 
‘dimwitted’; the enemy is… aliens.  When Carrey, impersonating Heston, brings up 
aliens the audience immediately understands that Heston’s enemy – the liberal elite who 
call you dimwitted while seeking to take away the freedom — is just as imaginary.  The 
scene then switches, and Carrey is no longer dressed as Heston, but instead, a country and 
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western singer. As he sings, he roundly mocks every aspect of Charlton Heston’s career, 
personality, physicality, and ideology.  Along with the predictable dick jokes (ex. 
“You’re a big, big man with a little bitty gland/ So you need something bigger just to fill/ 
Your cold dead hand”) the chorus mocks Heston’s death and supposes that his gun is 
what denies his entrance to Heaven: “The angels wouldn’t take him up to heaven like he 
planned/ ‘Cause they couldn’t pry that gun from his cold dead hand”. 
 Not surprisingly, conservative talk radio, Fox news and other right-wing media 
outlets were figurately up in arms over Carrey’s portrayal of Heston.  The Fox News 
Channel host political commentator Greg Gutfeld feigned outrage and victimage at the 
harm Carrey had caused, calling Carrey, “the most pathetic tool on the face of the 
earth”.  Gutfeld attempted to invoke the sacred value of our time, anti-prejudice, to attack 
Carrey by calling him a “modern bigot”.  Instead of charging that Carrey was mocking 
Heston the individual, or gun rights, Gutfeld, a libertarian gun-rights advocate, argued 
that Carrey was mocking all of “rural America”.  Carrey clapped back calling “Fux 
News” a “media colostomy bag that has begun to burst at the seams and should be 
emptied before it becomes a public health issue” (Bond, 2013). 
 Viewers, on the other hand were, frighteningly, not just figurately up in arms. As I 
noted near the beginning of this chapter, the sacred allows, even promotes, violence in its 
defense.  Gorski (2017) argues that moral decline is at the center of religious nationalist 
rhetoric.  The New Christian Right in general, and the NRA specifically, blame moral 
decline for all of America’s problems (Whitehead et al., n.d.). Enforcing the moral order, 
not gun control, is the answer to society’s problem. Carrey became a symbol of this 
moral decline; in Burke’s term, he had violated the moral order, and for it to be restored, 
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there had to be a sacrifice.  As Jennifer Dawson (2019) argued in her analysis 
of American Rifleman, the NRA has promoted vigilante violence in order to restore the 
moral order for many years.  Both Carrey and Funny or Die received death threats after 
the performance. Ironically, Carrey chose to be protected by armed guards (Bond, 
2013).  Carrey had mocked the un-mockable: the individualist interpretation of the 
2nd amendment which NRA members believe is a God-given right, enshrined in the 
divinely inspired Constitution. 
Conclusion 
 Sacred rhetoric changes the way that we think from qualified to 
categorical.  When Heston stated that his gun could only be taken “from his cold dead 
hands”, he drew a line in the sand: he established that this was the sacred limit.  Once the 
sacred limit has been established there can be no negotiation: believers in 2nd amendment 
absolutism would rather die than give up their guns. 
 On television and radio aimed at a broad audience, the NRA pays lip service to 
the idea that Americans are safer if ‘good-guys’ have guns. They state that the proper 
response to school shootings is not disarming teenagers, but rather, arming teachers, and 
that if guns are outlawed only outlaws will have guns, etc., etc.  But the strength of the 
NRA arguments is not based in such mundane arguments: it is in its sacred rhetoric.   On 
the National Rifle Association’s website, “every possible argument for gun control is 
contested based on the exact wording of the Second Amendment, in part by quoting the 
founders” (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 119).  Dunbar Ortiz summarizes these examples: 
George Mason asked “[W]ho are the militia? They consist now of the whole 
people.” 
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Thomas Jefferson said, “No free man shall be debarred the use of arms.” 
Patrick Henry said, “The great object is, that every man be armed.” 
Richard Henry Lee wrote that, “to preserve liberty it is essential that the whole 
body of people always possess arms.” 
Thomas Paine noted,  
“[Arms… discourage and keep the invader and the plunderer in awe, and preserve 
order in the world as well as property.” 
Samuel Adams warned, “The said Constitution [must] never construct to 
authorize Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press, or the rights of 
conscience; or to preserve the people of the United States, who are peaceable 
citizens from keeping their own arms.” (“The Second Amendment”, quoted in; 
Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, pp. 119–120) 
Unlike gun control advocacy groups’ websites, the NRA website is not full of facts and 
figures which attempt to change people’s opinions. Quoting the saints of American civil 
religion is enough.  Who needs data when you can quote dogma?  Sacred rhetoric 
changes our mode of thinking from contingent to final.  There are no ‘what ifs’ or ‘buts’; 
the right to bear arms is in the Constitution, the Constitution is sacred and cannot be 








OBAMA’S TEARS  
The best lack all conviction, 
while the worst are full of passionate intensity. 
          W.B. Yeats 
 
 In his address after the shooting at the Charleston African Methodist Episcopal 
Church in 2015, an exasperated Barak Obama stated only “sporadically, our eyes are 
open” to the horror of gun violence, then, “[we] slip into comfortable silence again… 
once the eulogies have been delivered… once the TV cameras move on” (Obama, 2015)
As the American rhetorical theorist Jeremy Engels wrote following the failure to pass gun 
control measures after the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting, “we are moved, and 
we move on. Moving on, and on, and on, ad infinitum” (quoted in Rood, 2018). 
            Obama spoke on gun violence dozens, if not hundreds of times during his 
presidency, often in the wake of mass shootings. And every time, it would take the 
attention of the media for a few minutes, and then the nation would move on.  Obama’s 
exasperated tone came from his frustration with the lack of sustained attention to the 
issue.  Though, in his first term, President Obama attempted to console the nation 
following mass shootings with eulogies, things changed after the Sandy Hook shooting 
which occurred just after he had already won re-election. Once electoral politics were 
removed, Obama attempted to put each shooting in the context of the greater problem of 
gun violence in America, and in so doing, make all the dead present at each 
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speech.  Obama attempted to overcome the problem of fleeting engagement by creating a 
sacred civic obligation to control gun violence. 
            I begin this chapter with a discussion of Obama and American civil religion 
drawing on the work of Bellah’s student, and now Yale professor, Philip Gorksi (2017). I 
then discuss Obama’s national eulogy following the shooting of representative Gabrielle 
Giffords.  I then begin my focus on Obama’s address following the Sandy Hook 
elementary school shooting.  I argue that this was the turning point of his rhetoric in the 
wake of mass shootings.  Instead of attempting to console the nation, Obama utilized 
memory to rouse civil religious sentiment.  To do this, Obama used the rhetorical device 
of the warrant of the dead:  Obama attempted to convince the American people that they 
had an obligation to the dead to enact gun control legislation. Drawing on the work of 
memory theorists (Assmann, 2011; deTar, 2016; Halbwachs, 1992; Honneth, 2015; Nora, 
1989; Nora & Kritzman, 1996; Özyürek, 2007), I then discuss Obama’s attempt to put the 
Sandy Hook deaths into historical context through the strategic use of collective memory. 
Finally, I discuss Obama’s great failure: none of the legislation proposed in the wake of 
the Sandy Hook shooting became law. 
            Examining civil religious practices through the lens of instrumental 
presentism (Halbwachs, 1992) shows us how particular memories of the past are used to 
meet the political needs of the present. Obama attempted to use collective memory to 
convince his supporters that it was their sacred civil religious duty to protect the 




Obama and the American Civil Religious Tradition 
 When we think of modern politicians who have drawn on the contemporary civil 
religious tradition, we tend to think of right-wing populists who encourage religious 
nationalism or the speeches of those conservatives who exploit the narrative of manifest 
destiny such as Ronald Reagan’s magnificent national eulogy following the Challenger 
Disaster. However, politicians such as Reagan are seldom the writers of their own 
speeches and may not be steeped in the civil religious traditions themselves. Philip 
Gorski (2017) notes that Barak Obama, on the other hand, studied the American civil 
religion like no other president to date. Gorksi notes Obama’s reading of the African-
American civil religious tradition in high school, his study of the rhetoric of the 
founding-fathers and the ideas of civic republicanism at Harvard Law School, his 
exposure to “the modern-day jeremiads of Jeremiah White” (p. 191), and his deep 
affection for “the Augustinian variant of prophetic Christianity as developed by Reinhold 
Niebuhr” (p. 194). As Gorski states, “if one were putting together a course of study in 
America’s civil religious tradition, the reading list would look a lot like Obama’s own 
intellectual biography” (p. 191). 
 Gorski makes this point particularly clearly in his discussion of Obama’s speech 
“More Perfect Union”, which was delivered in the midst of the Jeremiah Wright 
controversy22, in the course of the 2008 Democratic Party presidential candidate 
nomination. Obama (2008) begins: 
                                                   
22 In March of 2008 NBC news released footage of Obama’s pastor Jeremiah Wright making 
‘controversial’ pronouncement about US domestic and foreign policies including declarations that America 
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two hundred and twenty-one years ago…. Farmers and scholars; statesmen and 
patriots who had traveled across an ocean to escape tyranny and persecution 
finally made real their declaration of independence. (para. 1) 
He goes on to state that the document these men produced “was stained by this nation’s 
original sin of slavery” (para. 2) ; however, 
the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our Constitution 
– a Constitution that had at is very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the 
law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a union 
that could be and should be perfected over time. 
And yet words on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves from 
bondage or provide men and women of every color and creed their full rights and 
obligations as citizens of the United States. What would be needed were 
Americans in successive generations who were willing to do their part – through 
protests and struggle, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war and civil 
disobedience and always at great risk – to narrow that gap between the promise of 
our ideals and the reality of their time. (para. 3 – 4) 
Obama begins with a discussion of the founding covenant of the Constitution, the 
breaking of this covenant through the sin of slavery, the remaking of the covenant in the 
Civil War, its breaking in the Jim Crow era, and the remaking of the covenant in the civil 
rights movement.  Obama summed up the entire American civil religious narrative in just 
                                                   
had engaged in “terrorism” in numerous countries around the world including Palestine and South Africa 
and that the Iraq war had been justified with lies from a corrupt government (Ross & El-Buri, 2008). 
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a few minutes, poetically and with broad popular appeal.  It was clear, from before he 
was even nominated to be the Democratic Party candidate, that Barak Obama would go 
on to be one of the great rhetors of the American civil religious tradition.  
The National Eulogy 
            Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1973, p. 48) note that, in classical times, 
epidictic rhetoric, including eulogies, were “apparently uncontroversial”.  The authors 
critique this conceptualization of epidictic rhetoric for contemporary times, arguing that it 
limits the genre to rhetoric “without practical consequences”.  Instead, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tytecta argue for a new definition for epideictic rhetoric which inspires 
audiences to action.  In this section, I begin to explain how in his first term in office, 
Obama followed this classical definition of epidictic rhetoric in his eulogies, but after the 
shooting at Sandy Hook elementary, Obama, like Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecta, saw 
the need to go beyond the classical bounds of epideictic rhetoric to inspire action. 
             As a rhetorical form, the eulogy is a form meant “to console the bereaved, to 
affirm the community’s values, and to exhort the audience to be virtuous” ( Hewett, 
2008, p. 91; cited in Campbell & Jamieson, 2008).  In their 2008 work, Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson discuss “national eulogies”.  They state that the 
form is used when “a traumatic event results in the death of civilians and by so doing 
calls the nation’s institutions or values into question” (p.102). Campbell and Jamieson 
argue that the public look to the president after a tragedy to answer, “what does this 
catastrophe mean, and how is the country to act in order to ensure that it does not recur” 
(p. 108)?  The form usually occurs at the site of the tragedy, creating a lieu de 
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mémoire (site of memory) (Nora, 1989), turning victims into heroes (Campbell & 
Jamieson, 2008). 
            In the 2014 special issue of Rhetoric and Public Affairs devoted to the topic of 
civility, the American rhetorical theorist D.A. Franks discusses the national eulogies of 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, Reagan’s address after the Challenger disaster, Bill 
Clinton’s address after the Oklahoma City bombing, and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
speech after the Birmingham church bombing. Frank notes that all these national eulogies 
“position traumas as serving a teleological purpose” (p. 659). I see all of these eulogies as 
firmly planted in the strain of American civil religion which sees God as having a divine 
plan for America.  As Frank notes, the eulogists assume “that those who died did so in 
the cause of that divine purpose”.  
            Unlike those from the NRA, including Heston (discussed in the last chapter), who 
argued that deaths should not be used to advance political agendas, these eulogists all 
“deploy those who died as martyrs who require action on the part of the audience” 
(Frank, 2014). Frank argues that: “[n]ational eulogies should thus help the nation work 
through trauma by offering theological and political balms for deep wounds as well as 
narratives that offer hope and steps toward recovery” (p. 659). Frank argues that national 
eulogies should, indeed, be used to “establish the conditions necessary for 
policymaking”.  Unlike those that argue that the wake of tragedy is not the time for 
political discussion, Frank argues, “a civil society, in the wake of tragedy, ought to use 
symbolic rituals to work through trauma, doing so to allow for both grieving and 
subsequent problem solving” (p. 655).  Instead of only addressing the past and present — 
as classical epideictic rhetoric does — public eulogies, whether eulogies of politicians, 
 198 
celebrities, or national eulogies, become deliberative by attempting to influence the 
future.  
            Before Obama, American presidents had treated mass shooting as if they were all 
aberrations that could not be understood. After the 2007 shooting at Virginia Tech, G.W. 
Bush, the sitting-president, stated that it was “impossible to make sense of such violence 
and suffering” (Condolenses, 2007, para. 4). The contemporary American rhetorical 
theorist Craig Rood (2018, p. 56) notes that in his first term, Obama addressed mass 
shootings in much the same way. Obama’s eulogy following the mass shooting of 
eighteen people including Representative Gabrielle Giffords followed this thematic 
tradition by discussing the incomprehensibility of such violence. 
        The Pulitzer Prize winning liberal American journalist and historian Gary Wills 
(2011) compared Obama’s Tucson address to Lincoln’s speech at Gettysburg. Wills 
argues that in this address, Lincoln invited “all Americans to grieve for the tragic war and 
to share blame for the historical crime of slavery” (para. 4). Like Lincoln, Obama faced a 
traumatized and grieving audience, which he sought to unite. Obama avoided any 
divisive discussion of gun control or politics at all, instead turning to the biblical book of 
Job. The book of Job, of course, is sacred text in both the Jewish and Christian traditions. 
It is a poetic tale addressing the problem of theodicy which has plagued the Judeo-
Christian-Islamic tradition since its beginnings thousands of years ago. The story begins 
with Yahweh and Satan making a bet. Satan bets Yahweh that he (Satan) can make 
Yahweh’s faithful servant, Job, curse Yahweh. Satan begins by killing Job’s animals and 
servants, then Job’s children, and then causes Job to suffer boils all over his body. Like 
Job, the reader of the Book of Job is never given an explanation as to why God allows 
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these horrors. The horrors cannot be placed in a historical context because they are 
merely the result of a ‘bet’ between God and Satan: his suffering is unexplainable 
because it is caused by Satan’s whim alone. Like Job’s suffering, Obama explained that 
the evil that had happened in Tucson happened “for reasons that defy human 
understanding” (Frank, 2014, p. 653). Like this Christian interpretation of the book of 
Job, Obama’s (Wills, 2011) national eulogy after the Tucson shooting was ultimately 
hopefully.  After he eulogized the six dead, Obama added that Gabrielle Giffords had just 
opened her eyes for the first time. He then drew attention to the by-standers who had 
helped prevent the would-be assassination of Representative Giffords and asked the 
American people to engage in discourse which resisted polarization and blame.  
            Yet, Obama (2011) ended his national eulogy with a return to the near nihilistic 
lack of understanding in the book of Job. 
Bad things happen, and we have to guard against simple explanations in the 
aftermath. For the truth is none of us can know exactly what triggered this vicious 
attack. None of us can know with any certainty what might have stopped these 
shots from being fired, or what thoughts lurked in the inner recesses of a violent 
man’s mind. (para. 25) 
And then, once again, Obama urged the American public to not let this divide them, 
stating, “what we cannot do is use this tragedy as one more occasion to turn on each 
other. That we cannot do. That we cannot do.” Obama leaves us with this repeated 
anastrophic advice: we cannot let a tragedy divide America.  In the next section, I will 
show how Obama quickly abandoned his own advice. 
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The Tragedy That Changed Obama’s Rhetoric 
 On a crisp New England winter morning, a young man woke up, entered his 
mother’s bedroom where she lay sleeping, and shot her in the head four times.  He then 
took his just-murdered-mother’s car and drove to Sandy Hook Elementary School, armed 
with his mother’s legally purchased Bushmaster XM15-E2S rifle and ten magazines with 
30 rounds each. There, he killed twenty children, six adults, and himself.  He had shot all 
but two of his victims multiple times. The Connecticut State Attorney’s office concluded 
that the shooter’s “severe and deteriorating internalized mental health problems … [and] 
access to deadly weapons … proved a recipe for mass murder” (State of Connecticut 
Office of the Child Advocate, 2014, p. 9) 
            Maurice Halbwachs (1992, p. 140) argued that “every collective memory unfolds 
within a spatial framework”. Following Halbwachs thought, Pierre Nora developed the 
idea of lieu de memoire (site of memory) (1997). For Nora “[a] lieu de mémoire is any 
significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human 
will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any 
community” (p. 14).  After the shooting, Obama immediately gave an impromptu 
address, then travelled to the memory site of Newtown Connecticut to give a scripted 
national eulogy. 
            The German archeologist and theorist of memory, Jan Assman (2011), writes that 
ritual as memory is based on repetition: “each performance must follow a fixed model as 
closely as possible in order to make the actual performance resemble in every respect the 
previous one… Repetition is a form of preservation, and thus, memory” (p. 23-24).   The 
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enactment of the same movements in the same space, make the ritual visible. Obama’s 
sentiments immediately after the shooting were repeated in the second address. 
             Obama did not turn to the Old Testament God of the Book of Job.  Instead, he 
turned to the Pauline Christian God of Corinthians II quoting: “Do not lose heart. Though 
outwardly we are wasting away, inwardly, we are being renewed day by day”.  Rather 
than attempt to create a sacred morality, he draws on the existing religious values of 
patience, care, and protecting the vulnerable.  He argued that the fact this shooting had 
taken place meant that Americans had not done enough to protect their children.  He 
argued that we all need to work together in order to ensure such a tragedy doesn’t happen 
again.  He states that while no one law will eliminate such tragedies entirely “we have an 
obligation to try”.  Who do we have an obligation to?  He leaves this blank.  The 
audience is allowed to choose whether we have an obligation to our nation, to God, to our 
children, to all humanity, etc. 
 Assman (2011, p. 339) notes that “political memory is highly normative, 
prescribing what must by no means be forgotten in order to form and belong to a political 
identity”. Obama’s national eulogies followed the normative model in his first term.  As 
American rhetorical theorist Craig Rood (2018, p. 50) argues, early in his presidency, 
Obama’s speeches “closely followed the norms of epideictic rhetoric; he claimed that we 
should honor those who died by recommitting to civic values, such as patriotism, rule of 
law, and respect for one another”. Obama’s rhetoric brought all Americans together in the 
singular political identity of American.  However, following the Sandy Hook shooting in 
December of 2012, Obama’s tone and message changed.  Instead of purely epideictic 
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national eulogies, Obama began to combine epideictic and deliberative rhetoric.  He did 
not just call for respect of civil values, but instead made specific calls for gun control. 
            Obama’s speech after the Gabrielle Giffords shooting received praise from both 
sides of the aisle, with even far-right Republicans like Newt Gingrich praising it (Frank, 
2014, p. 654). On the other hand, the Newtown speech did not receive such bipartisan 
support. Those on the right stated that it was inappropriately “political”, a dog-whistle 
way of stating that it urged activism in favour of control. As Frank notes, the eulogy after 
the Gabrielle Giffords shooting in Obama’s first term “provided spiritual and 
psychological comfort, but little more” (p. 655).  However, the Newtown memorial most 
certainly did more: it called for action.  For this reason, it was accused of exploiting the 
dead for political gain.  Obama had crossed the sacred boundary. 
The Sacred as Qualified: Making Gun Control More Sacred 
Gun control advocates will not make progress until they recognize that the NRA’s 
power lies in the appeal of its ideas, its political engagement and acumen, and the 
intense commitments of its members.  Until gun control advocates can match 
these features, they are unlikely to make much progress.  
    David Cole; quoted in Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 22 
           It is easy to understand that different cultures, and different people within those 
cultures, hold different things sacred. For example, in the USA, many hold sacred the 
belief that marriage is a covenant only between a man and a woman; to others, the 
marriage covenant itself is sacred, but it can be between any two people regardless of 
gender; to yet others, the entire concept of marriage has more to do with taxes and 
insurance than anything sacred. What is more difficult to grasp is the question of whether 
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the term sacred is categorical or qualified.  Although we have, up until now, discussed the 
sacred in terms of the Durkheimian definition of the sacred as wholly other, this may not 
be the case for all societies and all individuals at all times.  For example, a highly 
religious individual may have a clear conception of the world in terms of the sacred and 
the profane, but what about those of us with a more secular Weltanschauung? In terms of 
rights, what about those who do not entirely agree with the Lockean notion of a natural 
law, and think Hobbes may have been onto something with his social 
constructionism?  One might clearly hold human life to be sacred, but what about a value 
like education.  Surely education is sacred, but less sacred than human life.  The border 
between what is sacred and what is profane might be more porous than Durkheim 
proposed.  Groups such as the NRA leadership understand this. Those who believe in gun 
control are also beginning to understand this. Obama hoped to convince us that human 
life is more sacred than the right to bear arms.  
            After the Sandy Hook tragedy, Obama stopped trying to change anyone’s mind on 
gun control. He gave up on convincing the Second Amendment absolutists, who are true 
believers in gun rights. Instead, he began trying to convince those that already believe 
that we need gun control to become militants.  Obama used civil religion to try to 
convince the left that their values are sacred too. He hoped that sacred rhetoric would 
mobilize gun control advocates as much as it mobilizes gun rights advocates. Obama 
attempted to make gun control a sacred obligation. 
Obama’s Sacred Rhetoric: The Warrant of the Dead 
            Though we often think of gun rights advocates as the “true believers”, many gun 
control supporters are true believers in the same manner.  As Hogan and Rood (2015) 
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note, many gun control advocates “assume, rather than prove, the efficacy of various 
plans for restricting gun ownership [to reduce gun violence]”. After the Sandy Hook 
shooting, Obama began speaking to these true believers. He did not use statistics and data 
to try to convince congress, the senate, and voters that gun control was necessary; rather, 
he used the sacred rhetoric of the warrant of the dead.  
            A warrant refers to the authority or justification to carry out an action. The 
warrant of the dead, therefore, is the notion that the dead give authority or justification 
for action.  As Rood explains “the warrant of the dead refers to an explicit or implicit 
claim that the dead place a demand on the living.” (2018, p. 47).  The warrant of the dead 
is often the justification for social change to lessen the chances of similar tragedies 
occurring in the future.  Rood argues that the warrant is more than simply a “cost-benefit 
analysis or a pragmatic argument that a particular position might reduce future deaths” (p. 
49).  Rather, the warrant of the dead is “an ethical claim” (p. 49).  It is a call to our moral 
obligations.  It is not qualified, it is absolute.  The warrant of the dead is sacred. 
            In some cases, the warrant of the dead is a call to carry on the work that the dead 
started.  For example, in the wake of the assassinations of peace activists like Martin 
Luther King Jr. and Gandhi, there were calls for the people to carry on the work of 
making peace through non-violence.  Whereas, in the death of a guerilla rebel in an 
independence war, there may be calls to fight harder for independence.  In both cases, the 
warrant is often used to encourage activists to honour the legacy of a fallen hero by 
continuing their work.  
            But we most often hear the warrant of the dead regarding those who died in 
tragedies that were not related to their life’s goal or purpose. Rood (2018) gives the 
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example of the NAMES project AIDS memorial quilt.  This quilt, which honoured the 
individual loved-ones who had died of AIDS, was placed on the Washington Mall to 
demand government action to address the AIDS crisis.  We hear the warrant of the dead 
in relation to the covid-19 crisis being used to call for better protections for medical 
workers and universal health care.  And of course, George Floyd’s last cry of “I can’t 
breathe” calls us to action against police brutality.   These voices call us to action, even 
though the dead themselves may not have been activists. After the events of September 
the 11th, 2001, we heard the warrant of the dead used to call for everything from tighter 
airport security to the completely unrelated overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government. 
We can safely assume that those who died in 9/11 had not spent their lives fighting for 
greater TSA checks or an end to the Baathist regime in Iraq. And today, those who have 
died of covid-19 may have never even thought about the impact of nationalized health 
care or public health measures on virus epidemics. Some are outraged that, after his death 
from covid-19, Herman Cain’s social media accounts continued to be used by political 
operatives to claim that the novel coronavirus was not as deadly as the media was 
claiming – something that Cain himself had argued before he had died (Voytko, 2020).   
            As Katherine Verdery (1999, p. 29) notes in her book The Political Lives of Dead 
Bodies, “what gives a dead body symbolic effectiveness in politics is precisely its 
ambiguity, its capacity to evoke a variety of understanding”.  The dead are rhetorically 
useful because they cannot speak. Just like Charlton Heston used Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s death to advocate for gun rights, we can manipulate the dead to say whatever suits 
our rhetorical purpose.  We will never know what the dead teenagers at Columbine high 
school thought about their classmates owning assault rifles. We will never know if the 
 206 
teacher at Newtown thought she would have been safer had she been armed 
herself.  Verdery recognizes that the dead sometimes “present the illusion of having only 
one significance”.  But as Rood (2018, p. 51) states “interpreting or ascribing significance 
in the aftermath of mass shootings often says less about the dead or the condition of their 
death than it does about us”.  We use warrant of the dead to make our own political goals 
sacred. 
            The warrant of the dead is a common feature of national eulogies.  At Gettysburg, 
Lincoln commanded that the deaths of the soldiers “shall not be in vain”. The address is 
exalted and held up as part of the cannon of American civil religion as honouring both the 
dead and the survivors who fought on both sides of the civil war. Yet, Lincoln clearly 
used the warrant of the dead to call for a united “nation”: Gettysburg remains “a final 
resting-place for those who here gave their lives, that the nation might live” (Voytko, 
2020 emphasis added).  Similarly, in making the argument for war following the tragedy 
of September 11th, 2001, Bush stated that “we have suffered great loss. And in our grief 
and anger we have found our mission” (2001).  Presidents throughout American history 
have recognized that calling on the warrant of American dead, calls Americans to action, 
whether at home or abroad.  
            In the last century, the warrant of the dead has been the prime mover of gun 
control legislation. Particularly, assassinations and attempted assassinations of politicians 
and activists.  The 1968 Gun Control Act came out in the wake of the assignation of J.F. 
Kennedy in 1963, as well as Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy in 1968. The 
1993 Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (the Brady Bill) which mandated federal 
background checks on firearms purchases and a five-day waiting period, was named after 
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James Brady, the press secretary who was shot in the head during an attempted 
assassination on Ronald Reagan in 198123.  
            The warrant of the dead is frequently invoked after mass shootings in America, 
and usually is not invoked after other kinds of fire-arms deaths.  Though America has one 
of the worst rates of mass shootings in the world24, it actually accounts for a small 
number of deaths by firearms in the USA – less than 1% by some estimates. About two of 
the three women killed by former or current male sexual partners every day in the USA 
are killed by guns (Catalano et al., 2009)  – a far greater number than women killed in 
mass shootings. More surprisingly, one (typically a poor, rural) American per week is 
shot by a toddler (Ingraham, 2017)! Though Americans are beginning to learn about the 
shootings of African-Americans by police-officers, we rarely hear these shootings 
discussed in arguments about gun control.  Even though the #defundthepolice movement 
has taken hold around the world, the idea that police need guns is rarely challenged 
outside of countries like the UK, Norway, and New Zealand. At least from a rhetorical 
perspective in the gun control debate, the lives of women suffering from domestic 
violence, African Americans, and even, poor, rural white American, do not matter as 
much as the lives of suburban kids.  For Rood, this highlights the fact that “the warrant of 
the dead inevitably represents and reiterates power imbalances” (2018, p. 53).   
                                                   
23 Reagan himself was shot in the lung but recovered and returned to the White House within two weeks. 
24 It is often noted that American has the highest rates of mass shootings in the world; however, some 
populist and conservative American media outlets, and even academics rightly note, that it is difficult to 
find exact numbers on the mass shooting taking place in countries such as Liberia (Lott & Weisser, 2018). 
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 Though there was disagreement about exactly what should be done regarding gun 
control following the 1999 Columbine shootings, both Democrats and Republicans used 
the warrant of the dead to argue that something must be changed in order to prevent 
similar school shootings — be it bans on automatic weapons or armed guards at school 
entrances. At a memorial service in Colorado, Vice President Gore insisted, “All of us 
must change our lives to honor these children [so that] those who died here this week will 
not have died in vain” (1999) .  Following the Newtown shooting, several parents of the 
children shot vocally called for gun control, some prioritized mental health issues over 
gun issue, and one parent even claimed to support the NRA’s efforts to have more armed 
security in schools (Rood, 2018, p. 51).  There was little agreement other than on the fact 
that ‘something’ must be done. But our attention quickly waned, and nothing was done. 
‘This is Not the Time’: Politicizing Tragedy 
            For post-colonial and critical theorists such as Edward Said, “collective memory 
is not an inert and passive thing, but a field of activity in which past events are selected, 
reconstructed, maintained, modified, and endowed with political meaning” (2000, p. 
252). Those in power attempt to select what can be remembered when and how. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, theorists such as Maurice Halbwachs (1992) noted how 
the process of forgetting was crucial to this construction of meaning. In that chapter, I 
also noted how Charlton Heston called out politicians and activists who used the shooting 
to make a political point.  As Rood adds, “gun rights advocates often reject the notion 
that there is any obligation to the dead by claiming that now is the time for mourning, not 
action” (2018, p. 55).  After the Newtown shooting, NRA executive vice-president 
Wayne Lapierre (2012) stated that he would not discuss gun control efforts “out of 
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respect for those grieving families.”  He went on to state “while some have tried to 
exploit tragedy for political gain, we have remained respectfully silent”.  Heston and 
Lapierre attempted to prohibit the memory of mass shootings from being “endowed with 
political meaning” as Said might say.  Moreover, they attempted to invoke our disgust at 
the mixing of the sacred and the profane: while liberals use the sacred deaths for their 
secular political purposes, gun rights activists argued that this mixing of the sacred and 
the profane, regardless of political intent, is in itself a violation of the moral order. 
            Unlike previous presidents, Obama (2013a) directly challenged this idea that the 
memory of mass shootings should not be politicized.  He invited the families of mass 
shooting victims to Washington to lobby for gun control.  He directly addressed the 
charge that this was inappropriate by stating: 
I’ve heard folks say that having the families of the victims lobby for this 
legislation was somehow misplaced. ‘A prop’ somebody called them. “Emotional 
blackmail”, some outlet said. Are they serious? Do we really think that thousands 
of families whose lives have been shattered by gun violence don’t have a right to 
weigh in on this issue? Do we think that their emotions, their loss, is not relevant 
to this debate. (para. 17)   
As Rood (2018) notes, “Precluding talk by gun control advocates works to the NRA’s 
advantage since their primary legislative goal is to resist legislation” (p. 63). Invoking the 
‘not now’ rhetorical strategy is useful for those who want to maintain the status quo.     
            However, on many occasions, including the NRA convention following the 
Columbine shooting which I discussed in the last chapter, the NRA itself politicized the 
media moment of a mass shooting. They used it to argue for more guns in schools.  In his 
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speech on Dec. 21, 2012, a week after the Sandy Hook massacre, Lapierre argued that 
armed guards in schools would help protect “our kids” – thus invoking the same 
paternalistic nation-as-family metaphor that Obama had used.  In doing so, the NRA 
committed the same violation of decorum that they accuse Obama of committing.     
Presenting the Dead 
            Though he did not use the term himself, the discourse of collective memory 
begins with Emile Durkheim.  His notion of “collective effervescence” – the 
transcendence of the individual – is the force which moves the past into the present using 
mnemonic tools such as totems and rituals (Durkheim, 2001). Durkheim’s student, 
Maurice Halbwachs, was the first sociologist to use the term “collective memory”, 
suggesting that individual memory is constructed within structures and institutions, and 
that these memories are only understood within social constructions (Halbwachs, 
1992).  Halbwachs understood that memory enables us to live in groups and 
communities, and living in groups and communities enables us to build a 
memory: memory, therefore, is intersubjectively constituted.  Halbwachs expanded the 
Durkheimian notion of the totem to include commemorative events. With Durkheim, he 
saw that memories faded without continual reinforcement. Totem symbols and repeated 
rituals are needed to bring the past into the present and, as I argue, actualize memory into 
civil religious obligations such as the need for gun control.  These mnemonic aids are 
necessary to overcome the problem of fleeting engagement.  
            Maurice Halbwachs posited that “the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on 
the basis of the present” (1992, p. 39). Since Halbwachs’ ground-breaking formulation, 
“the idea that present political and social concerns shape representation of the past has 
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become a governing assumption in studies of public memory” (deTar, 2016, p. 93).  As I 
noted in the previous chapter, this is referred to as instrumental presentism. Collective 
memory is actualized in totem reverence and ritual: in contemporary American terms, 
this means that the needs of the present moment are met by perpetuating memories of the 
past. 
            As Susan Sontag (2004) explained, remembering is “an ethical act”.  It is an act 
that “has ethical value in and of itself” (deTar, 2016).  Civil religion and sacred rhetoric 
are intrinsically connected to public memory.  A nation’s civil religious obligations are 
defined, constrained, and actualized by choosing what is remembered.  Those with power 
choose which heroes should be commemorated with statues in public squares, which 
battles would be remembered on which public holidays, which songs would be sung to 
remember the values of the nation, which values should be promoted above all. This 
promotion of particular memories is a rhetorical tool to meet the political needs of the 
present.  This construction of public memory is particularly important in times of crisis 
when values compete, such as freedom and safety, gun rights and gun control.  
            The warrant of the dead straddles epideictic and deliberative rhetoric: it commits 
to contemporary civil religious values, but it is also a call for change.  Rood argues that 
this is true of Obama’s nation eulogies which, regardless of occasion, frequently oscillate 
between the two rhetorical genres: “[his national eulogies] insist on public action, while 
[they] praise the dead and blame those who have failed to protect them” (2018, p. 
50).  As Obama’s presidency progressed, and particularly after he won re-election, he 
more consistency expressed frustration at the lack of action on gun control.  After the 
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2013 mass shooting at the Washington Navy Yard he stated “Our tears are not enough… 
If we really want to honor the dead, then we must change gun laws” (2013). 
            Public memory is not the simple act of recall, but rather, a selective attention to 
the events that are important to particular agendas.  The contemporary protests over 
confederate monuments in the South of the USA highlight this issue.  Most of the statues 
of the confederate soldiers in the south being argued over today were not erected during 
the confederacy. Rather, most of them were constructed during the Jim Crow era, after 
reconstruction until the end of the 20th century civil rights era.  The fact that they were 
not erected directly after the civil war makes it abundantly clear that the statues were 
erected in order to prompt a particular public memory for a particular agenda: they were 
erected to intimidate African-Americans, not to commemorate the soldiers (Upton, 2017). 
            Obama attempted to erect rhetorical statues in his speeches. Statues cement 
people and events into the American collective memory.  The term epideictic can be 
translated as “showing forth” or “to present”: epideictic rhetoric ‘presents’ us with figures 
and values of the community.  To make the warrant of the dead more powerful, Obama 
conjured the dead.  With details of their lives, Obama ‘presented’ the dead to his 
audiences. 
            Rood (2018) argues that Obama’s speeches after Sandy Hook had three stages: 
• 1. Obama attempted to put each particular shooting in the context of the history of mass 
shootings, and particularly, our failure to act on them (p. 55). With this, it became evident 
to the listener that if action had been taken after any of the previous mass shootings, then 
these lives would have been saved.  
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• 2. Obama situated the latest particular mass shooting within the broader context of gun 
violence and all its victims.  
• 3. Obama called us to see the dead as is if they were members of our own families and act 
accordingly (p. 55). 
               In putting a particular mass shooting within the context of the history of mass 
shootings, and the history of gun violence in America, we begin to see the shooting not as 
an aberration, but as a predictable and avoidable event. Following the Durkheimian 
lineage, German critical theorist Axel Honneth explains that shared recollection expands 
the community “beyond its current members, establishing relationships of recognition 
with members who have died as well as with those not yet living” as they are pushed to 
make a “binding decision about what kind of collective they would like to be respected 
and remembered by future generations” (Honneth, 2015, p. 323). In this way, Obama 
(2012) might overcome American’s fleeting attention, and inspire the continuous struggle 
necessary for legislation and cultural change. 
Whether it’s an elementary school in Newtown, or a shopping mall in Oregon, or 
a temple in Wisconsin, or a movie theatre in Aurora, or a street corner in Chicago 
– these neighborhoods are our neighborhoods, and these children are our children. 
(para. 5) 
Obama’s use of polysyndeton shows how history keeps repeating, building “an inductive 
line of reasoning that builds to generalization: mass shootings are a public problem that 
requires our attention” (Rood, p. 56). Moreover, if we recognize this event in its historical 
context, it becomes preventable. This recognition of its preventability calls us to action. 
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            It’s important to note that Obama did not just include mass shootings in this list, 
but also included, “a street corner in Chicago” (2013).  Unlike the other examples, he is 
not talking about a specific instance; rather, just any street corner in one of America’s 
most violent cities.  Obama is suggesting that the problem of gun violence is not just 
limited to mass shootings.  As I noted earlier, mass shootings only account for 1% of the 
more than 30 000 annual deaths from gun violence in America.  With just this simple 
phrase, Obama is ‘showing forth’ not just the dead of mass shootings, but all those who 
die of gun violence in America. Obama’s use of this phrase to expand public memory 
was risky. Whereas the warrant of the dead related to school shootings is uncomplicated 
by race, class, or presumed guilt, the image invoked by the phrase “a street corner in 
Chicago” most definitely is. We undoubtedly think of a young, poor, African-American 
male, most likely involved in the drug trade or a related crime. Obama attempted to block 
this image, and mitigated this risk, by highlighting one death: that of Hadiya Pendleton, a 
15-year-old African-American honours student from Chicago.  He stated: 
… so good to her friends that they all thought they were her best friend.  Just three 
weeks ago, she was here, in Washington, with her classmates, performing for her 
country at my inauguration.  And a week later, she was shot and killed in a 
Chicago park after school, just a mile away from my house… (para. 85)  
In Judith Butler’s (Butler, 2009) terms, Obama was making this death ‘greivable’.  
            As I discussed earlier, the fact that, on average, twenty-six people per day in 
America are shot has become normal. But twenty-six people shot in one day in one single 
place is, thankfully, not normal yet. Americans still are attentive to mass shootings. In 
highlighting “a street corner in Chicago” (Obama, 2012) and Hadiya in particular, Obama 
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is attempting to bring attention to the normal.  He hoped that in doing this, we would not 
only momentarily ‘open our eyes’ but that our attention would be held long enough to 
make its way from hope to legislation. 
Durkheimian Vs. Rouseauvian Civil Religion 
 Although we tend to think of Rousseau as on the side of enlightened reason rather 
than religion, Rousseau saw that civil religion could support “republican morality, 
society, and politics” (Orhan, 2013, p. 168).  He first mentions a “civil profession of 
faith” in a 1756 letter to Voltaire (Rousseau, 2018, p. 408).  In the letter, Rousseau states, 
I would wish, then, that in every State there were a moral code, or a kind of civil 
profession of faith, containing, positively, the social maxims everyone would be 
bound to acknowledge, and negatively, the fanatical maxims one would be bound 
to reject, not as impious, but as seditious (p. 254). 
            Rousseau’s work The Social Contract (2014) expands on these words.  The work 
begins with an overview of religion and politics, noting that ancient Greece, Rome, and 
Israel all were regimes which combined theology and politics.  Rousseau argues that with 
Christianity came a dangerous separation of “the theological kingdom and the political 
system” (Orhan, 2013, p. 169).  He saw this as undermining political union.  For 
Rousseau this type of “religion of man” — as he called it — meant that laws had no 
moral support and therefore must be enforced through the threat of force.  Moreover, he 
saw that this type of religion turned people’s attention completely towards the afterlife, 
undermining the “social spirit” (quoted in Orhan, p. 170). 
            As Turkish political scientist Özgüç Orhan summarizes, Rousseau was most 
concerned with the “public utility” of religion (2013, p. 170).  Drawing on Coleman’s 
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work on civil religion, the contemporary German memory theorist Carmen Schmitt 
succinctly states: “In this view, civil religion is consciously “designed” by leaders to 
exert social control over the citizenry” (Coleman: especially p. 67; p. 69; cited in 
Schmidt, 2016).We see here the connection to the Halbwachian notion of collective 
memory. Where Halbwachs departs from his mentor, Durkheim, is in his “instrumental 
presentist” approach to memory (Britton, 2012).  Halbwachs saw that collective memory 
is shaped by the issues and understandings of the present. What both Rousseau and 
Halbwachs recognized is that leaders reconstruct the past, choosing what is to be 
remembered and what is to be forgotten. For Rousseau, it is advice, for Halbwachs, it was 
simply an observation. 
 In Durkheimian thought, religion offers both cosmological answers and continuity 
of moral practices leading to social cohesion expressed and maintained through ritual. As 
Orhan (2013, p. 172) explains, functionalism focuses “on what a religion does rather than 
what it is”.  For functionalists, “any collective experience that transports the individual 
beyond himself and binds him with others has a religious quality to it” (Orhan, p. 
172).  While for Rousseau, “civil religion is a sensible thing for leaders to create and 
encourage; for Durkheim it is an emergent property of social life itself (Hammond, 
quoted in Orhan, 2013, p. 174).  For Rousseau, civil religion is the top down 
manipulation of collective memory for the good of the nation; for Bellah and other 
Durkheimians, civil religion emerges organically from the bottom-up. 
 Obama attempted to use memory to construct civil religious obligations.  While 
Obama might be using civil religion in a Rousseauvian way – as a useful tool for making 
policy – he is not imposing it in the way that Rousseau suggested, or even the way that 
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the Founding Fathers of the USA did. Obama is not writing documents and erecting 
statues; instead, Obama is simply reminding the population of past events, which create a 
sense of obligation. Using enthymematic argumentation, Obama simply reminds his 
audience of the context of past mass shootings and that no action was taken.  The 
audience is left thinking about whether action in the present could prevent future mass 
shootings.  We can assume that Obama was attempting to use enthymeme so that the 
audience would create their own, seemingly organic, civil religious obligation to push 
their leaders for gun control legislation.   
The Sacred Value of the Family 
  Though many note the high level of individualism in developed nations, many of 
these nations still consider ‘the family’ to be a sacred institution.  Though we often quote 
neo-conservative Margaret Thatcher’s statement that “there is no such thing as 
society”,  we miss out on the second part of that quote: she didn’t follow it with “there 
are only individuals”; she stated “there are individual men and women and their families” 
(Staff, 2013). Although Thatcher herself was, of course, British, this statement was a 
perfect encapsulation of neo-conservative ideology of the time with Thatcher in Britain 
and the Reagan in the USA. And though Brits celebrated Thatcher’s death, dancing in the 
streets and singing “Ding Dong the Witch is Dead”, Reagan remains a respected, even 
beloved figure in much of the USA.  The neo-conservative ideology which has embraced 
individualism, yet not completely abandoned the sacred status of the nuclear family, is 
still alive in the USA. 
  Obama’s attempts to bring sustained attention to gun control relied heavily on the 
sacred status of the family in American culture. After the Sandy Hook shooting, Obama 
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repeatedly stated that we had to do better for “our” children.  His use of this possessive 
pronoun played a double rhetorical duty: 1. it encouraged parents to fight for a safer 
nation for their own children; and, 2. it evokes what George Lakoff refers to as the 
“nation-as-family” metaphor (Lakoff, 1995).  Obama wants Americans to see these dead 
children as their own and to see that they have failed to protect their children.  Even 
more, he wants us to see all America’s children, not just the victims of mass shootings, 
as, in some way, our children. This is one of the few rhetorical devices Obama used in the 
press conference right after the shooting – indicating that perhaps it was his own 
spontaneous feeling, rather than one written by a team of speechwriters.  At the prayer 
vigil a few days later, Obama made this sentiment even clearer, stating: “We come to 
realize that we bear a responsibility for every child because we are counting on everyone 
else to help look after ours; that we’re all parents; that they’re all our children” (Obama, 
2012, para. 12).  
            A month later, when Obama introduced gun control proposals in the wake of the 
Sandy Hook shooting, he quoted three of the letters that he had received from children all 
over the nation concerning the Sandy Hook shooting.  Instead of merely quoting them, he 
invited the children and their parents to come to the White House.  During the press 
conference he mentioned the children by name and asked each one to “go ahead and 
wave” (Obama, 2013a).  As the news cameras panned the audience, showing the 
children, ‘our children’ were not just rhetorically but visually presented to us. 
   In referring to the dead as “our children”, Obama attempted to transcend political 
divisions by using the sacred status of the family.  He attempted to make the gun control 
debate “not between those who support gun control and those who oppose it but between 
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those who recognize and accept their obligation” to take care of “our children” and those 
who do not (2013). In a nation as individualistic as America, individual citizens are not 
expected to take care of each other.  But, regardless of individualism, parental 
responsibility remains a sacred duty in America.  In making the dead “our children”, 
Obama is associating gun control with this sacred responsibility and, hopefully, making 
ending gun violence a sacred responsibility in itself. 
            The family metaphor is also a way of extending the limit of memory.  While we 
may pay attention to a mass shooting for only a few days, we do not grieve a child for 
only a few days.  Obama (2013) states: 
Hadiya’s mom hasn’t forgotten. The notion that two or three months after 
something as horrific as what happened in Newtown happens and we’ve moved 
on to other things, that’s not who we are.  That’s not who we are.  (para. 2) 
            At his speech after the Washington Navy Yard shooting the next year, Obama 
(2013) turned to the similar rhetorical technic of anaphora: “Once more our hearts are 
broken. Once more we ask why. Once more we seek strength and wisdom through God’s 
grace” (para. 5). Obama brings up all the mass shootings that we remember. In doing this, 
he makes all the victims present.   
            Obama’s use of the warrant of the dead was not confined to his verbal rhetoric, he 
also used visual and embodied rhetoric to make this warrant clear.  At the White House’s 
2013 gun control plan, the flag was flown at half-mast to remind us all of the dead.  More 
painfully, the warrant of the dead was made visible as the families of the dead children 
stood beside him as he spoke about gun control.  Obama’s rhetoric not only praised the 
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dead, but also “blamed those who have failed to protect them” (Rood, 2018, p. 50), 
including lawmakers like himself who failed to pass gun control legislation (p. 50). 
The Problem of Sacred Rights 
            Like the NRA, who appropriated the language of the civil rights movement, 
Obama, too, used the language of rights to argue his position. He argued that at Oak 
Creek in Wisconsin, Sikhs right of freedom of religion was taken from them when an 
armed man went into their temple on a killing spree.  He argued that the fundamental 
rights to life and liberty were denied to the students at Virginia Tech, Columbine, and 
Newtown (Obama, 2012).  More problematically, Obama put forward a collectivist 
interpretation of the Second Amendment (Obama, 2013), implying that this was 
sacred.  In doing this, he ignored the fact that the Second Amendment was, at least in 
part, created to enable white men to enforce slavery through slave patrols. How can a 
man whose father was African and who is married to the ancestor of slaves, honestly 
believe that the Bill of Rights is a sacred document? Such engagement with the mythical 
history of American civil religion is what led many on the left, perhaps most famously 
including Cornel West, to criticize Obama as an ‘Uncle Tom’(Capeheart, 2016).    
            But this is just one of the problems for progressives attempting to engage in 
‘rights talk’. Heston brought up the notion of duty in expressing the covenant principle of 
limited government and the duty to overthrow a government that oversteps its limits. 
Obama also brings us notions of obligations.  The warrant of the dead itself is a sacred 
obligation.  But as I elucidated in my chapter on the Constitution as covenant, there is an 
inherent contradiction in the idea of rights – which comes from the Lockean natural law 
tradition — and the idea of democracy.  If the people are truly free, then they can decide 
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to change any law, even if that law is a ‘sacred’ natural law or a ‘God-given right’ 
enshrined in the Constitution.  When Obama stated: “We live in a society, a government 
of, and by, and for the people” (Obama, 2013) he is implying that we can change the 
laws.  But if this is the case, then what good are sacred rights?  If the people are truly 
free, then no law can be sacred.  This is the inherent contradiction of natural law and 
democracy.  
            But perhaps the biggest problem with Obama’s sacred rights talk has to do with 
the problem that all progressives face: we don’t like to talk in such absolute terms.  In 
2014, Thomas Francesca Smith and Thomas Hollihan guest edited an issue of Rhetoric 
and Public Affairs on civility.  Most of the articles in the special issue discussed the gun 
debate in America.  In their own two articles in the issue, they very convincingly argued 
that we have not had any progress on gun control because conservatives in America 
engage in rhetorical practices which effectively shut down any chance of debate 
(Hollihan & Smith, 2014; Smith & Hollihan, 2014).  This is not a surprising argument 
given my analysis of Charlton Heston’s rhetoric in the last chapter.  I argued that the 
NRA had successfully made its audience take a quantum leap.  The NRA leadership, with 
Charlton Heston being its most eloquent example, used rhetoric to push their own 
individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment into the category of the 
sacred. Once an idea is sacred, there is no room for facts, data, and reasoned 
argument.  In Hume’s terms, when the ‘is’ slips on the ladder of statis to become an 
‘ought’ there is no turning back.  We can have a reasoned discussion of what ‘is’, but 
only passion will define what ‘ought’ to be. 
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            Many have noted that liberals in America are at a disadvantage because they do 
not like absolute terms of sacred and profane (ex. Marietta, 2012). This has many 
proposed reasons: less religious sentiment, more diverse social spheres, more respect of 
nuance, etc.; regardless of reasons, this means that the left have the added burden of 
producing evidence of their policy plans to a sound-bite-based audience.  Peer-reviewed 
research doesn’t tend to go viral.  On the other hand, as Rood notes, gun rights advocates 
have a “motivational advantage… they do not need to craft or argue about the best 
plan” (2018, p. 62), all they have to do is oppose any gun control legislation. Their task is 
simple, and very simply communicated with a reference to the sacred Second 
Amendment and the God-given right to bear arms. 
            As Rood discusses, gun control advocates have another particular disadvantage: 
“there is a gap between accepting responsibility for others and embracing gun control” 
(2018, p. 62).  Heston and the NRA only need to convince gun rights advocates of one 
thing, that the individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment is sacred.  Obama 
and gun-rights advocates must not just convince Americans that they have a sacred 
obligation to their fellow citizens, but that gun control is the correct way to fulfill this 
sacred obligation. 
            A further disadvantage that gun control advocates have is that their solutions will 
never completely eliminate the problem. Gun rights advocates have a simple goal, stop 
gun control legislation.  Their only points of discussion are details such as whether 
minors, criminals, and the mentally ill should be allowed to have guns.  But even the 
most radical legislation proposed by Democratic gun control advocates in America would 
amount to, at best, a modest decrease in gun violence.  Even if guns were completely 
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outlawed in America – which no one is proposing – people could still smuggle them into 
the country or, more frighteningly, make guns on 3D printers.  Obama even admitted 
“there is no law or set of laws that can prevent every senseless act of violence 
completely”. However, he goes on to add that “If there is even one thing we can do to 
reduce this violence, if there is even one life that can be saved, then we’ve got an 
obligation to try” (Obama, 2013).  As Rood notes, “such incremental progress, even if 
realistic, is typically not inspiring… Obama has tried to create activists who are 
paradoxically moderate” (2018, p. 63).  Modest, incremental change is not sexy.  
            Perhaps most importantly, gun rights advocates are more motivated than gun 
control advocates because the laws affect them personally.  If gun owners know if a 
particular piece of control legislation will have a personal, immediate impact, then: they 
might face more checks when buying ammunition, they may not be able to take guns 
across state line, or they may have to return particular pieces such as bump stocks or 
silencers on guns they own. One the other hand, the exact effects of gun control 
legislation on gun crime are unknowable, at least on an individual level.  We might know 
that generally that countries with tougher gun control legislation have less gun violence: 
but we can never know if a specific piece of gun control legislation will prevent a specific 
crime in the future. If gun control were enacted, statistics might show that the violence in 
my neighborhood had lessened, but I would never know if it prevented a crime against 
me, personally.  I would never know if a shooting did not occur at my daughter’s school 
because the would-be shooter couldn’t buy an AR-15.  Even the families of victims of 
gun violence are not personally motivated to fight for gun control: no piece of gun 
control legislation will ever bring back their dead husband, or mother, or son.  Gun rights 
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advocates know if a particular piece of gun legislation pertains to the weapons which they 
own, so they can fight against legislation that they know will affect them personally.  But 
gun rights advocates can never be sure if regulations would actually stop them from being 
victims of gun violence; therefore, they have no personal reason to become activists.  
Thus, it is not surprising that gun rights advocates are much more motivated and 
passionate about their cause than gun control advocates.   
The Failure 
            On April 17, 2013, four months after the Sandy Hook shooting, none of the gun 
control measures that Obama had proposed passed in congress. It was particularly 
surprising that even the proposed expansion of background checks didn’t pass despite the 
fact that polls showed that 85% of Americans were in favour of such expansions (Pew 
Research Center, 2013). The political scientist Kristin Goss (2006) refers to this as the 
“gun control paradox”: a large majority of Americans support more gun control measures 
such as background checks, yet legislation cannot be passed. But it is not a paradox at 
all.  It’s simple, the small number of Americans who do not support background checks 
are much more organized and politically active than those who don’t. Speaking after the 
senate vote, Obama himself alluded to this.  He stated that legislatures were afraid of “a 
vocal minority of gun owners” who might “come after them in future elections”. 
According to Obama, gun rights advocates are: “Better organized. They’re better 
financed.  They’ve been at it longer.  And they make sure to stay focused on this one 
issue during election time” (quoted in Rood, p. 53).  The Pew Research Center (2013) 
confirms Obama’s statement.  This is referred to as the “activism gap”.  Gun rights 
advocates are twice as likely as to contact a public official about gun rights compared to 
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gun control advocates and they are four times as likely to have given money to 
organizations that support their views.  
            After the failure of legislation following the Sandy Hook shooting, Obama and his 
advisers began to reconsider their rhetorical strategy.  Obama explained that gun control 
advocates “will have to be as passionate, and as organized, and vocal as those who 
blocked these common-sense steps”.  As Rood succinctly explains, “The Challenge, in 
short, was for gun control supporters to become gun control activists” (2018, p. 
53).  Obama had to radicalize gun control activists.  He needed to push the notion of gun 
control from a public good to a sacred commitment.  He didn’t accomplish this. 
Conclusion 
            In his first term in office, Obama did little to place individual mass shootings 
within a greater historical context.  However, following the Sandy Hook shooting, 
Obama reminded his audience of other mass shootings, and of the daily gun violence in 
America.  In doing this, Obama situated these shootings not just in the context of other 
mass shootings, but in the context of gun violence in the nation as a whole.  This showed 
Americans that these shootings were predictable and thus preventable. 
            After Sandy Hook, Obama didn’t try to persuade anyone that gun control is 
necessary. He didn’t point out that every other industrialized nation has stricter gun 
control than America.  He didn’t point out the correlation between lax gun control laws 
and higher gun violence rates.  Instead, he simply asked us to remember the dead. He set 
these deaths ‘apart’, making them sacred.  Sacred rhetoric does not seek to persuade, it 
seeks to consecrate.  
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            After the failure in congress to pass gun control legislation, despite the support of 
the overwhelming support of the American people, Obama continued to focus not on 
persuasion, but on mobilization.  Rood argues that Obama “used the warrant of the dead 
to transform those who support or are open to gun control into activists who are as 
committed as their opponents are to the rhetorical and political struggle over gun policy.” 
(2018, p. 55). 
            At the press conference following the Sandy Hook shooting, Obama cried.  After 
the 2013 mass shooting at the Washington Navy Yard and the failure to pass legislation 
to prevent this mass shooting, Obama’s message was clear: “Our tears are not enough”, 
gun laws have to change.  He hoped that, like a statue of the virgin Mary that cries every 
Easter, Obama’s tears would rebirth his followers.  Obama didn’t need to convert his 
followers, they needed to be reborn.  To be reborn not just as believers but as gun control 
activists.  
            After the mass shooting at the Washington Navy Yard, Obama stated, with 
exasperation in his voice, that Washington had failed to fix the problem and so now, the 
change would have to come “from the American people” (Obama, 2013c).  It didn’t 
work; American gun control laws are no tougher now than they were before Sandy 
Hook.  Rood (2018, p. 62) concludes his discussion saying, “The warrant of the dead tries 
to get audiences to authentically feel a sense of responsibility for and obligation toward 
unknown victims, but, as I have indicated, such challenges make that ethically 
complicated and rhetorically difficult”. 
            Obama gave up on using reasoned argument to persuade the American people that 
gun control measures would save lives; instead, for the four years after the Sandy Hook 
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shooting Obama turned to sacred rhetoric, not to persuade those who disagreed with him, 
but to mobilize those who believed he was right.  Richard A. Lanham famously noted, 
rhetoric as “the economics of attention”.  Obama reminded us that our attention had not 
been sustained following the previous mass shootings.  In reminding us of this, he 
implied that the Sandy Hook shootings could have been prevented and he urged us to 
take action now so that more would not happen in the future.  Obama used collective 
memory to provoke action. His epideictic rhetoric became deliberative.  He used the 
memory of mass shootings and the mention of pervasive gun violence to encourage the 
civil religious value of safety and paternal care to further his aim of passing gun control 
legislation. 
            In the eulogy form, we often see what Kenneth Burke (1984) might refer to as 
“victimage”.  Luke (1990) explains the duality of victimage in that it “creates and then 
castigates enemies” while simultaneously “sanctifies and then sacrifices heroes” (p. 116). 
Though Campbell and Jamieson state that in the usual form of the national eulogy, the 
speaker turns the victims into national symbols of strength. This was not Obama’s 
rhetorical goal.  At the interfaith prayer service following the Sandy Hook shooting, 
Obama did not seek to turn the dead into martyrs for the nation. Instead, he used the 
occasion to call for action.  Instead of seeking to valorize the dead, Obama focussed on 
unifying the survivors and the nation.  He highlighted what could be gained through the 
loss, saying that the people of Newtown should be an inspiration for all of us to love our 
children.  But most importantly, instead of referencing the afterlife, Obama focussed on 
how we could make the USA better for the survivors. 
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            Obama didn’t just mourn the dead who had been shot on that particular day — it 
was more than an epideictic ritual — Obama attempted to use that moment to cement 
public memory, to connect these deaths to the deaths from gun violence all over the 
nation. Obama used the national eulogies to make not just those dead New England 
children present, but to make the presence of all those who have died of gun violence in 
America known. Obama took a top down, Rousseavian approach to civil religion in 
attempting to make the obligation to care for the most vulnerable though gun control a 
civil religious value; however, because of his use of enthymematic argument, he made it 
appear as an organic expression of popular values. 
            The Obama presidency was a presidency of contradictions.  As Dunbar-Ortiz 
notes (2018, pp. 144–145), Obama called for gun regulations domestically “while fully 
supporting the unlimited production of bombs, bombers, and drones to kill people” 
abroad. Perhaps those who might otherwise support gun control, hesitate to associate 
themselves with Obama for these reasons. Activists tend to come from the extreme of the 
political spectrum, and Obama was nothing if not a centrist. Although his national eulogy 
following the Sandy Hook massacre was referred to as “Obama’s Gettysburg Address” 
(Frank, p. 654), the speech, and the subsequent effect were a failure. As Rood (2018, p. 
51) notes “Obama’s effort to transform gun control supporters into gun control activists 








CONCLUSION: IDOLS V. IDEALS 
If so, then you, the reader, might see in these pages how much fun I had "playing" 
this Article, in addition to benefiting from your own playful encounter with the 
printed residue of what was once mine” (Mootz, 1988, p. 524) 
 
 When we in academia consider American thought, we undoubtedly think of 
pragmatism: Peirce, Dewey, James and the rejection of Idealism.  But this is not who the 
general public consider the greatest American thinkers.  Instead, civil religious heroes 
like Martin Luther King Jr., George Washington, Ronald Reagan, and Ben Franklin are 
considered America’s greatest (Wilson, 2005). These men were idealists. These were not 
men who thought that laws were social constructs and that morality should be 
utilitarian.  These were men who believed that, or at least publicly announced that, there 
are God-given rights granted to all those who they considered fully human, and these 
rights are enshrined in the Constitution.  These men all believed in the same natural laws 
of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it is only their conception of who is fully 
human that has differed. 
 It is therefore not surprising that the American hermeneutic is not critical25 or 
constructionist. Rather, the American hermeneutic is fundamentalist.  It believes in the 
                                                   
25 There have been attempts to introduce a critical hermeneutic into the American legal tradition, most 
notably the legal realist movement in “elite law schools” which came into vogue as early as the early 20th 
century (Goodrich, 2016).  However, as Goodrich notes, this movement has “focused almost exclusively on 
the indeterminacies or undecidability of written law”.  Though Justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsberg could 
be considered to be a part of the legal realist movement for incorporating insights from feminist and critical 
race theory into decisions, it is by no means a mainstream hermeneutic in the American legal system. 
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importance of the authorial intent of those idealist men. It believes that America will be 
great again if it commits itself to living the ideals of those great men which can be found 
in the cannon of American civil religion.  Both gun control and gun rights advocates have 
used the sacred status of these idealist men and the fundamentalist hermeneutic to attempt 
to change minds and mobilize those who already support their cause.  This has been 
extremely successful for gun rights advocates, but gun control advocates have failed to 
mobilize their supporters enough to enact legislations. 
Findings 
Puritan Covenant Theology and the Fundamentalist Hermeneutic             
 In my historical review of the concept of the right to bear arms, I highlighted the 
fact that the Second Amendment is part of the American civil religious cannon. Because 
it is now a sacred document, it can only be approached with a fundamentalist 
hermeneutic.  In the American fundamentalist hermeneutic, authorial intent matters. Gun 
rights activists attempt to convince us that the ‘historically correct’ interpretation of the 
Second Amendment is an individualist one.  Gun control activists, on the other hand, 
have argued that the ‘real’ interpretation of the Second Amendment only gives militias 
the collective right to bear arms.   
            This led me to the question: why does America as a nation hold so strongly to this 
fundamentalist hermeneutic rather than attempting to make laws for more utilitarian 
purposes?  I argue that this fundamentalist hermeneutic is an outcome of Puritan 
covenant theology.  We cannot understand American history — from the monumental 
human achievement of representative democracy and human rights, to the horror of mass 
shootings — without understanding Puritan covenant theology. Puritans see all of history 
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as a series of covenants God makes with his chosen people.  In order to retain God’s 
blessings, his people must follow the obligations of the covenant.  If anyone does not 
follow the rules of the covenant, the entire nation is damned. This is why it is so 
important to not only ensure that individuals follow the rules of the covenant, but also to 
make sure that the government does.  If the government violates the obligations of the 
covenant, the whole nation will be damned.    
            The doctrine of Sola Scriptura, a fundamental tenet of most Protestant 
denominations, means that no entity has authority over the covenant: no priest, or self-
proclaimed prophet, has authority over the Bible. As the notion of the covenant came to 
inform all life in the USA, not just religious life, the doctrine of sola scriptura also 
applied to legal and political covenants: no judge or president has authority over the 
covenant of the US Constitution. If such a ruler attempts to disobey or even misinterprets 
the covenant, the people have not just the right, but the duty to rise up against them. 
Covenant theology leads to a fundamentalist hermeneutic in every aspect of life. 
            Covenant theology is based in the belief that there are God-given rights and 
laws.  This was secularized in the Enlightenment into the concept of natural laws.  These 
laws are not social constructions: they are inalterable and 
everlasting.  However, democracy is based on the notion of popular rule: the people have 
the right to change the laws.  But how can inalterable and everlasting laws be 
changed?  How can a nation like the United States with a Constitution based in the 
Enlightenment concept of natural laws be a democracy?  The answer is that they cannot 
change the covenant without causing a rupture in the entire epistemic system. To change 
the covenant would cause the epistemic system to collapse as it would mean that God’s 
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laws are wrong.  A rhetor cannot advocate to change the laws without similarly 
advocating for the collapse of this epistemic system.  If rhetors want to avoid this radical 
proposition, they can only advocate for a different interpretation of those laws. For this 
reason, gun rights advocates’ only device for persuading the populous that individuals 
have the right to bear arms is to argue that the Founding Fathers intended the document to 
be read with an individualist hermeneutic.  Similarly, gun control advocates must argue 
that the Founders intended the covenant to be read with a collectivist hermeneutic.  
Speculations on Why Heston Succeeded and Obama Failed 
             As Dunbar-Ortiz (2018, p. 127) explains, “The more that gun-control advocates 
raise the issue of government regulation, particularly federal government regulation, the 
more ammunition is provided to those who hold the Second Amendment sacred to stand 
their ground”.  If one believes in the individualist interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, then gun control is a threat to the entire epistemic system of the United 
States of America.  Gun rights advocates are correct in claiming that changing the 
Constitution is a threat to the American way of life and America itself.  And when people 
are threatened, they band together.  In the year 2000, with Heston convincing Americans 
that gun rights would be taken away in light of the 1999 Columbine massacre, the NRA 
membership swelled to a record 4.1 million members (“Timeline of the NRA,” n.d.). By 
associating himself with figures like Martin Luther King Jr., Heston was able to sacralise 
the individual right to bear arms. Gun control advocates had no hope of passing gun 
control legislation. In 2004, Congress let the assault weapons ban expire. In 2005, George 
W. Bush signed a bill granting the gun industry immunity from lawsuits from victims of 
gun violence. And most importantly, in the 2008 case of DC v Heller, the Supreme Court 
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of the USA ruled that the Second Amendment grants the individual right to bear 
arms.  After the shooting of Gabrielle Giffords and eighteen others, after the Aurora 
movie theatre shooting, and even after the Sandy Hook Elementary school shooting, no 
gun control legislation was passed (“Timeline of the NRA”).  
 Rhetoric is not a science.  The psychology of crowds is too complex for us to 
attribute social change to one speech, or even a whole campaign. And this is not the focus 
of this project. But I firmly believe that Heston’s rhetoric is what persuaded many 
Americans that the individual right to bear arms is a ‘God-given’ right: a natural law 
enshrined in the sacred document of the Constitution. In 2018, Chris Hedges, the Pulitzer 
Prize-winning American journalist and Presbyterian minister, wrote that,  “A gun 
reminds Americans that they are divine agents of purification, anointed by God and 
Western civilization to remake the world in their own image” (Hedges, 2018, p. 
8). Heston was instrumental in cementing this in the minds of a generation. What’s more, 
Heston convinced them if the fight for gun rights was lost, the entire American 
experiment of democracy and freedom would collapse soon after. Instead of causing an 
epistemic collapse, Heston convinced them that it would cause a social collapse. He 
argued that every right guaranteed in the Constitution depended on the American 
individual’s right to bear arms to protect it. Using an individualist interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights, inserting himself and his cause into biblical and civil religious 
narratives, he convinced many that the individual right to bear arms is a God-given right 
and that it is under threat from the enemies of the nation and the American way of life. 
 In my research, I was hoping that I would find a rhetorical formula for persuading 
Americans of the need for gun control. I didn’t find that. Obama’s choice to stop 
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attempting to persuade his opponents, and instead try to turn those who already supported 
gun control (an estimated 85% of the American public at the time (Goss, 2006)) to 
become gun control activists seemed reasonable.  But this strategy failed.  It failed 
because becoming a radical moderate is an oxymoron.   
  One reason I speculate that Obama failed is because gun control is not a personal 
issue to the majority of Americans who do not own a gun. Obama failed because no one 
knows, or even expects that gun control could save them from being a victim of violence. 
We do not think about the future in terms of policy choices in the present. For those who 
have experienced gun violence – such as the parents of mass shooting victims, they might 
guess that enacting gun control might save someone else’s life, but it won’t heal their 
own wounds or bring back their own children. None of us have a personal reason to 
become gun control activists. 
  This summer, the murder of George Floyd sent millions of protesters into the 
streets to protest police brutality. Police brutality is a personal issue in the USA. Though 
only about a thousand Americans a year are killed by police, tens of thousands more are 
injured: far more than those killed or injured in mass shootings (Number of Gun Deaths 
in 2020, 2020).  21% of African Americans say they, personally, have been a victim of 
police violence at least once in their lives. Though these numbers are smaller for people 
of other races, they are not insignificant (Palosky, 2020). The Black Lives Matter 
movement was able to take the amorphous issue of racism in the United States and focus 
on one aspect of it that many Americans have second-hand, if not first-hand, experience 
with. As I noted earlier, only 1% of gun deaths in the United States are the result of a 
mass shooting.  Yet gun control activists have focused their rhetoric on mass shootings 
 235 
and the control of weapons used in these shootings.  We may feel bad for a few moments; 
we may even feel afraid. But it is difficult to mobilize an audience around an issue which 
affects so few people in that audience.  Rhetoric is not just the art of persuasion, but also 
the art of making people give you some of their limited supply of time and attention. You 
only have to look to the reactions of people in states like Iowa in the beginning of the 
Covid-19 epidemic, when faraway New York City was being decimated, compared to 
now, when their own cities are being affected, to realize that we don’t have enough 
attention to spend on problems that concern people we don’t know.             
  Gun rights, on the other hand, are a personal issue. 30% of Americans report 
owning a gun, and 43% of Americans report living in a house with a gun (L. Said, 2019). 
From these numbers, I would guess that everyone in the USA knows someone who is 
afraid of losing their right to bear arms. On the other hand, there is no way of predicting 
with certainty who will become a victim of gun violence in the future. Data analysis can 
predict our chances of being a victim of gun violence if we live in a particular area: but it 
won’t tell us for sure. Even the most complex social forecasting cannot tell me that I, 
certainly, will be shot at a certain time at a certain place.  And therefore, no matter how 
sophisticated the computer model of the impacts of legislation, I will never know if a 
piece of gun control legislation would prevent me from being shot. Therefore, the issue is 
not a personal one for me. Meanwhile, gun owners know with certainty whether a 
particular piece of gun control legislation will affect them. It is not surprising that gun 
owners are more passionate about legislation than someone who guesses that they maybe, 
might, one day, perhaps be a victim.   
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 Rhetoricians need to discover a way to make gun control a personal issue for 
Americans. One manner of making it a personal issue is to endow it with sacred 
meaning.  Obama’s rhetoric attempted to do this. He invoked the sacred American value 
of protecting the family. However, this was still done as a reaction to mass shootings. 
Gun control needs to be part of a sustained set of values. In my historical review of gun 
laws in the USA, I did not find any gun control legislation that was enacted after mass 
shootings. Instead, as I noted, in the 1960s, a string of assassinations of political leaders 
including John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. led to strong gun regulations 
being passed by congress. Moreover, the most comprehensive gun regulations in the last 
half century came after the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan. However, Obama 
was not able to pass legislation after the Gabrielle Giffords shooting.  Any guess as to 
whether an attempted assassination of a higher profile politician or political activist 
would spark action on gun control would be pure speculation.  
 I began this investigation by noting how the Black Panthers had created the 
monster of the individualist interpretation of the Second Amendment.  The Black 
Panthers opened the flood gates in modern times, but as I came to believe through this 
investigation, both the collectivist and individualist interpretation of the Second 
Amendment are not a complete historical anomaly.  I asked how it was that the Second 
Amendment became so hallowed that even a group as radical as the Black Panthers could 
appeal to it to gain entrance to the state legislature while armed. I also asked why 
Americans don’t just change their Constitution. Through this investigation, I found the 
answer to both these questions in what I termed the American fundamentalist 
hermeneutic: the devotion to the original text – whether religious or legal. I found that 
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this American fundamentalist hermeneutic emerged from the covenant theology of the 
Puritans and commands that the nation must abide by the covenant of the Constitution.  If 
the government does not abide by this covenant, the people have a duty to rise up, or else 
the nation will be damned.  
 The American civil religion understands the US Constitution to be based in laws 
that are above human construction. I am not only speaking about American religious 
organizations, such as the Church of Latter Day Saints, which explicitly state that the 
Constitution of the United States of America was divinely inspired.  Instead, I am 
referring to the Lockean notion of natural laws and the belief that the rights enshrined in 
the Constitution are natural laws: ‘God-given rights’ – not social constructions.  This has 
made the Constitution of the United States a sacred document of the American civil 
religion.  When a nation sees its Constitution as a sacred text, then the answer to 
contemporary problems cannot be to change that text; rather, it must be to return to the 
text with an even more fundamentalist hermeneutic. Moreover, to change the text would 
collapse the epistemological framework of the nation.    
Implications 
In order to resolve this conflict, to explicate the manner in which the meaning of a 
text is encountered, it is necessary to move beyond the simplistic dichotomy 
between "objectivity" and "subjectivity. To recover some notion of legal 
objectivity without either making the ludicrous suggestion that legal texts are 
wholly unambiguous or simply surrendering to subjectivism requires an 
examination of the ontological question which Hans-Georg Gadamer's 
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hermeneutics poses: how is it that the world reveals meaning to its inhabitants?  
(Mootz, 1988, p. 527) 
 Even though I now believe that disarming individuals is unconstitutional, I don’t 
dismiss the idea of disarming Americans.  Why? Because, to me, the Constitution is not a 
sacred text. I do not approach the document with a fundamentalist hermeneutic.  But I 
now understand why it is so important to so many Americans.  Covenant theology is the 
epistemological basis of the nation of the United States of America.   
 The contemporary right in the USA assumes a fundamentalist hermeneutic in 
assuming that the Second Amendment was meant as an individual right for anyone to 
own a gun in order to protect themselves from ‘big government’ and from criminals. The 
contemporary left in the USA assumes a fundamentalist hermeneutic when they 
romanticize the intent of the Founding Fathers by assuming that the Second Amendment 
was meant as a collective right of the state militias to fight the British. Neither side 
recognizes the uncomfortable truth that the Second Amendment was meant to give white 
male citizens the right to bear arms in order to pursue happiness and maintain power 
through the appropriation of indigenous land and African slave labour.  As Roxanne 
Dunbar-Ortiz (2018, p. 127) writes: 
… because gun-control advocates erroneously misinterpret the Second 
Amendment provisions as being related only to militias as national guards, they 
delude themselves, failing to comprehend the history embedded in contemporary 
US culture and social relations.  
 American justice has always been, to more or less of an extent, vigilante justice 
(Hedges, 2018).  The story of the white teen, Kyle Rittenhouse, who, in August 2020 
 239 
took an AR-15 to a Black Lives Matter protest, is not a new one. From anti-British rebel 
militias, to post-civil war slave patrols, to the strike-breakers hired by the gilded-age 
robber-barons, the individual right to bear arms has been a staple of this vigilante 
justice.  As Dawson (2019, p. 11) writes, “The Second Amendment may offer a sense of 
meaning-making that allows men to feel like protectors of their families and their homes 
against an evil that cannot be contained by the rule of law-abiding citizens.” The distrust 
of government in the USA is not just a distrust of overreach, it is also a distrust that the 
government is capable of protecting its citizens against the (now mostly figurative) 
wilderness.  To these vigilantes, the right to bear arms is a God-given right and is 
therefore above secular law. 
 This sentiment is echoed by Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (2018).  Dunbar-Ortiz’s 
research and synthesis of primary documents changed my own understanding how 
individual gun rights were needed to establish and maintain colonial imperialism in what 
is now the United States.  She explains that the gun rights movement makes visible how 
racism and capitalism are celebrated together in America. Dunbar-Ortiz writes: “it was 
barely news when George Zimmerman openly auctioned the gun he used to kill Trayvon 
Martin, selling it for $250 000 dollars to a mother who bought the gun as a birthday 
present for her son” (p. 168). The rhetoric of gun rights, and the rhetoric of gun control, 
must be understood within a broader ideological system.  Only when both sides of the 
aisle confront this “text with context” can we expect reasonable gun laws in the United 
States of America. 
 In this dissertation, I looked at the rhetoric of the Second Amendment through the 
lens of the sacred rhetoric of civil religion. I stressed the point that sacred rhetoric 
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changes our mode of thinking from qualified to absolute. The sacred rhetoric of civil 
religion feels good. It feels good to think that you are right no matter what the facts are. 
But this kind of rhetoric doesn’t overcome political divides and it isn’t good at finding 
solutions. 
 In the wake of the Sandy Hook shooting, President Obama and Wayne La Pierre 
of the NRA both engaged in a discussion of gun reform.  In their discussion of “strategic 
maneuvering” in the gun control debate, Eckstein and Lefevere argue that we must move 
beyond pathos-filled rhetoric to reasoned debate.  Eckstein and Lefevre note that Obama 
started by assuming that guns are the cause of violence, thus advocating for more gun 
control. Many liberals, like Obama, take a technologically determinist view of guns: the 
gun makes an innocent, struggling, inner-city boy commit violence. The boy is a victim 
of circumstances, with no agency in the decision to become a hero or a thug.  While the 
political right in the USA take the other extreme of technological neutrality: the gun is a 
neutral tool, just like a pen.  One can use a pen to write a love poem, or one can use a pen 
to calculate the maximum number of Jews that can fit on a freight train to 
Auschwitz.  Just like the pen, the gun has no agency.  In short, guns don’t kill people, 
people kill people. 
 Contemporary philosophers of technology eschew such binary oppositional 
stances.  These extremes fail to take into account the circumstances of the gun’s 
production and the ideology of the society in which it exists (Feenberg, 1999). Weapons 
production is not just an important part of the American economy, as Chris Hedges 
explains, the gun “fools the disempowered into fetishizing weapons as a guarantor of 
political agency” (Hedges, 2018, para.1). Gun rights fit in with the atomized 
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individualistic ideology of the contemporary USA.  Mark Ames (2005; cited in Hedges) 
notes that guns are promoted as the source of political power in America. He writes, 
If you think guns, rather than concentrated wealth, equals political power, then 
you’d resent government power far more than you’d resent billionaires’ power or 
corporations’ hyper-concentrated wealth/power, because government will always 
have more and bigger guns. In fact, you’d see pro-gun, anti-government 
billionaires like the Kochs as your natural political allies in your gun-centric 
notion of political struggle against the concentrated gun power of government. 
(para. 2) 
 Lapierre argued that guns are neutral instruments without agency.  For Lapierre, 
the answer to the problem of American gun violence, therefore, cannot be found in 
limiting guns, but rather, changing people.  Eckstein and Lefevre note that “Neither 
Obama nor Lapierre was reasonable because they ignored the other’s starting point” 
(Hedges, 2018).  We cannot have reasoned debate if we cannot decide on whether guns 
kill people or people kill people.  
 More importantly, we cannot have reasoned debate if all we do is argue over 
interpretation the old covenant: the US Constitution and Bill of Rights.  The Israelites 
failed to uphold their covenant and so paradise was lost. For Christians, only the sacrifice 
of God himself could relieve them of their duties of the old covenant. With Christ’s blood 
their sins were washed away and a new covenant begun. Americans have failed in their 
covenant, and so, all the originalist interpretation of the old covenant will not help 
them.  America needs a new covenant. 
 242 
 For Gorski (2018), civil religion is the middle path between religious nationalism 
and what he refers to as “radical secularism”.  Similarly, Gehrig (1981) recognizes that 
civil religion appeals to the “everyday” American as it is a happy middle ground between 
fierce politics and fierce religion. The “civil religionist”, for Gorski, is someone who 
“sees the civic community as a positive good” (p. 15) and will “strive to build civic 
friendships with ideological opponents” (p. 16). In the current climate of hyper-
partisanism in the USA, I see the potential of civil religion to bridge the radical divide 
between conservative religious and liberal secular Americans.  However, this cannot be 
done if American civil religion clings to its fundamentalist hermeneutic. 
 It is possible to admire some of the actions of national heroes, such as the Framers 
of the Constitution, without assuming that the documents that they produced are too 
sacred to be altered. It is possible for nations with similar histories to the USA – such as 
the other former British colonies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – to honour 
their Protestant heritage, and to continue to believe in a foundation of natural laws, 
without applying a fundamentalist hermeneutic to their founding documents. 
 Before Americans make a new covenant, they must confront the reality of what 
the old covenant was built on. Historians such as Dunbar-Ortiz (2018) and Richard 
Slotkin (2000) argue that we must situate contemporary gun rhetoric in the larger myths 
regarding the necessity of violence to control indigenous and slave populations.  As 
Richard Slotkin writes in Regeneration Through Violence, the first of his trilogy on the 
mythology of the American West: “A people unaware of its myths is likely to continue 
living by them” (p. 4). As Slotkin argues, myth “reaches out of the past to cripple, 
incapacitate, or strike down the living (p.5).” But there is hope in the oft-quoted notion 
 243 
we will repeat the history that we do not learn.  If we learn from the past, and accept the 
affect it has on the present, then we can change the future. I have faith that once there is 
acceptance that the covenant of the USA, the Constitution, was written to create and 
uphold an imperialist white supremacist state, then, for most citizens of the USA, the idea 
that judges should approach the Constitution with a fundamentalist hermeneutic will 
dissolve. 
Gadamerian Hermeneutics and Gun Control as a Part of a National Process of 
Reckoning and Recovenanting 
 The Austrian sociologist Danielle Celermajer (2009) argues that nation states can 
“recovenant” through collective apology.  She sees that formally recognizing the sins of 
the past allow a nation to clarify its essential character in opposition to these sins.  In the 
wake of WWII, nations came to terms with their complicity with the Nazis through 
apology.  Celermajer argues that Chirac’s official apology for the Vichy era in France, in 
which he stated that the era was an afront to the essential character of the French nation, 
helped France define its modern identity in opposition to this era. More recently, nations, 
particularly those founded in colonialism such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa, 
have defined themselves anew through a truth and reconciliation processes. In admitting 
wrongdoing, these nations were reborn with new values better matching the moral 
character and diversity of their current inhabitants. 
  The United States of America has not gone through such a process.  There have 
been minor apologies such as George H. W. Bush’s apology for the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War Two, but there have been no apologies for 
America’s dual founding sins: slavery and the seizure of indigenous peoples’ land. For 
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there to be such a process, and a subsequent ‘recovenanting’, the USA must first come to 
terms with the sins of its civil religious heroes like Washington, Jefferson, and even 
Lincoln.  Perhaps then it can stop treating its civil religious canon as everlasting and 
unalterable divinely-inspired documents. To use the Judeo-Christian term, these are idols. 
It is not the letter of the text, but the spirit of the text that should be celebrated. 
  In this process of recovenanting, the USA could recommit itself to its founding 
ideals of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as well as the ideals the Puritans 
expressed in Winthrop’s A Model of Christian Charity.  Yes, Winthrop did speak of 
exceptionalism, but that exceptionalism was not because of the riches from appropriation 
of slave labour and indigenous lands.  Instead, it was an exceptionalism found in 
exceptional charity, communalism, and unity.  
…we must love brotherly without dissimulation, we must love one another with a 
pure heart fervently. We must bear one another’s burdens. We must not look only 
on our own things, but also on the things of our brethren (Winthrop, 1630, para. 
51). 
 De Tocqueville observed that religion kept American individualism in 
check.  Perhaps the insistence on the individual right to bear arms is a result of unchecked 
American individualism.  I am not proposing a return to an explicitly Christian America, 
but, as Bellah suggested, perhaps civil religion can serve the same purpose: to keep 
individualism in check. As we saw in the last chapter, Obama attempted to use the sacred 
rhetoric of civil religion to mobilize Americans to care for each other despite 
individualism. He failed. Perhaps he failed because Obama’s brand of civil religion still 
approaches everything with a fundamentalist hermeneutic.  Perhaps Obama’s brand of 
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civil religion failed because it attempted to rewrite history with the claim that the 
Founding Fathers wanted a collectivist interpretation of the right to bear arms. Perhaps a 
recovenanting is needed. 
The Australian Example 
 I would be remiss to conclude a discussion of gun control without discussing what 
has come to be called ‘the Australian example’.  After a horrific mass shooting in a 
popular tourist spot on the Australian island of Tasmania, the Prime Minister put forward 
a strict gun control bill which passed with support of all political parties as well as local 
governments.  An article in the Journal of the American Medical Association states: 
Following enactment of gun law reforms in Australia in 1996, there were no mass 
firearm killings through May 2016.  [Though overall firearm deaths were already 
in decline] there was a more rapid decline in firearm deaths between 1997 and 
2013 compared with before 1997 (cited in Dunbar-Ortiz, 2018, p. 196).  
These gun reforms did more than just completely stop mass shootings for a decade, they 
also prompted a decline in all causes of death including suicide, which was the largest 
cause of gun death in Australia, and, it should be noted, the largest cause of gun deaths in 
the USA (Gramlich, 2019). 
  Dunbar- Ortiz notes that prior to 1996, Australia had a gun culture similar to 
America.  It was among the top ten purchasers of personal firearms in the world, though 
it had no manufacturers (p. 197-198). Moreover, Australia had the same history of violent 
seizure of indigenous land. Yet, the US congress has never been able to pass gun laws 
like the Australian parliament has.  Dunbar-Ortiz writes:   
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Violence perpetrated by armed settlers, even genocide, were not absent in the 
other territories where the British erected settler-colonies – Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand… but the people of those polities never declared the gun a God-
given right; only the founding fathers of the United States did that (p. 202).    
Though many liberals disagree, Dunbar-Ortiz suggests that perhaps it is not the lobbying 
by the NRA and gun manufacturers that keeps America from passing gun laws.  While 
liberals like Obama blame the lobby efforts of these organization, Dunbar-Ortiz notes 
that the NRA is actually losing the membership of hunters and sportsman because they 
don’t want to be associated with the political right (p. 199). NRA membership has been 
declining since its high in the year 2000 (Coaston, 2019). Yet Congress has still not 
passed gun legislation. For Dunbar-Ortiz, gun culture is more fundamental to the USA 
than any lobbying organization. And until liberals start listening to radicals like Dunbar-
Ortiz, it will remain this way. 
 But Dunbar-Ortiz (2008) also remarks on one major difference between other 
settler-colonial states like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada: though all of these 
nations were, like the USA, founded by Anglo, settler colonists who appropriated land 
from indigenous people, these nations did not have “economies, governments, and social 
orders based on the enslavement of other human beings”.  More specifically, Dunbar-
Ortiz is referring to the importance of the labor of enslaved people on plantations in the 
southern states. She sees this as important because guns were needed to control the large 
number of enslaved people working under a single colonist.  
 Dunbar-Ortiz (2018) is proposing that the necessity of guns to the economic 
system of the early USA is what makes the gun culture so strong.  While the majority of 
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this dissertation has stressed the historico-theological determinants of contemporary gun 
laws, recognizing the truth in Dunbar-Ortiz’s economic determinist model of cultural 
value reproduction is crucially important in understanding America’s relationship with 
guns.  
 In the field communication, we are familiar, and even comfortable with 
technological determinist analysis of culture – from Harold Innis’s analysis of the 
importance of the railroad in Canada, to Marshal McLuhan’s mantra of the “medium is 
the message”.  Yet we are still hesitant to embrace more orthodox Marxist economic 
analyses of culture.  Dunbar makes an excellent case for the importance of recognizing 
the present day impacts of the economic model of the plantation. The economic system 
based on one (white) plantation owner overseeing an economic machine which 
expropriated labor from sometimes hundreds of enslaved people caused the early USA to 
generate wealth far beyond that generated in the other former British colonies of the New 
Zealand, Australia, and Canada with their small-scale direct resource extraction 
economies.  This economic system could not have been possible without firearms.  And 
just as the wealth generated from this system is still visible in the opulent planation 
weddings and the Ivy League university campuses, it is still visible in American gun 
culture.  
 Though the institution of chattel slavery was forbidden in parts of what is now 
Canada, New Zealand, and Australia since the late 18th century26, slavery continued to 
exist in some parts of what is in now Australia, New Zealand, and Canada until the 
British Slavery Abolition Act of 1833. However, the economies of nations themselves 
                                                   
26 Slavery was abolished in Upper-Canada (what is now Ontario) in 1793.  
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were never based on the system of many enslaved people working under one colonist. 
Instead, slaves in Australia27, Canada, and New Zealand were mainly used for household 
labour. The African-Canadian historian Natasha L. Henry notes that the majority of 
slaves in what is now Canada worked in domestic houses cooking, cleaning, and taking 
care of other people’s children. In fact, in New France (what is now Quebec) the term 
“domestiques” became a synonymous with African and Indigenous enslaved.  In 
Australia, indigenous enslaved people were transported to colonial centers to be used as 
porters, household servants, and sex slaves. The reason this is important is because of 
how easy it would be for a household of colonists to control a few household servants 
compared to the difficulty of one slave master expropriating the labour of perhaps dozens 
of enslaved people.  Dunbar-Ortiz argues that guns were absolutely integral to the 
plantation slavery whereas they were not necessary to keep domestic servants ‘in line’. 
Thus, guns facilitated the plantation system and the culture of the American south. There 
would be no “Gone with the Wind” without guns.  
 Though some of the men who formed the first governments of  Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada had familial ties to the transatlantic slave trade28, they were not 
plantation owners and slave masters like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.   
The first Prime Ministers of New Zealand, Canada, and Australia were city-dwelling 
lawyers who, perhaps, never touched a gun. Colonists in these territories did not demand 
                                                   
27 It should be noted that Australia was founded as a penal colony and relied on the labor of these convicts 
– whether this constitutes slave labor is debatable.  Dunbar-Ortiz does not discuss this.  
28 For example, recently released documents show that Sir John A. McDonald’s father received 
compensation from the British government for freeing enslaved people from his plantation in the 
Caribbean.  
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gun rights as fervently as those in the USA as their economies did not depend on them.  
For Dunbar-Ortiz, the fact that the saints of the civil religion of Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand were not plantation-owners who depended on guns to keep enslaved people 
working, makes a difference in contemporary attitudes towards the necessity of guns in 
society.  Though we might argue with Dunbar-Ortiz as to whether this explains the 
difference in attitudes towards guns in former British colonies today, what is clear is that 
the USA must come to terms with the importance of guns in the perpetuation of slavery 
in early America and the fact that current legislation, including the Second Amendment, 
was put in place to help uphold the institution of slavery.   
Conclusion 
To recover some notion of legal objectivity without either making the ludicrous 
suggestion that legal texts are wholly unambiguous or simply surrendering to 
subjectivism requires an examination of the ontological question which Hans-
Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics poses: how is it that the world reveals meaning to 
its inhabitants? It is not necessary to fully develop an ontology -- that is a task 
reserved for the Heideggers of the world -- but only to bring Gadamer's ontology 
to bear on the problem of legal interpretation. (Mootz, 1988, p. 526) 
 
 In the preface to her work Approaching the US Constitution, American legal 
scholar Kelly L. Hunter (2014) recounts her recent sabbatical in New Zealand. With 
surprise, Hunter announces that “New Zealanders were able to protect minority rights 
rather well without the benefit of an American-style Constitution and without allowing 
judges any authority over their legislature whatsoever”(p. vii)! She seems absolutely 
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shocked that “Kiwis are able [to] take rights quite seriously without the help of activist 
judges” (p. viii). 
  For most citizens of democracies, the idea that in New Zealand an ombudsman 
— who has no legal authority — spends time understanding the effects of policy on the 
lives of people, and then makes recommendations to those who have legal authority, and 
that these recommendations affect laws, seems perfectly reasonable.  But for Hunter this 
was quite a shock! Having spent her adult life studying the American legal system in 
traditional institutions, Hunter believed that change could only come from partisan, 
activist judges and others with legal authority.  However, Hunter saw with her own eyes 
that apolitical civil servants were able to make changes. Moreover, they were able to 
make changes that reflected the changing needs of the nation. As she writes: “Rather than 
relying solely on legal authority, Aeteoroans [the Maori name for New Zealanders] sense 
that democracy needs a robust and active living conscience”. You can almost see the 
raised eyebrows of her surprise. Hunter argues that New Zealanders “sense what the 
apostle Paul wrote in his letter to the Corinthians, that where the letter of the law kills, the 
spirit of the law gives life” (p. viii). In an incredibly powerful about face, Hunter admits 
“it began to look as if the very presence of the U.S. Constitution was a significant, if not 
primary, source of the problem” (original emphasis, p. ix). 
  The authors of the The Federalist Papers (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison) feared 
that, for the same reasons that I explained in my discussion of the contradiction between 
natural law and democracy, a written Constitution could be antidemocratic.  However, 
Hunter (2014) explains that the authors of The Federalist Papers, 
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also understood that the way we approach the Constitution matters greatly. If the 
supreme law of the land is reduced to a legal document then lawyers and judges 
can be erroneously empowered to use legal technicalities to manipulate the 
Constitution in ways that serve potentially nefarious ends, violating the very 
natural law principles that inspired the Constitution’s creation… If on the other 
hand the Constitution is viewed as more than a legal document, as standing for 
something bigger than law constructed by human hands, it can actually play an 
important role in furthering the pursuit of classic liberal natural law justice 
without threatening key democratic principles.  And when approaching the 
Constitution this way, the US Supreme Court can provide the same function as 
New Zealand’s ombudsman does – it can serve as the nation’s collective 
conscience.  (pp. xiii – xiv) 
 In religious terms, this is the difference between worshipping idols and 
worshipping ideals.  The fundamentalist hermeneutic worships the idols instead of paying 
attention to the ideals. But Hunter’s (2014) observations from New Zealand show us that 
this doesn’t have to be the case: the USA can continue to draw on the ideals of the 
Founding Fathers and move from a fundamentalist hermeneutic to a constructive 
hermeneutic. 
 Gadamer likened the hermeneutic experience to that of play: when we play a game, 
we do not control the game, but rather, transcend it (Stiver, 1996, p. 92).  The game cannot 
be completely controlled despite the most meticulous method.  Rather, the truth of the game 
is revealed in the interaction of the game and the player.   
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 Gadamer uses this metaphor to explore how neither author nor interpreter control the 
meaning of the text.  Contra Schleiermacher, Gadamer did not believe that either the author 
or the interpreter could step out of history and be sure of authorial intent; rather, as the 
American theologian Dan Stiver explains, for Gadamer “history and tradition prepare us to 
know and to understand” (p. 92). Understanding a text without acknowledging our own 
part that we play in the game is impossible.   As another American theologian, David 
Klemm (1986, p. 181) poetically noted, understanding is the “splendid magic of 
immediately mirroring the present in the past and the past in the present”. The 
interpreter’s history shapes the text and the text shapes the interpreter’s history.  The 
fusion of horizons is necessary for any understanding.   
 As Gadamer explains (2013) our horizon is the limit of our perspective. Different 
horizons offer different perspectives. A fusion of horizons via a constructive hermeneutic 
does not dismiss other’s perspectives as untrue; instead, it recognizes that they come from 
a different vantage point: it recognizes the historicity and situatedness of traditions and 
texts.  The USA does not have to ‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’ but can draw 
on the ideals of the Founding Fathers without approaching the Constitution with 
hermeneutic fundamentalism.  Like Gadamer suggests, with a fusion of horizons we can 
move on from the search for authorial intent towards understanding of meaning.  
 Hermeneutics is a philosophy of communication which begins with the question 
of interpretation and learns from difference.  For philosopher of communication 
Ronald Arnett (1986), a constructive hermeneutic focuses on future possibilities, not 
present shortcomings. Rather than tear down through deconstruction, a constructive 
hermeneutic engages with historical tradition or traditions with a dialogic openness to 
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broaden horizons. As Arnett (2003) explains, a constructive hermeneutic does not claim 
that it can stand above or outside of history to inform the ignorant. Instead, it situates 
itself within history. 
 The lack of a covenantal constitution in nations like New Zealand and Canada has 
not left them without a moral rudder. Instead, the ideals of their Founding Fathers, not so 
different from the Enlightenment ideals of the Founding Fathers of the USA, have been 
strengthened by the contributions of immigrants, and most recently, the promotion of the 
ideals of their indigenous nations. The recent covid-19 pandemic shows how the people 
of these nations came together to protect the lives of the most vulnerable, acting quickly 
enough to save lives and protect the economy. Guided by their founding ideals of ‘order, 
peace, and good-governance’, with a constructive hermeneutic the governments and the 
people incorporated emerging scientific knowledge and came to reasonable solutions.  
 Hunter (2014) concedes, as Rawls (1999) understood, we need to have a common 
theory of justice to have a well-ordered society; however, she writes, we also “must 
engage in ethical dialogue.  We limit ourselves in the most condemning way when we 
replace ethical debate with a debate over what the words of a text requires of us legally” 
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